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Drawing on the concept of antifragility as a lens, this thesis explores how once bankrupted 
business venture owners bounce back to venture again. Examined through the prism of 
‘microstoria’: the creation and sharing of contemporaneous storylines by people frequently 
overlooked in entrepreneurship research, the research focused on the narrative accounts of 
twenty UK-based entrepreneurs who have come out of bankruptcy to venture again. Data for 
the empirical inquiry were chiefly collected using the semi-structured interviews and publicly 
available documents on entrepreneurship and bankruptcy in the UK. The thesis makes 
contribution to knowledge in three main areas. First, it demonstrates that the once bankrupted 
business owners go through a series of three stages to recover from their bankruptcy entailing: 
determining for the cause of the failure, embracing negative bankruptcy experiences, and 
undertaking a series of coping measures. This enables them to develop an internal attributional 
style by taking control of their actions, increase their self-efficacy, and benefit from the 
bankruptcy by developing antifragility as an ‘entrepreneurial competence’. Second, this 
competence allows the venture founders to engage in long-term reflexive and experiential 
learning behaviours which allow the business owners to prospectively sense-make and form 
deeper high-order moments of learning which are harnessed to restart. Third, a range of 
supporting organising practices were found to impact the development of antifragility. A 
theoretical grounded model has been formed through a synthesis of the research findings. The 
model encompasses the steps and factors involved in returning to entrepreneurship post-
bankruptcy by forming antifragility as an organising capability. A series of practical 
implications, and some relevant policy implications of the study are set out to support the 
effective management of entrepreneurship and bankruptcy in practice. 
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“Failure is the opportunity to begin again more intelligently” (Henry Ford) 
Venture founders who cannot meet their financial objectives to run their firm and go through 
bankruptcy, a documented financial event that is linked with poor monetary performance, can 
often feel mentally exhausted due to the humiliation, shame and guilt associated with their 
business downfall (Jenkins et al., 2014; Ucbasaran et al., 2013). Unfortunately, the author has 
witnessed a family member go through the traumas that are linked with an entrepreneurial 
failure which resulted in bankruptcy. In recent years, entrepreneurs and scholars alike have 
recognised that irrespective of the positives of a venture demise, a business failure that ends in 
bankruptcy can be severely distressing (Ucbasaran et al., 2013; Walsh, 2017; Lattacher and 
Wdowiak, 2020). A vast number of works have uncovered how emotionally destructive, 
socially devastating, and physically damaging the firm collapse experience is (Singh et al., 
2007; Van Kesteren et al., 2017). In the most severe cases, failed business owners have been 
found to suffer from episodes of depression, worse yet, develop phobias as well as take part in 
drug abuse and even engage in acts of criminal behaviour, such as murder (Singh et al., 2007; 
Smith and McElwee, 2011). Several newspaper articles have also reported that business owners 
have resorted to suicide due to the burden of venture failure and bankruptcy (Mampatta, 2020; 
Gourguechon, 2018).  
Unfortunately, the last few decades have seen a rise in uncertain and competitive economic 
climates which have increased the risk of failure of interneural pursuits within organisations 
and led to many entrepreneurs having no option but to discontinue their venture (McGrath, 
1999; Amankwah and Wang, 2019). Unsurprisingly, statistics demonstrate that at least half of 
firms fail in their first five years (Anyadike-Danes and Hart, 2018). Further, given the current 
global pandemic, an entrepreneur is likely to face issues in their ability to cope and maintain a 
fruitful business (Bartz and Winkler, 2016; Manolova et al., 2020; Cowling et al., 2020). This 
could mean that business owners are currently even more likely to face a high probability of a 
venture demise and bankruptcy (Nummela et al., 2016; Martinez et al., 2019). Expectedly, the 
detrimental nature of business failure and bankruptcy can reduce the chance of an entrepreneur 
resurfacing within the entrepreneurial ecosystem (Walsh, 2017). In this situation, both 




not be fully exploited in the form of another enterprise and the dissemination of such learning 
could be obstructed (Shepherd 2003; Ucbasaran et al., 2010).  
However, failed business owners frequently become ‘serial entrepreneurs’ as they often make 
use of lessons from their previous failures to shape their subsequent venture successes (Stoke 
and Blackburn, 2002; McGrath, 1999; Sarasvathy, 2004). Studies that focus on how company 
founders can restart post failure and bankruptcy are therefore crucial to understand how certain 
entrepreneurs are able to do so for several reasons. First, such work can hold powerful 
implications for policymakers who wish to design schemes that can support entrepreneurs in 
contemporary times where they may face hardships (Williams and Vorley, 2015; Cheung, 
2014). This is especially important due to the current turbulent economic landscape where 
venture failure and bankruptcies are increasingly likely (Amankwah et al., 2020). Further, work 
on entrepreneurial re-entry post venture failure can help policymakers ensure policies are put 
in place to encourage second-chance entrepreneurship as well as prevent business failure. This 
is critical, as exemplified by the European Commission’s ‘Second Chance’ policy which 
endeavours to ameliorate the negative social implications of venture failure given the growing 
importance of the matter (European Commission, 2011). Second, this type of research is 
needed as it can aid educational practitioners in their pursuits to guide future entrepreneurs 
(Walsh, 2017). Third, such work can also assist venture owners to deal with their livelihood 
collapsing and ways in which they can pre-empt failure by creating sustainable firms. In effect, 
this can benefit the economy in the long-term (Walsh, 2017; Acs et al., 2008).  
Over time, entrepreneurship and management scholars have shifted their focus from primarily 
examining entrepreneurial successes to paying more scholarly attention to exploring the impact 
of managing a venture failure and bankruptcy (Omerede, 2020; Lattacher and Wdowiak, 2020). 
To date, such work has made several meaningful contributions to the field. Yet, the research in 
this field requires theoretical development (Byrne and Shepherd, 2015; Lattcher and Wdowiak, 
2020). Moreover, there is much about the important topic that remains hidden (Hessels et al., 
2011) and this could be due to the work being narrowly researched across three research areas: 
1) The antecedents of a business failure, primarily paying attention to an entrepreneurs’ view 
on the cause of the company demise (Mellahi and Wilkinson; 2004; Amakwah-Amoah, 2015).  
2) The experiences of an entrepreneurial collapse, mainly from the lens of the firm owner 




3) The use of coping and learning mechanisms to deal with the venture collapse (Amankwah-
Amoah et al., 2018; Schermuly et al., 2020; Walsh 2017). 
Within the first area of research, scholars have focussed on how business owners attribute 
blame towards their failure (Heider, 1958) alongside examining the genuine causes of the 
business collapse (Nummela et al., 2016; Amankwah-Amoah, 2016; Al Shami et al., 2019). 
Research has found that an entrepreneurs’ perception of the causes of their firm demise can 
influence how they cope (Cardon et al., 2011; Kibler et al., 2017) and impact how they learn 
from the firm collapse as well as develop their consecutive firm (Mantere et al., 2013; 
Amankwah-Amoah 2015; Yamakawa and Cardon 2015; Yamawaka et al., 2015). Beyond these 
works, it is worth pointing out that there has been a renewed interest in investigating the range 
of factors which can influence the antecedents of failure. This includes the influence of gender 
(Watson, 2003; Justo et al., 2015; May et al., 2020), ethnicity and age (Headd, 2003; Mendy 
and Hack-Polay 2018; Hack-Polay et al., 2020) alongside their levels of human capital 
(Wennberg et al., 2010) which entails their level of educational experience (Headd, 2003; Liao 
et al., 2008) and geographical location (Cardon et al., 2011). Hence, adding another layer to 
the intricate research on the antecedents of failure. In sum, the evidence from the works on the 
implications of a firm owner’s impact of their attributional style has provide useful knowledge 
on the heterogeneity in failed firm owner’s attributional style as well as the consequences this 
may have on one’s ability to restart a venture. Yet additional work is required to deeply 
understand the connection between the processes. 
Within the second area of research, frequent attempts have been made to investigate the 
experiences of entrepreneurial failure which have revealed the various effects of a venture 
demise and bankruptcy (Heinze, 2013; Van Kesteren et al., 2017; Ucbasaran et al., 2013). 
Many studies have provided observations on how firm owners handle the stigma associated 
with their firm downfall (Singh et al., 2007; Shepherd and Haynie, 2011; Walsh 2017; Klimas 
et al., 2020) and the impact this has on restarting a firm (Simmons et al., 2014). Another area 
of work has explored the adverse psychological and physiological effects of a firm failure that 
entrepreneurs deal with (Shepherd et al., 2009; Jenkins et al., 2010). Evidence in this domain 
has revealed the issues failed firm owners face in terms of their mental and physical health 
(Singh et al., 2007; Van Kesteren et al., 2017; Fisch and Block, 2020). Besides this, several 
scholars have investigated the financial issues associated with a venture failure and bankruptcy 
(Ucbasaran et al., 2013). Studies have specifically examined the hardships firm owners 




bankruptcy (Mathur, 2013; Cusin and Maymo, 2016).  Despite these negative effects of venture 
failure, the second theme within this stream of literature has explored the positives of a venture 
demise experience (Omerode, 2002; Klimas et al., 2020). Scholars have also noted that how a 
failed and bankrupted entrepreneur appraises a situation in relation to their wellbeing (Lazarus, 
1991), may influence the amount of grief they experience (Jenkins et al., 2010; Jenkins et al., 
2014; Jenkins and McKelvie., 2017).  
Another increasingly important research theme within this second stream of literature has 
uncovered how a firm owner’s identity impacts their experiences. For example, studies have 
analysed how a firm owner’s age (Dias and Teixera, 2017; Baù et al., 2017; Lin and Wang, 
2019), gender and sexuality (Shepherd and Patzelt, 2015; Simmons et al., 2019) alongside their 
education experiences (Mayr and Mitter, 2014; Espinoza-Benavides and Diaz, 2019; Amaral 
et al., 2011) as well as their spirituality (Singh et al., 2016) can influence their ability to bounce 
back from a firm collapse. Going further, other literature in this area, has investigated 
geographical and institutional factors in relation to a firm owner’s experience of failure. Such 
works have highlighted that not all entrepreneurs endure stigma across the globe due to 
differing cultural attitudes (Gratzer, 2001; Erfat, 2006; Cardon et al., 2011). A considerable 
amount of literature has also been documented on the connection between the leniency of 
bankruptcy policies and restarting a firm in different countries (Lee et al., 2007; Lee et al., 
2011; Peng et al., 2010). Studies have shown how bankruptcy policies can subsequently 
influence the speed and likelihood of rebounding to venture again (Tabb, 2019; Eklund et al., 
2020).  
Overall, one may decipher that a failed entrepreneur’s experiences, which are drawn from 
several factors, play a key part in determining whether they are able to launch another firm 
again. Yet, the literature has not examined how one is able to mitigate the social, psychological, 
and financial impact of their venture demise in enough depth which would be valuable to 
examine further. Moreover, additional work is required to analyse the relationships between 
the effects of venture failure coupled with the influence of identity and geographical factors in 
relation to an entrepreneur’s ability to restart a venture. Further, it would be valuable to 
determine the positives of venture failure and bankruptcy in greater depth. Such positives can 
include how failed entrepreneurs are able to use their experiences to potentially identify an 




Beyond looking at an entrepreneur’s experiences of failure, the third research stream that 
scholars are currently investigating is about how business owners overcome a venture demise 
and bankruptcy. A theme within this stream of literature have looked at the coping mechanisms 
failed entrepreneurs use. Studies have researched how business owners self-reflect (Shepherd, 
2003; Cope, 2011) and make sense (Mandl et al., 2016; Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2018) of 
their firm collapse in combination with other coping mechanisms. Other research has gone on 
to highlight the practical coping mechanisms firm owners use (Singh et al., 2007; Schermuly 
et al., 2020) and identity related coping mechanisms to overcome the stigma associated with 
their bankruptcy and firm failure (Shepherd and Haynie 2011; Singh et al., 2015; Kibler et al., 
2017). Besides this, a few works have touched upon how entrepreneurs use emotional 
regulation, which involves a process of managing emotions and when to have them, in 
combination with self-reflection to cope with their failure and learn from it (Byrne and 
Shepherd, 2015; He et al., 2018; Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2018). Collectively, the literature 
in this area has begun to develop knowledge on the range of coping mechanisms that business 
owners engage in to overcome their failure and bankruptcy, although further works are required 
to continue to deepen one’s understanding on the matter. 
Building on the literature on how firm owners cope, another developing theme within the third 
stream of research examines the role of a failed firm owner’s emotions, such as their resilience, 
in relation to their learning and coping (Ucbasaran et al., 2013; Shepherd et al., 2016; Corner 
et al, 2017). Within this theme of studies, entrepreneurial restarters following a business 
collapse are often likely to be those who display higher levels of optimism and confidence 
(Ucbasaran et al., 2006; Ucbasaran et al., 2010; Hayward et al., 2010). Whilst positive emotions 
can be valuable to learning, other evidence has conveyed how grief, negative emotions, and a 
narcissistic personality can impede a business owner’s failure learning and consequently their 
restart (see Ucbasaran et al., 2011; Lafuente et al., 2019; Shepherd 2003; Liu et al., 2019). 
Besides this, researchers have further examined the consequences of how a venture founder 
attributes the cause of their business collapse in relation to rebounding to venture again (Eggers 
and Song, 2015; Walsh, 2017). Yet, notwithstanding the valuable research conducted, the 
empirical work on how an entrepreneurs’ emotions affect their learning and coping from a 
venture demise has only scratched the surface of knowledge on the matter (Lattacher and 
Wdowiak, 2020; Tipu, 2020). 
Within the third stream of research on overcoming entrepreneurial venture failure, another key 




(Shepherd, 2013). Studies have focussed on the processes entrepreneurs embark on to learn 
gradually and have produced several useful models on the phenomenon (Lattacher and 
Wdowiak, 2020). Central to this area of research is that business owners utilise both reflective 
(Minniti and Bygrave, 2001; Pretorius and Le Roux, 2011; Frota Vasconcellos Dias and 
Marten, 2019) and experiential learning methods (Cope 2003; Ekanem and Wyer, 2007; Cope, 
2011). Interestingly, not all firm owners may learn in the long-term which may impact their 
ability to restart a venture again (Parker, 2013; Singh et al., 2015).  
However, other works within this area of overcoming business failure and bankruptcy have 
notably examined how learning has been used to identify the opportunity to restart a firm 
(Ucbasaran et al., 2009; Acheampong and Tweneboah-Koduah 2018; He et al., 2020), develop 
an enterprise (Stam et al., 2008; Nielson and Sarasvathy 2016), and form valuable 
entrepreneurial skills (Minello, 2014; Frota Vasconcellos Dias and Martens, 2019). Contrary 
to this heralded view that business owners learn from failure, even in the short-term, a string 
of studies have called out that venture founders may not always develop valuable knowledge 
nor competencies, and in some instances more likely to fail again (Gottschalk et al., 2017; Van 
Kesteren et al., 2017). Interestingly, another growing theme of literature has highlighted that a 
venture founder’s ethnicity, culture, and education can influence their ability to learn (Mengy 
and Hack-Polay 2018; Wei et al., 2019; He et al., 2020).  
Collectively, extant research on coping and learning from a company failure has provided 
useful explanations on the matter. Yet, a more thorough understanding is required to grasp how 
one copes with bankruptcy, the order of the various coping mechanisms used and the length of 
a previously bankrupted entrepreneurs’ recovery. Further, it would be beneficial to identify the 
precise role of an entrepreneurs’ emotions in conjunction to how they cope and learn. Another 
challenge with this research is that it is not completely clear how and why certain entrepreneurs 
utilise their failure learnings in the long-term to restart a firm, whilst others may not. Moreover, 
additional empirical data is required on how factors can exactly impact one’s learning from 
failure and bankruptcy, given the limited literature on the matter as well as the value of 
exploring the topic. 
In sum, upon reflection of the helpful knowledge scholars have provided on the complex nature 
of business failure, there are an array of future research ideas across a range of topics to advance 
one’s understanding on the subject. First, within each of three research steams there are areas 




1. Within the first stream of works, it would be beneficial to understand the role of a 
previously bankrupted firm owner’s attributional style in relation to their experiences, 
coping and learning from their bankruptcy.  
2. Within the second stream of literature, a more coherent understanding on the exact 
experiences of a firm owner’s failure and bankruptcy as well as the implications this 
has in relation to one’s ability to develop the opportunity to restart a firm would be 
useful. Hence, further research can help to truly form an understanding of the varied 
experiences and behaviours undertaken to deal with bankruptcy. 
3. Lastly, within the domain of overcoming business failure, it would be helpful to build 
on works on how a once bankrupted business owner is able to cope and learn in relation 
to their emotional functioning in greater detail. Additionally, it would be valuable to 
understand whether firm owners genuinely learn in the long-term from their venture 
failures and bankruptcy as well as the exact processes involved (Van Kesteren et al., 
2017; Gottschalk et al., 2017). Along the same lines, it would be useful to understand 
the learning trajectories that work most optimally for once bankrupted entrepreneurs.  
Besides the above, regardless of valuable attempts to integrate differing streams of research 
(e.g, Byrne and Shepherd., 2015; He et al., 2018), one major area to build upon prior works is 
the formation of more concrete links between the streams of literature to build a clearer picture 
of how one can restart a firm after a venture blunder, in particular the cases which ended in 
bankruptcy. This entails further research between the: (1) perceived and genuine antecedents 
of venture failure; (2) experiences of a firm demise; (3) emotional coping and long-term 
learning trajectories from a venture collapse. It would be valuable to empirically explore the 
inter-relationships between these constructs alongside the influence of contributing factors 
which impact a business owner’s ability to restart an enterprise. In doing so, one can obtain a 
more organised viewpoint of the connections between the dynamic processes involved in 
bouncing back from a venture failure and bankruptcy. 
Second, another research idea to enrich current work on entrepreneurial failure and bankruptcy, 
involves the use of an alternative theoretical lens which can help to provide further clarification 
to some of these inconsistencies and the research areas that require development, by offering a 
fresh perspective to the matter. This is important given that several works have heavily relied 
on institutional related theories (Lee et al., 2011; Eberhart et al., 2017; Peng et al., 2010) and 
the entrepreneurial learning theory (Byrne and Shepherd 2015; He et al., 2018; Amankwah-




Mathur, 2013; Cusin and Maymo, 2016). The frequent use of these types of theories could be 
due to the result that they can provide useful explanations of entrepreneurial failure responses. 
Yet, this is also often problematic as it does not always generate the deeper explanations about 
why certain business owners are able to bounce back from bankruptcy which is an intricate 
matter.  
Third, despite several useful qualitative studies conducted in the domain of venture failure, the 
bulk of works, precisely, the studies that examine learning from failure are largely based on 
quantitative measures (Lattacher and Wdowisak, 2020). Such quantitative studies have not 
been able to provide thorough conceptual evidence required to explain the full extent of the 
learning processes following an entrepreneurial demise which ends in bankruptcy. This is an 
issue as one cannot form conclusive evidence and accordingly, additional rich qualitative work 
on the subject can help advance the subject. 
Lastly, a significant concern about prior empirical works in the venture failure arena is that 
they do not always include entrepreneurs who have not been legally bankrupted as part of their 
samples of participants. Hence, there is not as much known about how and why certain 
previously bankrupted business owners are able to launch another firm (Ucbasaran, et al., 2013; 
Yamawaka and Cardon, 2015). Irrespective of the potential sampling challenges associated 
with including previously bankrupted business owners in studies, by not involving them this 
could be highly problematic given the potential difference in their venture failure experiences 
in contrast to failed non-bankrupted entrepreneurs (Sellerberg and Leppänen, 2012; Van 
Kesteren et al., 2017). 
This study seeks to answer the current calls for an integrated approach to examining the 
accounts of the once bankrupted business owners to develop current theoretical understanding 
on the matter. Specifically, deeply exploring ‘how’ and ‘when’ certain venture founders were 
able to restart a firm post-bankruptcy, as well as investigating ‘what’ practices enabled and 
impeded once bankrupted business owners to restart a firm. This entails, focussing on a 
business owner’s emotions during their (1) failure and declaration of bankruptcy, (2) the 
outcomes of such failure events, (3) the launch of a subsequent venture to present-day. First, 
an analysis of the causes and experiences of venture failure and bankruptcy events will be 
obtained. Sequentially, an explanation of how the entrepreneurs coped with the firm collapse, 
bankruptcy and the related consequences linked to these incidents will be captured. Next, a 




processes involved in order to restart a firm will be garnered. This will be examined in 
connection to the causes and experiences of their firm demise and the failure coping 
mechanisms that the once bankrupted entrepreneurs engage in. Lastly, an analysis of the 
contributing practices which aided and hindered the restart process will be provided, such as 
examining the exact role of the venture founders’ emotional functioning.  
This thesis aims to explore these research areas using an alternative overarching theoretical 
lens of antifragility (Taleb, 2012). Antifragility is the precise opposite to being fragile (Taleb, 
2012). Individuals, systems, and organisations that display antifragile properties reap benefits 
from sources of pain which makes them stronger (Taleb, 2012). This differs from the resilient 
who tolerate pain, and the fragile who get weaker under strain (Taleb, 2012). Hence, those who 
exhibit antifragile properties can handle a previous stressor better in the future. Alongside 
antifragility, other theoretical concepts will be applied to form the overarching theoretical gaze 
of antifragility. The concept of self-efficacy which is described as one’s belief in themselves 
and is a component of the social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1977) will also be utilised. This is 
a useful concept that has been identified to have an impact on how individuals view incidents 
of failure (Shepherd et al., 2009). Besides this, the attribution style theory (Heider, 1958; 
Weiner, 1992) which is used to explain how individuals assign reasoning for the existence of 
events will be drawn on as well. The attributional style theory has been recognised as a core 
concept that influences how a firm owner is able to cope and learn from their venture demise 
(e.g Mantere et al., 2013; Yamakawa and Cardon, 2015; Kibler et al., 2017; Kibler et al., 2020). 
Taken as a whole, the use of multiple theories is recommended as highlighted by other scholars 
(see Walsh, 2017; Jenkins et al., 2010; Walsh and Cunningham, 2017).  
The use of self-efficacy and attributional style theory alongside the primary overarching 
theoretical lens of antifragility provides a multifaceted perspective to understand how once 
bankrupt enterprise owners bounce back. Additionally, the approach is a suitable theoretical 
lens for four reasons. First, each concept places a focus on how individuals react, especially 
antifragilty, and taken together this can potentially provide a unique gaze to understand how 
entrepreneurs have been able to overcome and benefit from their business failure and 
bankruptcy which are associated with adverse implications (Heinze, 2013; Sellerberg and 
Leppänen, 2012; Van Kesteren et al., 2017). Second, the lens can help to offer a more granular 
explanation of the emotional resources that once bankrupted firm owners possess to restart a 
firm post-bankruptcy. Third, the concepts, primarily antifragilty, can help to explain how and 




Fourth, the concepts together can help to shed further light onto how a business owner is able 
to cope and learn from their venture demise and bankruptcy. In this regard, the research 
questions driving the empirical inquiry are: 
1) How does entrepreneurial antifragility come to be identified and labelled in discourse 
on restarting a business venture after bankruptcy? 
2) When and how does entrepreneurial antifragility lead to the identification of 
opportunities for new business start-up post-bankruptcy?  
3) What are the organising practices that enable (or impede) the entrepreneurial 
antifragility required to restart a business venture after bankruptcy? 
The three research questions provide the basis for in-depth research inquiry of the firm owner’s 
accounts of their venture restart. The first research question enables one to garner how precisely 
an entrepreneur can reach a stage where they have recovered from the venture demise. This is 
valuable given that the grief a firm owner may experience could hinder their motivation to 
bounce back (Shepherd, 2003). The second research question allows one to ascertain when a 
once bankrupt entrepreneur can re-enter the entrepreneurial ecosystem or not, which could 
involve shedding light onto the convoluted processes of learning (Shepherd, 2013; Cope, 2011; 
Singh et al., 2015). The last research question provides detailed knowledge on the exact impact 
of other factors which influence one’s ability to restart post business failure (Mengy and Hack-
Polay 2018; Wei et al., 2019; He et al., 2020) and bankruptcy. 
Importantly, the research questions can be described as three research objectives: 
1) Explore how previously bankrupted entrepreneurs are able to develop the capability to 
restart a venture. 
2) Understand when and how firm owners are able to identify an opportunity to re-enter 
entrepreneur post-bankruptcy. 
3) Obtain insights into the practices that prompt and discourage business owners to 
rebound to venture again following bankruptcy. 
In terms of methodology, the study adopted a qualitative research design. Specifically, the 
‘microstoria’ approach has been taken to study the narratives of the research participants. 
Microstoria entails exploring the stories of “hidden” individuals who typically do not meet the 
traditional realms of scholarly research, even though their views may shift current social 




who have restarted a business within the last 20 years participated in 20 semi-structured 
interviews. Reviews of the participants archived bankruptcy and business failure 
documentation were undertaken. Field notes were also captured. The methodological approach 
granted the opportunity to deeply form an understanding of the unique lived experiences of 
entrepreneurs that have bounced back from bankruptcy (Creswell and Poth, 2016; Collis and 
Hussey, 2013). The respondents were recruited via taking a purposive sampling strategy. 
Following the data collection stage, the evolved grounded theory (Struass and Corbin, 1998; 
Chamberlain-Salaun et al., 2013; Gioia et al., 2013), was applied to analyse the data obtained. 
This data analysis approach is suitable for microstoria-based research (Creswell and Poth, 
2016). The evolved grounded theory precisely explores how an individual acts within a given 
social context and the interpretations they ascribe to their interactions (Struass and Corbin, 
1998; Chamberlain-Salaun et al., 2013; Gioia et al., 2013).  
In sum, the chosen methodology and theoretical approach has enabled one to build upon 
existing theoretical understanding on the topic of venture failure and bankruptcy. Moreover, 
this type of research can offer practical implications to help assist policymakers in the 
development of optimal bankruptcy laws as well as ways in which they can aid distressed and 
failed firm owners’ wellbeing during the times of crisis (Williams and Vorley, 2015; Cheung, 
2014). This may ultimately boost firm survival rates as well as increase rates of repeat business 
ownership. In what follows, a description of the key research findings, the theoretical and 
practical contributions of the thesis, followed by an overview of the entire thesis.  
1.1 Main Research Findings  
Through taking the microstoria approach, this study has produced three key aggregate 
dimensions that correspondingly answer each research question. First, it has been found that 
the firm owners undergo three stages to gradually recover from their venture collapse. Such 
stages involved: (i) an attribution search to identify the true cause of their business failure; (ii) 
embracing their negative experiences and periods of fragility associated with their bankruptcy 
and business failure through a series of appraisals; and (iii) undergoing an array of sense-
making, reflective, emotional, and practical related coping mechanisms. Importantly, by 
undertaking the three stages of recovery they were able undergo a deeper personal and 
emotional re-examination which led them to form an internal attributional style, self-efficacy, 
as well as form antifragility as an ‘entrepreneurial competence’ since they had been able to 




first aggregate dimension has provided answers to how entrepreneurial antifragility is identified 
and labelled in the discourse on rebounding to venture again following bankruptcy. 
The second aggregate dimension highlighted how prior, during, and after their recovery period, 
the participants commonly learnt gradually. Specifically, prior to recovering, the respondents 
often discussed how they formed short-term “lower-order” knowledge. Following their 
recovery period, they obtained long-term “higher-order” knowledge through experiential and 
reflexive learning as guided by their entrepreneurial competence of antifragility (Politis, 2005; 
Frota Vasconcellos Dias and Marten, 2019). Such learning led to the entrepreneurs forming the 
capability to prospectively sense make and collectively led to the formation of deeper moments 
of realisation which were utilised to develop one’s internal attributional style and antifragility 
coupled with the capability to restart a firm. Next, following the participants’ restart, the 
respondents reported to continuously form higher-order learning (Cope, 2011) by exploiting 
their antifragility. The informants were also found to use rhetoric language to describe 
themselves, develop the ability to pivot, form strategic insight, and minimise the impact of risks 
to obtain further antifragility. In sum, the second aggregate dimension has generated an 
understanding of how one’s antifragility influences their long-term learning trajectories and 
ability to utilise their insights gained from their bankruptcy to form another venture.  
The third aggregate dimension revealed that several practices help and hinder an entrepreneurs’ 
venture restart by governing how they make use of their antifragility. They often engage in five 
emotional practices which enable them to bounce back by aiding their ability to exploit their 
competence of antifragility. The practices entail: i) playing hope, ii) driving through the maze, 
iii) demonstrating civil courage, iv) developing one’s attributional style, and v) dropping the 
emotional baggage. They also made use of their social support such as their mentoring 
relationships and formed an understanding of the short-term benefits of their United Kingdom 
(UK) bankruptcy charges. Despite these vastly positive practices, several other practices 
hindered the firm owner’s ability to restart a business. The participants specifically raised 
issues with the long-term implications of their bankruptcy charges as well as overcoming 
stakeholder reactions coupled with financial problems.  
Going further, the findings from all three aggregate dimensions have been integrated to form a 
grounded theoretical process model (see Figure 8). The model highlights the key stages, 
processes, and practices involved in a firm owner’s restart journey post-bankruptcy. Precisely, 




1.2 Theoretical Contributions 
Drawing on antifragility as a lens to examine the accounts of the twenty once bankrupt 
entrepreneurs, each aggregate dimension provides several conceptual implications that extends 
theoretical understanding on restarting a venture post-bankruptcy. The study also provides 
suggestions to develop theory in the arena of entrepreneurial failure, new venture creation, 
entrepreneurial learning and beyond. In sum, the study ultimately makes five key theoretical 
contributions: 
1) The findings from the first aggregate dimension offer three conceptual implications. The 
implications entail: (i) providing an explanation about the intricate process of developing an 
internal attributional style and the consequences this has on forming a business owner’s self-
efficacy; (ii) highlighting how appraisal is core to how a business owner can start the recovery 
process by embracing their experiences: and (iii) developing an understanding of the range of 
coping processes, that eventually lead one to foster antifragility as an entrepreneurial 
competence and display aspects of post-traumatic disorder. In this regard, the findings from 
the first aggregate dimensions have significantly helped to piece together the steps involved in 
the puzzle of antecedents of an entrepreneurial blunder to how one commences the venture 
failure recovery process.  
2) The findings from the second aggregate dimension provide major steps in understanding the 
long journey of learning from business failure and bankruptcy. The results help to augment the 
view that gradual experiential learning is a key learning trajectory post venture failure. The 
findings from this theme importantly also identify that reflexive learning led to prospective 
sense-making. Both methods were prompted by the competence of antifragility. Importantly, 
as whole, they were crucial in helping the business owners obtain higher-order learnings and 
the ability to exploit the competency of antifragility by demonstrating the need to assert their 
leadership again as a business owner. Hence, the findings have developed the applicability of 
the use of antifragility by showing how it has been a key driving force in helping the business 
owners realise the potentialities and limits of restarting and managing a new firm. Besides this, 
another significant outcome from the second aggregate dimension is the explanation of how 
once bankrupted entrepreneurs continually learn in the long-term. Specifically, the findings 
illustrate that the business owners make use of their strategic foresight, the ability to pivot and 
embark on effective risk-taking strategies by further utilising their antifragility and internal 




3) The findings from the third aggregate dimension have provided a theoretically enriched view 
about how emotions can be viewed as organising practices (Scheer, 2012) in the context of 
entrepreneurial re-entry post-bankruptcy. Specifically, a venture founder’s civil courage, 
resilience, and self-efficacy have been key in developing the antifragility that was used to 
restart a firm. This provides the foundations for future works to further explore the role of a 
failed firm owners’ emotional practices in more depth. Aside from this, the results from the 
third theme have provided conceptual insights into the organising actions that entrepreneurs 
engage in to help rebound to venture again. Furthermore, by using antifragility as a theoretical 
lens, the results from this theme have offered a more granular understanding of the long-term 
implications of the UK bankruptcy policies which can impede one’s ability to make a return to 
entrepreneurship.  
4) The theoretical process model (see Figure 8) has helped form conceptual linkages between 
the coping processes and the two learning trajectories (experiential and reflexive) that are 
utilised by entrepreneurs to develop and exploit antifragility to rebound to venture again. The 
model also illustrates the supporting and impeding practices that influence a business owner’s 
ability to rebound to venture again. Besides this, the model highlights the firm-level and 
individual-level implications of restarting a venture post-bankruptcy. In effect, the model has 
extended current efforts (Cotterill, 2012; Boso et al., 2019; Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2016) to 
synthesise several aspects of the re-entry process following failure which are often treated in 
isolation of each other. Thereby, this model may help to shape how scholars see how 
entrepreneurs can bounce back from failure. The model has also contributed to aspects of the 
concept antifragility by showing the value of the theoretical construct in the context of 
entrepreneurial re-entry post-failure. To the author’s knowledge, this is the first research that 
applies the concept of antifragility to real world business owners. 
5) Finally, the study has made empirical implications. Through use of multiple methods, the 
theoretical participant strategy and microstoria approach, rich data has been obtained about the 
once bankrupted entrepreneurs who may not always partake in studies of this nature. The 
evolved grounded theory has further enabled one to detect relevant trends within the study data 
to answer the research questions thoroughly. Taken collectively, the chosen methodology has 
therefore emphasised the value of using such methods (Boje, 2011; Van Burg et al., 2020). 
1.3 Practical and Public Policy Contributions 




1) It is suggested that failed (including formerly bankrupted) entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs 
who have not failed can utilise the grounded theoretical model (see Figure 8) to prompt them 
on ways to form antifragility as an entrepreneurial competence. Hence, this could help firm 
owners develop new and existing ventures coupled with preventing venture failure. This is 
particularly crucial for business owners who have failed, as it can allow them to ensure they 
can return to entrepreneurship and use their prior knowledge to run more successful ventures 
(Schumpeter, 1942; Korsgaard et al., 2020).  
2) As the results highlight the negative aspects of failure and importance of social support, it is 
recommended that extant recovery programmes and newer schemes are developed to provide 
bespoke exercises to help failed firm owners emotionally, physically, and mentally deal with 
their multifaceted venture failure experiences.  
3) The results can be utilised to help form and develop existing educational entrepreneurial 
initiatives. This may help to enhance both budding and current entrepreneur’s mental wellbeing 
coupled with providing them with guidance on how to form antifragility as entrepreneurial 
competence. Entrepreneurship educators can therefore utilise the findings to design optimal 
entrepreneurial courses which can thereby increase the odds of individuals taking 
entrepreneurship as a career.  
4) The thesis has overall helped to provide a positive view of entrepreneurial venture failure 
and bankruptcy. The findings demonstrate the positives which are linked to the elusive darker 
side of firm failure and highlight that a company demise is not always end of the road for a 
business owner’s entrepreneurial career.  
5) The results of this study add to the escalating debate on whether current schemes can be 
developed, and new programmes should be launched to increase venture ownership following 
failure. It is argued that the results provide policy suggestions which can assist firm owners in 
several ways. This entails recommendations for when entrepreneurs register a company in the 
UK, and if made bankrupt, how their bankruptcy charges are dealt with, the support they 
receive during their bankruptcy as well as how financial aid should be offered to them 





1.4 Structure of the Thesis  
The thesis is made up of seven chapters. The overall structure and description of the key 
components of each chapter is summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1: Thesis structure and content 
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Issues and Findings 
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Issues and Findings 
3) What are the organising 
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Chapter 2 commences with an overview of works in the entrepreneurial failure domain, 
followed by a critical review of the three main themes of literature in the arena of firm failure 




failure and bankruptcy, and iii) overcoming failure and bankruptcy. An explanation of the 
theoretical lens is then offered. 
Chapter 3 provides a description of the research methodology. The chapter precedes with an 
outline of the research setting, followed by an explanation of the research approach and 
purposive sampling strategy. Sequentially, a description of the participant recruitment, data 
collection and analysis processes are given prior to addressing the study’s methodological 
limits.  
Chapter 4 presents the findings from the first research question. The chapter comprises of the 
analysis of three sub-themes; (i) understanding the previous venture failure and bankruptcy; 
(ii) business failure experience and embracing fragility; and (iii) previous business failure and 
bankruptcy recovery. The chapter then ends with a diagram that represents the processes 
involved in recovering from business failure and bankruptcy. 
Chapter 5 provides the findings in answer to the second research question. Structured around a 
process model which depicts how a firm owner learns, the chapter is divided into three sub-
themes: (i) entrepreneurial learning stages; (ii) opportunity identification; and (iii) long-term 
learning and foresight. 
Chapter 6 offers the findings in relation to the third research question.  The chapter is divided 
into three sub-themes which entail: (i) positive emotional practices; (ii) catching the fire: 
‘building bridges’ with stakeholders and ‘making do’ with bankruptcy policies; and (iii) 
awareness of ‘longer-term’ issues associated with bankruptcy. The chapter is then followed by 
an integration of the entire thesis findings as illustrated by the grounded theoretical process 
model. 
Chapter 7 provides an outline of the major theoretical and practical contributions of the thesis 
in line with existing literature. A discussion of the study’s limitation and avenues for future 






Entrepreneurial Failure, Experiences, Recovery and Re-entry  
This chapter will present a critical review of the literature in the entrepreneurial venture failure 
and bankruptcy domain. The chapter is separated into six sections. The first section gives an 
overview of research on the definitions of entrepreneurial failure. The second then involves an 
examination of the studies focussed on the antecedents of business failure and bankruptcy. 
Sequentially, the third section delves into the research that has explored the experiences of 
business failure and bankruptcy. The fourth section will look at the scholarly work on how 
company owners have managed to overcome business failure and bankruptcy in their pursuit 
to start another company. This section can be broken down into a further seven sub-sections 
which examines the literature across how firm owners cope, learn and use their emotional 
resources. The fifth section will then draw on the antifragility perspective to bouncing back 
from entrepreneurial failure. This sections ends with an overview of the Organising Framework 
(Figure 1). Lastly, the sixth section entails a summary and conclusion as well as overview of 
the Methodology Chapter.  
2.1 Entrepreneurial Failure Definition Overview  
Entrepreneurial failure can be construed in multiple ways (McGrath, 1999). Given its 
importance (Watson and Everett, 1993) the definition has been long discussed by various 
business and management scholars (Walsh and Cunningham, 2016). One can define business 
failure in very broad terms or give it a more specific description (Ucbasaran et al., 2013). It 
could entail the voluntarily termination of a business to embark on other more fruitful 
endeavours (Headd, 2003; De Tienne and Wennberg, 2016), retiring and/or to merely reap the 
rewards of investments (Headd, 2003, DeTienne, 2010). Subsequently, these positive closures 
are not always a ‘failure’ yet can fall into this category and therefore it is crucial to ascertain a 
clear description of the term.  
A subjective definition used in the literature draws on a firm owner’s level of human capital, 
which can be inferred one’s skills, experience, and knowledge (Gimeno et al., 1997; Becker, 
1975). This definition entails that failure involves a firm owner inadequately meeting their set 
business objectives meaning they have no option but to discontinue the venture. Essentially, 
this definition determines that failure is threshold performance level that the entrepreneur can 




one leaving the enterprise because of changing their interest in running the organisation, yet 
the authors do recognise that legal factors and other objective factors can form part of the 
definition (Bruno et al., 1992). Additional scholarly attempts have also added a level of 
subjectivity to their definition by examining the exact implications their business failure had 
on their personal lives (Singh et al., 2007; Cope, 2011). Further, recent work has defined firm 
failure as a case in which the business is terminated, as one cannot respond and adapt to external 
factors in time (Amankwah-Amoah, 2016). Interestingly, an entrepreneurs’ definition of an 
external factor could be unique to their firm and thus, this definition can be deemed subjective 
too. 
Alternatively, a more objective definition of business failure can include the business owner 
becoming insolvent, in which case their business debts outweigh their assets, leading to them 
not being able to operate the firm (Shepherd 2003; Lattacher and Wdowiak, 2019). Another 
objective definition, entails bankruptcy, an observable and formal event, usually involving a 
court case, which is linked with poor financial performance (Ucbasaran et al., 2013; Jenkins et 
al. 2014). Interestingly, research has found that business owners sometimes deliberately 
bankrupt themselves as opposed to it being out of their choice (Moulton and Thomas, 1993) or 
‘phoenix’ a firm (see Matthew, 2015). Bankruptcy is not one of the most common types of firm 
failure and can be classed as restrictive definition of venture failure (Cressy, 2006; Stanton, 
2012). However, one can infer the process involves financial and emotional losses which can 
have detrimental impact to an individual (Van Kesteren et al., 2017). Bankruptcy is also an 
observable point in a person’s life where they must make key changes to generally themselves 
out of the turmoil they are in and effectively back on track (Walsh, 2017, Cope, 2011). This 
study consequently identifies business failure as a cases in which a firm owner falls short of 
their goals and declares bankruptcy. 
Using bankruptcy as a definition for firm failure, is a desirable choice given that it is more 
objective than some of the more subjective and broader definitions. The process of bankruptcy 
also involves a set sequence of events. This means the sample of business owners who partake 
in this research share comparatively homogenous experiences and therefore one can easily 
highlight variances within their accounts. If a subjective definition were instead used, it would 
be more difficult to identify patterns across the participant’s experience given the range of 
interpretations one can assign to their definition of venture failure (Ucabasaran et al., 2009). In 




findings. Finally, it is worthy to note that for the literature review, research that is focussed on 
business failure and bankruptcy is examined.  
2.2 Antecedents of Entrepreneurial Venture Failure and Bankruptcy 
The first stream of research focusses on the early work by researchers which has particularly 
concentrated on the antecedents of venture failure (Bradley and Saunders, 1989; Zacharakis, et 
al., 1999). Within this literature theme, research has examined: i) reported causes of venture 
failure and bankruptcy; ii) the perceived cause of business failure and bankruptcy; and iii) how 
proximate ‘demographic’ factors impact the antecedents of business failure and bankruptcy.  
2.2.1 Reported business failure and bankruptcy causes  
There are a range of reported causes of venture failure. Internal causes are usually associated 
with a firm owner’s ability whereas external causes are linked with how extraneous factors 
which are often out of the company owner’s control (Yamakawa and Cardon, 2015; Atsan, 
2016, Numani, 2017). Scholars who have proposed the idea that venture failure is purely down 
to internal factors have taken a voluntarist perspective, which is due to the choices one makes. 
Such scholars have highlighted that one’s decision making, and management ability, as well as 
financial choices, are the main instigators for a firm collapse (Bradley and Saunders 1989; Van 
Auken et al., 2009). Thus, such studies propose that a firm failure is associated with the level 
of human capital a business owner possesses (Becker, 1975). Alternatively, a recent qualitative 
study, has taken a deterministic perspective by proposing that external factors out of the 
enterprise owners’ control, such as a lack of governmental support to help upskill business 
owners, are the predominant reasons why a venture fails (Adobor, 2020). Hence, this shows a 
venture failure may not always be attributed to the failings of the business owners solely. 
Despite the two distinct views, several studies have shown that a mixture of internal and 
external causes can lead to a firm demise (Khelil 2016). For instance, literature has highlighted 
that ventures that fail and, in some instances end in bankruptcy, are usually due to a business 
owners’ lack of market research, financial and managerial know-how, in addition to a poor and 
competitive business climate coupled with high-rates of crime (see Abdullah, et al., 2009; 
Ooghe and De Prijker, 2007; Fatowki, 2014; Numani, 2017). Besides this, other review papers 
have also emphasised a combination of both internal and external factors can result in a venture 
failure (Mellahi and Wilkinson 2004; Amankwah-Amoah 2016). More recent studies have also 
emphasised comparable results, yet they have also highlighted the issues associated with a 




2016; Al-Shami et al., 2019). One can decipher that a multitude of causes can lead to a firm 
demise, although further research is required to corroborate the range of causes in further depth. 
In sum, the research on the reported causes of business failure and bankruptcy have highlighted 
that financial and managerial related issues are seminal contributors to a venture collapse, and 
they can influence how an entrepreneur can deal with external drivers of failure. To enhance 
what is currently known, it would be useful for additional studies to reinforce the connection 
between these factors. 
2.2.2 Perceived business failure and bankruptcy causes  
Within this stream of research, a range of studies have explored how one attributes blame 
towards their bankruptcy and business failure. One’s attributional style depicts how individuals 
ascribe an explanation to events that occur (Heider, 1958). An aspect of one’s ascription is 
whether they are either linked to an internal locus of control meaning one believes that they 
have control over their actions and events that occur (Rotter, 1966; Weiner, 1992). This differs 
to an external locus of control where ascriptions are made to other factors that are out of one’s 
control (Rotter, 1966; Weiner, 1992). Interestingly, early works on the subject have shown that 
firm owners are likely to take responsibility for their venture blunder (Zacharakis et al., 1999). 
Following this, a string of works have shown that entrepreneurs often blame external factors 
instead, such as their business climate (Thornhill and Amit., 2003; Rogoff et al., 2004; Franco 
and Hasse., 2004). Other literature has examined the views of owners and employees who have 
also attributed their organisation’s failure to a range of external factors (Hager et al., 1996; 
Karabag, 2019).  
However, the most recent studies in this domain have documented that failed venture founders 
are inclined to display a varied range of attributional styles (Atsan, 2016) as they can blame 
both internal and external factors (Fatoki, 2014; Numani, 2017). Moreover, the way they 
attribute the blame, can influence how they cope (Cardon et al., 2011; Kibler et al., 2017) and 
learn (Mantere et al., 2013; Amankwah-Amoah.,2015; Yamakawa and Cardon., 2015; 
Yamawaka et al., 2015; Walsh and Cunningham 2017). Those who form an internal 
attributional style are likely to learn more which could stem from the firm owners forming an 
understanding of how they specifically caused the demise. Hence, it can be surmised, that based 
on the limited but useful studies on the matter, firm owners often undertake a varied approach 
to how they determine the causes of their firm demise and bankruptcy, which can consequently 




business owner’s attributional style can influence their learning and coping from their venture 
failure as the relationship between the behaviours is not clear. 
2.2.3 Proximate ‘demographic’ factors impact on the antecedents of business failure and 
bankruptcy 
Interestingly, a range of demographics factors can influence the causes of failure and one’s 
attributional style. For instance, cultural factors can impact an individuals’ attributional style 
(Ahmad and Seet, 2009; Cardon et al., 2011; Ojo, 2021). Other studies have noted differences 
in failure rates which could be linked to a firm owner’s gender, with female-headed firms more 
likely to fail than their male counterparts (Watson, 2003; Mayr et al., 2021). Justo et al. (2015) 
have also used feminist theories to highlight that female business owners are in fact, more likely 
to exit a business as opposed to failing. Ethnicity and age have also been found to influence the 
causes of an entrepreneurial demise (Headd, 2003). For instance, ethnic minority enterprise 
owners are often likely to face discrimination which can lead to higher failure rates (Mendy 
and Hack-Polay, 2018; Hack-Polay et al., 2020). Further work has drawn on the human capital 
theory (Wennberg et al., 2010) to highlight that one’s educational experience can impact the 
probability of their venture failure (Headd 2003; Liao et al., 2008). In short, one can surmise 
that the research on demographic factors have begun to add another layer to the literature on 
the antecedents of business demise and bankruptcy. This type of literature is valuable as it 
highlights the intricate nature of the factors that can cause a firm demise and additional work 
on the topic would be beneficial. 
Collectively, the works on the antecedents of business failure have provided useful insights 
into the real and perceived causes of failure and the cases which resulted in bankruptcy. One 
can garner that the studies have shown that internal enterprise related factors are often the 
common cause of failure, yet business owners may ascribe to both external and internal factors. 
Importantly, one can abstract that an entrepreneur’s perception of their antecedents of failure 
can influence how they cope and learn as well as their ability to restart a venture. Several 
demographic factors can also impact the causes of failure and how one perceives a business 
blunder. In sum, despite the valuable research on the antecedents of firm failure, it would be 
useful for scholars to make progress with this research stream by investigating the following 
questions: What are the causes of failure as well as bankruptcy and how does this impact a 
firm failure? What is the exact impact of a business owners attribution style? What is the 




2.3 Experiences of Entrepreneurial Venture Failure and Bankruptcy  
Another key stream of the literature on entrepreneurial failure examines the experiences of 
failed and bankrupted business owners (Shepherd, 2003; Sellerberg and Leppänen, 2012; Van 
Kesteren et al., 2017). The works can be separated into: i) negative effects of business failure; 
ii) positive implications of venture failure; and iii) the impact of geographical and identity 
factors in relation to an entrepreneur’s experiences of failure. 
2.3.1 Negative ‘contagion’ effects of business failure 
The studies which examine the negative effects of business failure have relied on the contagion 
view (Akhigbe et al., 2005) in which the entrepreneurial venture failure has a ripple effect on 
several aspects of the lives of firm owners. 
Social implications. Research has drawn on the concept of stigma, which is derived from the 
Greek translation for tattoo-mark; in former times, those who were deemed as immoral were 
usually marked so they could be identified for their behaviour (Bos et al., 2013; Erving 
Goffman, 1963). A vast number of studies have explored how business owners deal with stigma 
linked with their failure and bankruptcy (Shepherd and Haynie, 2011; Walsh, 2017; Klimas et 
al., 2020; He and Krähenmann, 2021). The social stigma that comes from bankruptcy is not a 
new phenomenon and those who are bankrupted can be classed as deviant (Singh et al., 2015). 
This can lead bankrupted entrepreneurs to feel shame from a range of stakeholders such as their 
creditors and customers, and even lead to marital issues (Efrat, 2006; Sutton and Calahan, 1987; 
Singh et al., 2007). Relatively recent studies have expressed that these entrepreneurs encounter 
stigmatisation in the form of, denigration, vilification, and all-round negative responses to their 
venture failure (Shepherd and Haynie, 2011; Walsh, 2017). Other literature has also shown that 
bankrupted entrepreneurs felt inferior to others (Sellerberg and Leppänen, 2012), some even 
felt incriminated with a loss of social recognition and received a general response from others 
with a lack of compassion due to holding a label as a failure (Van Kesteren et al., 2017). 
Additionally, failed (non-bankrupted) entrepreneurs felt ashamed and a loss of confidence 
(Smith and McElwee, 2011). Besides this, organisational failure has been reported to lead to 
stigma (McGrafth, 1999; Wiesenfeld et al., 2008).  
A collection of studies has indicated that entrepreneurial re-entry can be impeded by the stigma 
which venture founders encounter (Simmons et al., 2014; Kirkwood, 2007; Shepherd and 
Haynie, 2011). The grief that stems from the stigma can specifically hinder the development 




to feeling isolated (Politis and Gabrielsson, 2009; Cope, 2011). Furthermore, the bankruptcy 
can weaken stakeholder relationships, causing prior investors and suppliers to lose faith and 
credibility in the business acumen of the individual, consequently reducing further venture 
growth (Sutton and Calahan, 1987; Shepherd and Haynie, 2011). Jenkins et al. (2010) have 
also flagged that with increased stigma the business owner endures more grief, and an overall 
reduction in their status in society. Work has even found that the stigma could even impact a 
banker’s decision to help provide financial support to a new entrepreneurial project post-
bankruptcy (Cusin and Mayo, 2016). Kirkwood (2007) has also harnessed the Tall Poppy 
syndrome concept, to highlight that irrespective of damaged stakeholder bonds, those who have 
failed in business in general, may be unwilling to restart a company, given the stigma of failing 
again. Researchers have cautioned that if the entrepreneur does not re-enter entrepreneurship, 
they then may lose the knowledge they gained from their business demise (Cope 2011, Cope 
and Watts, 2000).  
However, other studies have positioned a different view in relation to stigma (Cope et al., 2004; 
Singh et al., 2015). Cope et al. (2004) have revealed that Venture Capitalists do not see failure 
as a ‘black mark’ and can be quite accepting towards it by showing a willingness to understand 
the circumstances of the firm failure. Singh et al. (2015) have also contested some of the prior 
views on stigma. They showcased the notion that the stigma is not a label, and rather a process 
that starts prior to the business failing, therefore questioning that the failure leads to stigma as 
pointed out by others (Efrat, 2006, Shepherd and Haynie, 2011; Van Kesteren et al., 2017). 
Most recently, Nahata (2019) has reported that failed serial entrepreneurs are also still more 
likely to obtain a better funding deal from Venture Capitalists in contrast to more novice 
business owners, indicating that failure is not as perceived as negatively as one thinks. Overall, 
through a series high-quality of works, studies have begun to uncover the range of views linked 
with a venture collapse. The stigma from business failure can be often deemed as a dire 
implication associated with the venture collapse that can often have negative long-term 
consequences for several business owners. Yet, the varied views on one’s business failure is 
not surprising given that a business demise can be perceived in several ways by range of 
stakeholders. 
Psychological and physiological Impact. Beyond the social implications of business failure 
and bankruptcy, studies have investigated the psychological and physiological impact of a firm 
failure (Shepherd et al. 2009; Jenkins et al., 2010; Ucbasaran et al, 2013). This type of research 




financial distress associated with the business collapse and the difficulties linked to terminating 
employees’ contracts (Cope, 2011; Singh et al., 2007). Early work by Shepherd (2003) 
highlighted that failed and bankrupted company owners feel a series of emotions from loss, 
helplessness and sorrow accompanied with stress. Following this, Singh et al., (2007) have 
showcased that failed and bankrupted entrepreneurs can self-stigmatise which can dampen their 
self-worth. The authors have also identified that business owners can experience serious mental 
health conditions, from depression to the development of phobias; therefore, going past the 
grief that Shepherd (2003) initially proposed. Research by Heinze (2003) has also demonstrated 
that failed business owners feel frustration, a loss of esteem and a series of worries about their 
venture demise. Van Kesteren et al. (2017) have further discovered that the discontinuation of 
a venture is comparable to the loss of a close one. They also found that the failed business 
owners encounter a significant amount of psychological anguish, and their physical health is 
impacted. Hence, it is evident that for many business owners that a firm failure and bankruptcy 
can cause harmful psychological and physiological damage. However, this may not be the case 
for all entrepreneurs, and this could be due to a number of factors which studies in this area 
often do not fully recognise. 
Financial effects of business failure and bankruptcy. A few studies have also highlighted 
the financial problems that business owners face following the declaration of bankruptcy (see 
(Moulton and Thomas 1993; Cope 2011; Singh et al., 2007; Metzger 2008; Shepherd et al., 
2009). The literature has drawn on cognitive concepts and the human capital theory to 
demonstrate that venture founders face difficulties with obtaining credit to run their 
consecutive firms (Metzger 2006; Mathur 2013; Cusin and Maymo 2016). Other evidence has 
highlighted that failed business owners are often viewed in a dire light by investors 
(Roccapriore et al., 2021) that could hinder future firm developments (Ha and Park, 2021). 
Such issues could stem from a multiple reasons associated with the business owner’s credibility 
following the firm demise, although supplementary research is required to back up these 
propositions. 
2.3.2 Positive implications of business failure 
Unlike the contagion view of business failure, that depicts the commonly negative issues 
associated with venture failure, other work has relied on the more competitive and positive 




Positive effects of business failure. Research has gradually started to demonstrate the positive 
experiences of venture failure that can take place at the same time as other harmful effects of a 
venture demise (Omerode 2002; Klimas et al., 2020). For instance, studies have demonstrated 
that failed firm owners can be regarded as equals (Cope et al., 2004; Sellerberg and Leppänen 
2012). Sutton and Calahan (1987) have discovered that bankrupted directors and senior 
management from firms feel guilt, yet they also experience relief. A number of studies have 
also found similar findings, highlighting the positive behavioural implications from a venture 
failure and bankruptcy that firm owners encounter (see Ucbasaran et al., 2006; Corner et al., 
2017; Dias and Teixeira, 2017; Jenkins, 2021). Besides this, Sarasvathy et al. (2013) propose 
that firm failure in general, can in fact spark further entrepreneurial ventures. The latest study 
in this area has found through examining social media data, that an entrepreneurs’ digital 
identity can change positively post-failure as well as negatively (Fisch and Block 2020). This 
is not surprising given the close connection entrepreneurs can have with their ventures (Cardon 
et al. 2005). 
Besides this, scholars in this area have focussed on how entrepreneurs use appraisal as a 
technique to deal with their failure that involves filing for bankruptcy (Jenkins et al., 2010; 
Jenkins et al., 2014; Jenkins and McKelvie, 2017). Appraisal entails the process in which a 
person evaluates a situation in relation to how it will impact their well-being in the context of 
the environment they are in (Lazarus, 1991). Appraisals can take the form of primary appraisals 
which are broken down into how the individuals perceive the situation of personal relevance 
and the extent to which the event links to their own desires (Smith and Lazarus, 1993). Jenkins 
et al. (2010) as well as Jenkins et al. (2014) have demonstrated that entrepreneurs overcome 
distressing feelings associated with their business failure by subjectively appraising the events. 
The findings from the two studies also help to explain why there is variation in grief that failed 
entrepreneurs experience through elucidating the processes that influence the volume of 
distress faced by business owners. This is useful as this type of evidence has provided a 
conceptual reasoning behind why such variation in grief occurs. Further works that examine 
how firm owners experience relief with a differing theoretical framework would be valuable.  
2.3.3 The impact of geographical and identity factors on one’s experiences of 
entrepreneurial failure 
Identity factors. Another emerging sub-set of research in management journals has provided 




Wang, 2019), gender (Shepherd and Patzelt, 2015; Simmons et al., 2019), education (Mayr and 
Mitter, 2014; Espinoza-Benavides and Diaz, 2019), and spiritual faith (Singh et al., 2016) plays 
a role in how they experience failure. The studies that have examined the impact of a venture 
founders’ age have utilised a range of behavioural, dispositional, and other entrepreneurial 
concepts to highlight how older business owners are often less likely to start another venture 
post-failure or can take longer to do so (Baù et al., 2017; Lin and Wang, 2019). The quantitative 
studies which have focussed on a failed entrepreneurs’ gender and sexual orientation, have 
shown that homosexual failed firm owners are perceived in a more severe light in contrast to 
failed heterosexual venture founders, whilst female business owners are less likely to return to 
entrepreneurship when they encounter public stigma in comparison to their male counterparts 
(Shepherd and Patzelt, 2015; Simmons et al., 2019). The longitudinal work on how one’s 
education can influence their restart, has shown that those educated to a higher level are often 
less inclined to rebound to venture again (Amaral et al., 2011). Finally, one’s spiritual faith can 
help business owners to view their failure positively and subsequently aid their venture restart 
(Singh et al., 2016). All in all, the works in this area have begun to provide useful knowledge 
on how one’s identity can clearly shape how they experience business failure, yet more in-
depth research is required on the matter. 
Geographical and institutional factors. Irrespective of identity factors, due to the diversity 
of failed entrepreneurs’ experiences, several quantitative studies have been conducted to 
highlight the differences in perceptions of a firm demise across the globe (Cotterill, 2012; 
Kuckertz et al., 2020; Simmons et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2021). Interestingly, it could be that 
culture is a contributing factor which could explain why entrepreneurs face differing amounts 
of stigma, as those based in Europe who have a failed business are more stigmatised compared 
to their US entrepreneurial counterparts (Gratzer, 2001; Cardon et al., 2011), who instead are 
more inclined to accept business failure and bankruptcy (Efrat, 2006). This can be exemplified 
with several depictions of previously failed US entrepreneurs who have risen again in the 
media, in contrast to once failed European entrepreneur. Cardon et al. (2011) have found that 
in general, more individualistic ‘independent’ cultures are less likely to stigmatise bankrupted 
entrepreneurs in comparison to those collectivist ‘interlinked’ cultures. Starting up again could 
therefore be influenced by the varying levels of stigma that bankrupted entrepreneurs face 
globally (Gratzer, 2001; Begley and Tan, 2001). However, this may not always hold true (Cope 
et al., 2004) and the varying attitudes could stem from the influence of the media (Wakkee et 




research is required in this area to truly grasp the exact impact of geographical perspectives of 
failure and bankruptcy as well as the impact this has on one’s re-entry post-bankruptcy. This 
type of work is needed given the varying social impact of failure across the globe. 
Unsurprisingly, given the issues that firm owners face financially and geographical differences 
in experiences of a venture demise, there is growing research in several law and economic 
related journals which examine the role of bankruptcy laws and an entrepreneurs’ ability to 
restart a company (Armour and Cumming, 2008; Fan and White, 2003; Primo and Green, 2011; 
Lee et al., 2021). To date, several quantitative studies have found through using institutional 
related theories, that more lenient bankruptcy laws can increase entrepreneurial development 
(Lee et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2011; Eberhart et al., 2017; Peng et al., 2010). A string of other 
quantitative works has also demonstrated comparable findings in several locations (Van Auken 
et al., 2009; Cressy, 2006; Ayotte, 2007; Cumming, 2012; Estrin et al., 2012; Fossen, 2014). 
The latest evidence in this area has placed importance on the value of managing bankruptcy 
policies globally (Tabb, 2019; Eklund et al., 2020). Yet, other work has highlighted that in 
certain locations, harsher bankruptcy policies can prompt entrepreneurial activity (Damaraju 
et al., 2020). Hence, this suggests that additional research is needed to explore the impact of 
bankruptcy policies in relation to restarting a firm that led to bankruptcy to provide a more 
thorough understanding on the topic. 
Considering all the evidence concerning the experiences of venture failure and bankruptcy, it 
appears that an entrepreneur has to deal with a range of implications from their entrepreneurial 
demise. A vast number of works have utilised the concepts of stigma to explain the negatives 
of firm failure. The research has gradually progressed to highlight the positives of business 
failure by using the appraisal concept to explain how firm owners deal with their experiences. 
Moreover, a range of geographical, institutional and identity factors can influence one’s 
experience. Despite these useful attempts, additional research is required to help provide 
further clarity on how entrepreneurs deal with their failure as well as the factors that can 
influence their experience given the heterogeneity of a failed business owners’ experiences. 
Specifically, it would be valuable to explore how bankrupted firm owners deal with their 
bankruptcy experience and minimise the stigma, psychological and financial impact attached 
to it. It be would also be useful for research to account the influence of factors such as 
spirituality and bankruptcy laws. Moreover, it would be valuable to recognise more of the 




The research areas that require investigation, can be presented as the following questions; How 
do previously failed entrepreneurs combat the social implications of their failure? What are 
the positives of the experience of business failure and how do firm owners identify such benefits 
exactly? How do the UK bankruptcy laws impact a firm owner’s experience as well as what 
other factors impede and enhance their recovery experience? What are the overall physical, 
financial, social and emotional implications of a firm collapse that results in bankruptcy? 
2.4 Overcoming Entrepreneurial Venture Failure and Bankruptcy    
Moving past reviewing the causes and experiences of entrepreneurial venture failure and 
bankruptcy, the third stream of literature is concerned with the research that has developed on 
how business owners overcome business failure by effectively coping and learning.  
2.4.1 Reflective and practical coping methods 
One key theme of works in this area, is focussed on how entrepreneurs cope with their business 
failure, through use of an array of techniques. Qualitative works have explored how critical 
self-reflection and sensemaking - an interrelated process of both scanning and interpreting 
information to gauge meaning (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991), have been used by failed venture 
founders in conjunction with other methods (Shepherd, 2003; Cope, 2011; Cardon et al., 2011). 
This is not surprising given that sensemaking is often generally used during times of crisis in 
general and can play an integral role in how individuals cope with issues (Maitlis and 
Sonenshein, 2010). Further work has also shown how sense-making can be used to obtain 
meanings from social environments (Weick, 1995) which can guide further actions and develop 
strategic foresight (Nathan, 2004). In the context of a family business going bust, Shepherd 
(2009) has proclaimed that sense-making and its constituent components, encompassing 
scanning, interpretation and learning are used as techniques by entrepreneurs when recovering 
from the grief that comes with their business demise. Other scholars have also shown that 
sensemaking can aid one’s decision to launch a subsequent firm (Mandl et al., 2016; 
Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2018). Yet, it is not known why certain failed business owners make 
sense of their business demise at a faster rate compared to others (Shepherd and Patzelt, 2017; 
Mandl et al., 2016), although recent evidence has found that firm owners require more support 
to make sense of their business failure (Byrne, 2021). 
Other scholars have gone on to delve into the other coping mechanisms that entrepreneurs use 
to recover from business failure, including those who have been bankrupted (Singh et al., 




deal with internal and external demands that are perceived as challenging (Lazarus and 
Folkman, 1984). They are broadly categorised into problem-oriented or emotional-focussed 
coping (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). Problem-focussed coping revolves around how 
individuals practically cope with stressors associated with the issue whilst emotional-focussed 
coping involves the monitoring of emotional responses to the issue (Lazarus and Folkman, 
1984). In the context of entrepreneurial failure, coping can be inferred as cognitive and 
behavioural efforts to alleviate the stressors that come with the closure of an enterprise (Singh 
et al., 2007). Singh et al. (2007) have shed light on the problem based coping strategies failed 
firm owners use, such as networking to raise money. The most recent work in this area has 
used the transactional stress theory to demonstrate that insolvent firm owners participate in 
coaching sessions as a coping method to enhance their wellbeing (Schermuly et al., 2020).  
Studies have also explored how business owners specifically combat the social stigma that 
comes from entrepreneurial failure and bankruptcy (Shepherd and Haynie, 2011; Singh et al., 
2015). Early work has touched upon an array of stigma-management techniques to overcome 
firm bankruptcies used by company directors (Sutton and Calahan, 1987). Through interview 
data, four key stigma coping techniques were identified, which involve managing the 
impressions of others (Sutton and Calahan, 1987). These techniques can be ranked on a 
continuum from concealing the bankruptcy to accepting full responsibility for it. In a similar 
way, Shepherd and Haynie (2011) identified that failed entrepreneurs employ impression 
management strategies to overcome the stigma from their venture failing. The impression 
management techniques entail the firm owner: i) internalising the experience of having a 
personal identity that is valued less than others; ii) trying to change the opinion of others and 
iii) avoiding specific stakeholders. The authors have suggested future work should interestingly 
look at entrepreneurs that have failed but do not internalise a social identity that is valued less 
by others due to the stigma of a business collapse. Singh et al. (2015) have further found that 
entrepreneurs overcome stigma through eventually transforming the failure by challenging the 
stigma and viewing the failure in a positive light. They have suggested that research should 
investigate the degree to which failure acts as a motivator to the development of future 
enterprises. More recently, a range of other scholars have corroborated prior works that explore 
how impression management strategies can help failed business owners can reduce the 
stigmatisation of their ventures demise (Kibler et al., 2017; Kibler et al., 2020) and the cases 
that end in bankruptcy (Walsh, 2017). Taken together, despite only a few studies focussing on 




bankruptcy, it is evident that impression management techniques have become established as 
a vital practical coping mechanism. This makes sense given that venture founders may feel 
their reputation is at stake due to the venture failure. 
One can abstract, that in summary, both practical and reflective coping mechanisms help 
business owners deal with several parts of their firm collapse. Yet, the relationship between the 
two coping mechanisms is not clear, despite a range of useful studies that have produced in-
depth findings on the topic. 
2.4.2 Emotional coping methods 
Building on making sense of their failure, other studies have extended the use of critical self-
reflection by focussing on how entrepreneurs deal with their emotions. This is not surprising 
given the close connection business owners can form with their ventures as well as the 
commitment and passion they can demonstrate towards the firm succeeding (Cardon et al., 
2005). Failed firm owners often engage in emotional regulation which is a process in which 
people can control their emotions, when they have them, and how they are expressed (Boss and 
Sims, 2008). Early work on the subject by Shepherd (2003) has proposed that business owners 
should take a dual process to grief recovery from their failed business. This entails switching 
between a loss and restoration orientation, the loss orientation involving dealing with the 
individual’s emotions through confrontation and the restoration involving supressing the 
failure events. Such techniques are important as the grief linked to the failure can inhibit the 
learning from the venture demise. Singh et al. (2007) have similarly agreed with Shepherd’s 
(2003) proposition of grief recovery but delved further by showcasing that firm owners 
undertake emotional and practical coping mechanisms to deal with the distress of their venture 
collapse. Specifically, the emotional focussed strategies have been noted to help one cope with 
the psychological aspects of their failure and entail the denial of responsibility and distracting 
themselves from the venture demise. Other research has recognised the link between how 
individuals cope with their failure as an entrepreneur and how well they regulate their failure 
and self-reflect on it (Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2018; Mandl et al., 2016). One can decipher 
there is clearly a link between these coping mechanisms used to deal with business failure. 
Additional work on how self-reflection and emotional regulation tactics are used by 
entrepreneurs to overcome their business demise, have included samples of those who have 
gone through bankruptcy (Cope, 2011). Cope (2011) went on to establish that business owners 




regulate through initially distancing themselves from the business failure to give themselves 
time to focus on healing instead. Second, the entrepreneurs critically reflect. Third, the firm 
founders engage in reflective action. These stages enable the entrepreneurs to view their failure 
in a more positive light as a valuable life lesson. Yet, extended periods of self-reflection can 
jeopardise recovery, so as a coping method it should be viewed with caution. Beyond these 
studies, Byrne and Shepherd (2015) have found from eight in-depth case studies of failed 
entrepreneurs that they reflect various emotional states which consequently impacts their 
ability to make sense of their failure. Negative emotions prompted the motivation to make 
sense of the failure, whilst positive emotions helped the entrepreneur learn more about their 
venture demise. Those who did not experience any negative emotions about the business failure 
showed little sign of making sense of the situation. Besides these useful studies, little work has 
been conducted on how once bankrupted firm owners self-reflect and emotionally regulate to 
make sense of their venture demise. He et al. (2018) more recently provided an alternative 
explanation about the sense-making process and the link it has with entrepreneurial learning 
from failure as well as how one emotional regulates. Learning has been reported to increase in 
line with coming to terms with the failure, but it then decreases at a certain point. Emotional 
regulation moderates this relationship, whereby when an entrepreneur reaches a point where 
they cannot deal with the business failure, it can be perceived as a positive learning behaviour 
for the business owners with increased emotional regulation. This study, although, provides 
useful findings, did not focus on those whose business has failed and led to bankruptcy, thus 
may not be generalised to these individuals given that they may have differing experiences 
(Van Kesteren et al., 2017).  
A similar view has been developed by firm level work which has highlighted the importance 
of how employees control their emotional reactions to failures in relation to how the 
organisation develops (Shepherd and Cardon 2009; Shepherd et al., 2011; Shepherd et al., 
2016). Shepherd et al. (2009) have specifically found that employees who fail and are able to 
start-up new entrepreneurial projects are those who are emotionally intelligent as they are able 
to regulate their emotions effectively. Overall, these works depict how the coping and learning 
methods used at firm-level to overcome failure are similar to those that entrepreneurs use.  
In summary, the literature on the importance of emotional regulation has begun to provide an 
understanding of how one deals with business failure in combination with other reflective and 
practical coping mechanisms that can ultimately lead one to rebound to venture again. Yet, the 




the sequence of them. Therefore, more work is required to explore which coping approach is 
most effective to help failed and once bankrupted entrepreneurs get back on track. 
2.4.3 Influence of an entrepreneur’s resilience capabilities  
Research in the domain of looking at a failed business owner’s emotional functioning has found 
that they often possess resilience capabilities (Shepherd and Patzelt, 2017). Such emotional 
functioning may be linked to their psychological capital. This capital entails the development 
of one’s self-efficacy, hope, optimism, and resilience (Luthans et al., 2007). Jenkins et al. 
(2014) have proposed that psychological capital can play a role in coping with entrepreneurial 
failure and can impact further entrepreneurial activity, since it involves the process of 
reviewing one’s situation in an optimistic light as well the belief in oneself to overcome 
challenges, through perseverance, resilience, and hope (Luthans et al., 2007). They have 
suggested that further work is required to investigate the impact of how one’s resilience 
capabilities influence how one deals with failure. More recent work by Corner et al. (2017) has 
shown that previously failed entrepreneurs display resilience, indicating a stable level of overall 
functioning which supports them in starting-up a new venture post their business collapse.  
Other research has harnessed the experiential learning theory to assess how much confidence 
an entrepreneur has in relation to the role it can have on how they rise from the ashes from 
business failure and act as a resilience capability (Ucbasaran et al., 2006; Hayward et al., 2010). 
Initially, Ucbasaran et al. (2006) proclaimed that habitual entrepreneurs, those who had gone 
through failure (including bankruptcy), were more likely to chase more opportunities than those 
who did not fail due to their overconfidence. However, this study was limited to quantitative 
findings and therefore cannot provide as much reasoning behind why formerly failed 
entrepreneurs feel more confident than those who have not failed. Yet, Hayward et al.’s (2010) 
study has expressed that confidence is key for entrepreneurs to start-up ventures post failure 
due to these business owners building emotional resilience. Such ‘emotional resilience’ is 
attributed to greater social, cognitive, and financial resilience from their failure which are 
perceived as second order benefits from their demise. These types of resilience mechanisms 
can enable the business owner to start-up again and counteract any costs that come with being 
overconfident. Besides this, empirical works have shown how negative emotions towards a 
business failure can lead to coping in the form of reflection as well as resilience, which in turn 




to be a key emotional resource that can shape how business owners learn from their venture 
collapse. 
Going further, scholars have focussed on how a positive attitude towards failure can help the 
entrepreneur deal with it in a more organised way, aid their future experiences as well as build 
resilience and confidence (Cannon and Edmondson, 2005; Politis and Gabrielsson, 2009; 
Coelho and McClure, 2005). Ucbasaran et al. (2010) have reported that serial entrepreneurs 
who have bounced back from failure often display a comparative optimism. This is an 
emotional state in which one believes that they are more likely to experience positive events 
than negative ones. This study was based on survey data results on 576 UK based entrepreneurs 
and despite the useful findings, it does not provide an in-depth reasoning for these results. Yet, 
Ucbasaran et al. (2013) have further conducted a review of literature, which has highlighted 
that more optimistic entrepreneurs are likely to bounce back as their emotions push them to 
recover and start another venture. In particular, the concept of “learned optimism” has been 
used to describe those who are inclined to turn their issues into solutions and build resilience 
(Seligman, 2006). Entrepreneurs who failed and restarted with such “learned optimism” are 
less likely to be held back from their failures (Ucbasaran et al., 2013). Despite these valuable 
research attempts, further research is required on the matter. Specifically, it would be useful to 
investigate the impact of a once bankrupt entrepreneurs’ optimistic outlook and their use of 
positive emotions in relation to their ability to develop another company to provide additional 
clarity on the subject. 
Importantly, research has also shown that grief and negative emotions can hinder one’s ability 
to learn from a venture collapse (Shepherd, 2003; Cope 2011). Entrepreneurs who also have a 
narcissistic demeanour have been found to form cognitive issues which impede their learning 
from their entrepreneurial demise (Liu et al., 2019). Taken together, the existing literature has 
demonstrated that a business owners’ emotional functioning can paradoxically impact how they 
cope, learn and form resilience; this could be linked to a range of factors. Scholars have argued 
that further research is required to investigate now only how bankrupted entrepreneurs deal 
with their failure stigma, but the other emotional and physical implications of their failure 
(Shepherd and Haynie, 2011).  
In line with one’s resilience capabilities, research has identified the implications of how one 
attributes the cause of their failure in relation to re-entering the entrepreneurial ecosystem. 




their failure, attributing it to external factors that are not linked to their direct control as a 
strategy to aid other’s impressions of themselves. This technique can also enable the firm owner 
to reduce the emotional intensity of the failure. Yet, other studies have identified that 
entrepreneurs who take responsibility for their failure are likely to learn more from it 
(Ucbasaran et al., 2011; Mantere et al., 2013) and this can influence the creation and 
development of subsequent enterprises (Cardon et al., 2011; Yamakawa et al., 2015; 
Yamakawa and Cardon, 2015). Yamakawa and Cardon’s study (2015) specifically highlighted 
that those who ascribe the origin of their business demise down to internal causes are likely to 
learn more than those who ascribe it to external causes; aptly known as a “self-serving 
attribution” (Rogoff et al., 2004). The logic underpinning this is that business owners who take 
responsibility for their venture demise may look back and recognise previous mistakes as well 
as identify how they can move on from such errors. Furthermore, Eggers and Song (2015) have 
highlighted that entrepreneurs who blame external factors for their business failure, are likely 
to re-start a venture in a different sector which could be at their own detriment since they may 
not fully exploit their previous failure learnings. Interestingly, Eggers and Song (2015) further 
found that overconfident firm owners are more likely to attribute their failure to external forces 
outside of their control. Walsh and Cunningham (2017) more recently have highlighted that 
business owners display four types of attribution styles which can impact their reaction and 
learning trajectories. The four styles comprise of an internal individual level; external firm 
level; external market level; and hybrid attributions. The internal attributional style often leads 
to rich learning about oneself. This differs to external and hybrid attribution which is more 
focussed on learning from the venture management and relationships. Interestingly, despite a 
few studies including accounts of bankrupted firm owners, much of the more recent work 
(Walsh, 2017; Eggers and Song, 2015; Riar et al., 2021; Li et al., 2021) has looked at 
entrepreneurs who have failed in general. Hence, despite it being apparent that a firm owners’ 
attributional style can impact their coping and learning, it would be valuable to garner more 
precise knowledge on the matter with bankrupted business owners. This additional clarity is 
required given that one’s attributional style may change over time which the current literature 
does not always consider. 
2.4.4 Learning processes  
An important aspect of overcoming business failure and bankruptcy, involves examining the 
learning steps used and if one truly learns. There is a body of work that has examined how 




identify the opportunity to build and run another company (Shepherd, 2013; Lattacher and 
Wdowiak, 2020). This is not surprising given that individuals often learn more from their 
failures than successes (Petroski, 1985) and that entrepreneurs often form gradual knowledge 
from crucial events in a small business (Cope, 2003). Learning can be considered a process of 
gaining new skills and development of knowledge through the constant repetition of tasks 
(Burke and Hutchins 2007; Minniti and Bygrave 2001). Entrepreneurial learning specifically 
has grown in scholarly interest (Wang and Chugh, 2014). The concept of entrepreneurial 
learning can be described as a process of experiential learning, which entails gaining 
knowledge through the conversion of experiences (Politis, 2005).  
Early research by Sitkin (1992) has highlighted the issues entrepreneurs face with learning 
from their small business failure. Yet, sequential works have uncovered that gradual learning 
from business failure is possible (Mckenzie, 2008; Shepherd, 2003), whilst others have 
reported that learning is only possible under certain conditions (Cardon et al., 2011; Yamakawa 
et al., 2010). A series of studies have highlighted that business owners utilise reflective 
practices to learn from business failure (Minniti and Bygrave, 2001; Pretorius and Le Roux 
2011; Frota Vasconcellos Dias and Marten 2019). Firm-level research has also emphasised that 
employees should embark on learning practices by reflecting on their failures to learn (Canon 
and Edmonson, 2005). Such reflection can lead to future business development (McGrath, 
1999). 
A range of other literature has been driven by the entrepreneurial learning theory to showcase 
that a failed venture founders engages in ‘higher-level’ learning which involves reflexively 
looking back at their failure (Cope, 2011; Ekanem and Wyer, 2007). This can equip 
entrepreneurs with the preparedness for their future enterprises by challenging prior behaviours 
that led to their failure. Cope (2011) specifically uncovered that following the initial stages of 
coping and reflection, the entrepreneur begins to explore how they can start-up again and by 
doing so, they reach a “higher order” stage of learning. He further noted that learnings gained 
from the failure are associated with the firm owners themselves, their venture and stakeholder 
relationships coupled with how they manage entrepreneurial ideas (Cope, 2011). Interestingly 
Parker (2013) has gone on to show that failed and bankrupted business owners usually tend to 
obtain short-term benefits from their firms’ downfall. These include useful learnings from their 
previous ventures which can be utilised in future enterprises, but such “benefits” eventually 
perish and thus can be classed as ‘lower-level’ superficial learnings (Baumard and Starbuck, 




entrepreneurs constituted a process of becoming fully conscious of their habitual behaviours 
and thought processes. The firm owners may have never experienced such behaviours before. 
This can involve the entrepreneur becoming aware of their ego and through no other option 
addressing it to challenge their perception of themselves. Thus, the learning process involves 
the business owner reflexively decoding old ways of thinking and at a certain stage, due to the 
severity of their experience, altering their thought processes. The authors propose that this 
supports prior work on higher-level of learning, as suggested by Cope (2011). Yet, unlike 
Cope’s process of reflection (Cope, 2011), these processes are less premedicated and this type 
of learning is rooted from epiphany-like moments. These types of moments entail the venture 
owners reaching a point where they had profound thoughts about the failure and the stigma 
attached to it. During this stage, they convert their failure experience from an adverse series of 
events to helpful incidents. Singh et al. (2015) also demonstrated that participants experienced 
lower-level learnings from the failure. To summarise, this area of work has highlighted the 
complexity of the experiential learning process from a venture blunder and the trajectories 
involved in order to learn in the long-term. One can deduce that experiential and reflective 
learning trajectories are likely to be used in combination with each other by failed business 
owners. It would be interesting for additional studies to delve into the relationship between the 
two as current work has not delved into this matter in much detail.  
2.4.5 Impact of timing on learning from failure and opportunity identification   
A key step that forms part of the learning from the firm failure process has been documented 
as opportunity identification (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). This involves the capability of 
the entrepreneur to pinpoint another business idea that can be put into motion (Amankwah-
Amoah et al., 2018; Cope, 2011). This is a growing research area (Tipu, 2020). Early studies 
have proclaimed that prior business failure and experience in general, can encourage 
opportunity identification (Minniti and Bygrave, 2001; Ucbasaran et al., 2003). Ucbasaran et 
al., (2006) have revealed that former bankrupted business owners identified more innovative 
opportunities for future enterprises in contrast to other entrepreneurs that had not experienced 
failure. Huovinen and Tihula (2008) and Mitchell et al. (2008), have also reported that failed 
firm owners can use their former business demise to help found another firm. Ucbasaran et al., 
(2009) supported these previous findings, yet business owners who possessed more than an 
average of 4.5 businesses were likely to identify less opportunities. The findings also 
demonstrated that if the experience is more negative than positive, it can diminish the quantity 




Recent theorising on opportunity identification post business failure has harnessed the concepts 
of structural alignment thinking (Mueller and Shepherd, 2016) and social capital (Quan and 
Hung, 2016) to indicate that prior business failure can influence one’s opportunity 
identification of subsequent firms. Further research has recognised that failed business owners’ 
experience, including the grieving stages, supports them to identify and exploit avenues for 
future ventures (Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2018). Moreover, other recent evidence has drawn 
on the experiential learning theory (Boso et al., 2019), motivation concepts (Jeng and Hung, 
2019) and the theory of planned behaviour (Acheampong and Tweneboah-Koduah, 2018; He 
et al., 2020) to report that failed firm owners harness their knowledge of failure to positively 
form and develop their sequential enterprises. Such works have called out that an 
entrepreneur’s capability to restart is dependent on their perception of their consecutive venture 
succeeding. In sum, the current literature has provided a range of findings to propose that 
previous failure and bankruptcy experiences are valuable learning experiences. Yet, it is not 
fully clear at what point are bankrupted firm owners able to rebound to venture again and how 
their experience has exactly enabled them to do so. 
2.4.6 Demonstration of learning  
Ownership of prior businesses has been found to generally increase the acquisition of 
entrepreneurial related human capital (Zhang, 2011; Bosma et al., 2004) which in turn can 
increase the likelihood of starting another venture (Amaral et al., 2009; Stam et al., 2008) and 
help the performance of future entrepreneurial pursuits (Headd, 2003). Scholars have proposed 
that the last stage from venture failure stems from obtaining such capital, which is referred to 
as the knowledge and skills gained from previous life experiences that can impact the 
performance of subsequent entrepreneurial firms (Kato and Honjo, 2015; Huovinen and Tihula, 
2008). The knowledge acquired can take the form of psychological capital (emotional resources 
and mental coping strategies), social capital (use of social networks) as well as business capital 
(use of business insights such as an understanding of customers) and it stems from the decision 
to leverage the opportunities entrepreneurs have found to launch another venture and the 
actions involved in the process (Choi and Shepherd, 2004; Luthans et al., 2007; Bosma et al., 
2004).  
Early literature in the domain of capital has touched upon how business failure can be used as 
a useful life tool to equip entrepreneurs to deal with future uncertainty to an extent (Politis, 




from their prior failures, yet they have found there is heterogeneity on making use of this 
learning (Sardana and Scott-Kemmis 2010). Moreover, quantitative works have utilised the 
entrepreneurial learning theory to show that prior failure can have positive firm-level 
implications (Stam et al., 2008; Nielsen and Sarasvathy, 2016). Further quantitative works have 
found that failed entrepreneurs are also likely to harness their experience to negotiate better 
financial deals than less experienced business owners (Zhang, 2011; Paik, 2014; Nahata, 2019). 
A longitudinal qualitative study has also uncovered similar results and highlighted that firm 
owners obtain several entrepreneurial competencies (Minello, 2014). Besides this, scholars 
have identified that previously failed firm owners are more inclined to think strategically and 
make innovative choices due to their prior venture demise (Rerup 2005; Kuuluvainen, 2010; 
Wakkee and Moser 2016; Lin et al., 2019; Yu et al., 2014). In terms of social implications, 
literature has shown that failed firm owners are likely to use their learning to build relationships 
with their staff (Polistis, 2008; Masuda, 2008; Atsan, 2016) whilst forming social networks 
successfully (Frota Vasconcellos Dias and Martens, 2019). Interestingly, Singh et al., (2015) 
have also shown that those who learn from their business, can use their capital in multiple ways. 
This does not only involve starting up a venture but can entail mentoring others as an active 
member of entrepreneurial groups which in turn can help boost the number of enterprises 
founded and perhaps pre-empt business failure. Overall, the long-term learning from a business 
failure could be due to the causes that led to the venture demise initially, although additional 
literature is needed to back these findings up. 
However other studies have contested the impact of entrepreneurial capital as entrepreneurs 
who start up a company again after failure have been found to fail again despite the previous 
knowledge obtained from the former ownership of a company (Van Kesteren at al., 2017; 
Gottschalk et al., 2017). Additionally, for those who have overcome business failure, despite 
obtaining useful experience to support their subsequent venture may still struggle financially 
(Wakkee and Mosser, 2016; Toft-Kehler et al., 2014). Beyond the grief that comes with the 
venture collapse, there are multiple reasons why firm owners may not learn anything from their 
prior business demises (Ucbasaran et al., 2008), which could stem from them not being 
effectively able to appraise their failure experience (Jenkins et al., 2014). Some entrepreneurs 
may justify that they have acquired more knowledge than they think they have from their 
business collapse due to not possessing the threshold level of psychological capital needed to 
effectively appraise the failure to learn, move on and utilise it (Cope, 2011; Singh et al., 2015). 




collapse could be due to an array of factors and therefore the work that business failure can 
often lead to long-term learning should be looked at carefully. 
The last sub-theme of works that examine the long-term learning trajectories of failed firm 
owners, focuses on the influences of identity and geographical factors. For instance, studies 
have highlighted that one’s ethnicity and culture (Mendy and Hack-Polay 2018; He et al., 
2020), external institutional factors (Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2019), as well as a combination 
of both identity and external factors (Wei et al., 2019) can impact a business owner learning 
post failure. Despite these useful findings on the impact of identity and geographical factors 
that influence a failed company owners learning, additional research is required to understand 
the implications of such factors. 
Taken together, although a vast amount of the literature on learning following a venture demise 
has indicated the range of learning possible, one should look at these results rationally, given 
that this may not always be the case. As highlighted by Coad (2014) and Walsh (2017) more 
work is required about long-term entrepreneurial learning post business failure to help shed 
light on the topic due to the contradictory nature of the findings on the matter. Research has 
also made calls for further literature to provide a sharper view of the influence of the range of 
factors that can impact upon how a business owner can learn from failure (Jeng and Hung, 
2019). 
2.4.7 Section summary  
Overall, the extant research on an entrepreneurs’ coping and learning experiences of business 
failure and the cases which led to bankruptcy have provided useful findings on the topic. The 
literature in this area has begun to demonstrate the intricate as well as important coping and 
learning processes that entrepreneurs undertake to deal with the negative implications of their 
failure and to consider restarting a firm. The works in this area have also precisely shown the 
multidimensional effects of coping and learning, with several studies relying on the 
entrepreneurial learning theory to explain their results as well as placing an emphasis on 
emotional regulation as a coping mechanism. 
Despite the valuable research on overcoming business failure, there are an array of avenues for 
investigation. First, there is a deficiency of studies that has examined how failed entrepreneurs 
who have gone through bankruptcy, emotionally regulate, self-reflect, and make sense of their 
venture demise as the bulk of the work in the domain focusses on those who failed in business 




entrepreneurs and the speed in which they make-sense of their bankruptcy as well as how their 
social networks impact how they cope as previous studies have failed to examine this in depth. 
There is also a need to find out which coping methods are most optimal to aid the venture 
owner’s recover, the order in which they occur and the inter-relationships between them. 
Second, if a firm owner undergoes a recovery period to come to terms with their business 
collapse, it would be valuable to understand how long does it last for. Subsequently, the 
research areas that need investigation can be summarised as the following research questions; 
Why and how do certain venture owners bounce back quicker from their bankruptcy experience 
then others and how do they do so? How long does this recovery period last for if there is one? 
How does a bankrupted firm owners’ social networks impact their recovery? What is the 
ordering of the coping mechanisms used by an entrepreneur restart a firm post-bankruptcy?  
Another research area that requires exploration entails looking at how an entrepreneurs’ 
emotional resources can impact their ability to bounce back in terms of their coping and long-
term learning. These comprise of their resilience capabilities which entail their optimism, 
passion, persistence, confidence stemming their level of self-efficacy, in combination with 
one’s attributional style. There is not a significant amount known about these precise topics, 
and from what is known, specifically in relation to the literature on attributional style, the 
findings are not completely clear. Investigating these areas are important, not only to add 
knowledge to the existing body of useful work but to help entrepreneurs potentially overcome 
their business failure as well as pre-empt ventures collapsing. The following research question, 
encapsulates this research areas; How does a previously failed entrepreneur emotional 
resources, comprising their resilience capabilities, self-efficacy, and attributional style 
influence how one overcomes bankruptcy, restarts a venture, and their long-term learning from 
the process?  
Beyond these research avenues, another area of work that requires further investigation 
involves delving into how learning exactly helps an entrepreneur overcome failure, identify an 
opportunity to restart a new venture as well as create and develop the firm. This includes further 
deciphering the exact learning process that venture founders undertake and use to form capital. 
This research topic is important to investigate as irrespective of knowledge provided from the 
literature that learning has been found to facilitate subsequent venture opportunity 
identification, creation, and development post-business failure, other works have shown that 
may not always be the case. Research has also highlighted how identity and external factors 




the body of work on whether firm owners learn post-failure, coupled with a need to understand 
the influence of factors that impact the learning process which has not been explored in enough 
detail, hence additional studies on the matter would be beneficial. Such research areas, can be 
explored using the following questions: Does learning from a previous business bankruptcy 
help an entrepreneur restart another company and if so, how does it precisely aid them in their 
venture opportunity identification and development of their consecutive firm? At what point 
does the firm owner recognise the opportunity to launch another company post-their business 
bankruptcy? What is the exact role of capital and which learning strategies help the previously 
bankrupted entrepreneur within their pursuit to start another enterprise? 
Lastly, several studies in this area have relied on cognitive and learning concepts. Such 
concepts have provided valuable insights into how firm owners overcome their venture failure 
and bankruptcy. Yet, the concepts are not able to fully explain the intricate processes involved 
in overcoming a business failure and bankruptcy. 
2.5 An Antifragility perspective to Bouncing Back from Entrepreneurial Failure 
2.5.1 Theoretical lens 
Antifragility has been taken as the primary theoretical lens driving this study. The concept of 
antifragility was introduced by Taleb (2012) to describe how individuals, systems and 
organisations respond to volatility. The mantra behind antifragility is that one can get stronger 
when faced with pain, meaning that they can handle the same pain better (Taleb, 2012). It is 
worthy of noting that the concept of antifragility has grown in immense popularity and has 
been utilised in several subjects, for instance health care systems have used the concept to 
provide advice on how they can be organised to prosper during a pandemic (Al-Azri, 2020; 
Ramezani and Camarinha-Matos, 2020). To elucidate the construct of antifragility further, one 
can note the example of labelling a package which contains items that are likely to break and 
requires transportation. It is common that one would mark the package with the phrase fragile 
to ensure it is left in peace and not broken. Alternatively, if the package contained contents that 
would not break and, in fact, possessed properties that were the exact opposite of fragile, 
meaning that they would get stronger if put through harm, it would be rational to label the 
package with “please mishandle”. The word antifragile though would be more appropriate as 
it aptly describes the inverse of fragile (Taleb, 2012). Moreover, antifragility goes further than 
being resilient, since the resilient tolerates pain and does not change, whilst the antifragile 




antifragile on the other end as the complete opposite and the robust or the resilient in the middle 
(Taleb, 2012).  
Another example that explains the concept of antifragility can be drawn from Greek 
mythology. Those on the fragile end of the continuum, can be represented by Damocles who 
has been reported to have died in a pressuring situation irrespective of his high power within 
society (Sanderson, 1996). This shows how one is broken from even the slightest of conflicts 
and instabilities. For those on the opposite end, antifragility can be best personified through the 
several-headed Hydra, who would grow back two heads each time one head was cut off (Taleb, 
2012). The mythical creature Hydra, shows how one gains from going through a harmful 
experience, overcompensating for the pain by increasing in strength in preparation to face 
another obstacle. Going even further, the idea of antifragility is explained as a curved response 
to a stressor that is non-linear that up to a certain point (Taleb, 2012). This means that with 
increased pain, less harm is encountered as the antifragile overcompensate for the shock 
endured and can benefit by handling the same stressor better than they previously did (Taleb, 
2012). On a deeper biological level, stressors provide information to human body about the 
wider environment which sequentially spur on a reaction (Taleb, 2012). Such reactions can 
involve the competition of living cells and their constituent parts to grow (Taleb, 2012). 
Another alterative example of a depiction of antifragility, can be drawn from it being 
comparable to post-traumatic growth, which unlike post-traumatic stress disorder where people 
face negative effects from previously occurred events, they in fact gain positively from such 
events (Calhoun and Tedeschi, 2014). 
The concept of antifragility is specifically drawn from one’s ability to handle the magnitude of 
black swan events (Taleb, 2012, Taleb, 2007). Black swan events commonly have three key 
attributes; (i) they are usually not forecasted and are not frequent; (ii) they can have a 
detrimental effect on the observer; and (iii) they are inadequately rationalised by hindsight 
(Taleb, 2007). Consequently, these occurrences can take-over one’s mind, given the fear and 
overreaction that comes from them as they can randomly occur, straying away from the desire 
for humans to have order (Taleb, 2012). An example of a black swan event entails World War 
1 (Taleb, 2012). Crucially, black swan events can be deemed as essential events for human 
development and antifragility helps to build one’s understanding about their worth. For those 
on the fragile end of the continuum such black swan events can appear to be negative whereas 




It is also worthy to note that Taleb (2012) has discussed how individuals follow the “skin in 
the game” heuristic, which involves acting in situations to obtain antifragility but also have a 
high degree of openness and courage to seek knowledge from novel situations (Markey-
Towler, 2018; Taleb, 2012; Taleb, 2018). He further has described another strategy to obtain 
antifragility known as the barbell strategy (Taleb, 2012). This involves having a dual attitude 
to black swans, with the two types of attitude sitting on either side of the barbell and avoidance 
to any black swans in the middle. Subsequently, one side of the barbell will entail the process 
of decreasing the chances of encountering negative black swans. By doing so, the fragile is 
protected since they are less likely to face irreversible damage. The second side of the barbell 
involves increasing the chance of encountering positive black swans, thus increasing the odds 
of facing a higher number of minor risks, whilst simultaneously avoiding the larger ones. 
Through following the barbell strategy, Taleb (2012) argues that it can help prevent irreparable 
damage whilst assisting one to become stronger through gaining from certain stressors, 
ultimately becoming more antifragile. Strategies like these have been noted to be integral to 
help entrepreneurial ventures to succeed when faced with immense uncertainty as they benefit 
from “trial and error” (Markey-Towler, 2018; Bridge, 2018). 
In addition, to the concept of antifragility, aspects of the social cognitive theory (Bandura, 
1977), precisely the concept of self-efficacy, which is defined as one belief in themselves to 
complete a task, will be utilised as a secondary part of the theoretical lens. The concept has 
been uncovered as a valuable construct in a number of situations, such as influencing ones’ 
ability to pursue entrepreneurial activities (Barbosa et al., 2007). Shepherd (2003) has 
highlighted that venture owners make use of their self-efficacy during their business failure. 
Self-efficacy has also been linked to other key entrepreneurial emotional states passion and 
persistence which can be related to a firm owner’s resilience required to overcome business 
failure (Cardon and Kirk, 2015; Coelho and McClure, 2005; Corner et al., 2017). In a corporate 
setting, those who display high levels of self-efficacy have been reported to often bounce back 
from failure (Shepherd et al., 2009). Hence, it is evident that self-efficacy has begun to be 
documented as a relevant concept in understanding how a firm owner can restart following a 
venture failure.  
In combination with the concept of self-efficacy, the attribution style theory (Heider, 1958; 
Weiner, 1992) will be used as a secondary part of an overarching theoretical lens. The 
attribution theory intends to provide an explanation of how individuals examine how 




the concept and highlighted that there are differing dimensions of the theory. Since the birth of 
the attribution theory the concept been applied to several behaviours and unsurprisingly, there 
has been a range of applications of the attribution theory in the realms of explaining how 
business owners are able to overcome venture failure (see Mantere et al., 2013; Yamakawa and 
Cardon, 2015; Kibler et al., 2017; Kibler et al., 2020). It is evident that the attributions which 
firm owners may make about their venture demise can impact the decision process to restart a 
business (Shaver and Scott, 1991). In this regard, the attribution style theory holds great value 
to the topic. 
2.5.2 Antifragility: experiencing, recovering, and venture re-start 
A range of well-known and relevant theories have been used by former studies within the 
domain of business failure. Yet, by drawing on the primary concept of antifragility alongside 
the concepts of self-efficacy and the attribution theory as an overarching theoretical lens one 
can significantly advance the current entrepreneurial failure literature in several ways. 
First, the overarching theoretical lens has meant that the author has provided a unique and 
multidimensional microscope to understand how business owners rebound to venture again 
post-bankruptcy. This is important as it is evident that no one single theory can be used to 
investigate how failed entrepreneurs have gone on to restart a venture given the complexity of 
the subject (Walsh, 2017). As discussed, the entrepreneurial failure literature has developed 
over the decades, yet it is vastly fragmented thus, a primary theoretical lens with secondary 
concepts could help to integrate a range of knowledge on the matter as well as produce novel 
findings on the matter. Antifragility as well as the aspects drawn from the attribution and self-
efficacy concepts focus on providing an explanation for how an individual may respond to a 
given situation. Yet, each theory provides a unique gaze to examine the subject. Attributions 
can be used to explain how a firm owner is able to piece together why their previous business 
discontinued and ended in bankruptcy. Self-efficacy can explain how one is able to develop 
the ability to launch another firm. Importantly, antifragility can be applied to generally 
elucidate the steps involved in the entrepreneurial re-entry process. Therefore, collectively the 
theories are suited to understand how formerly bankrupted entrepreneurs are able to bounce 
back and react effectively to the social, financial, behavioural and other effects of bankruptcy. 
For instance, the theoretical lens can help to add light onto how once bankrupted business 




can also help balance out the works on the social effects of failure that provide insight into the 
implications of stigma (Singh et al., 2015; Simmons et al., 2014; Cusin and Maymo, 2016). 
Second, a range of works have taken the voluntarist perspective to business failure by relying 
on the attribution theory alone to highlight the impact of one’s failure (Walsh, 2017). Such 
research has provided valuable insights into how a failed entrepreneurs’ ascription style can 
influence their sequential actions. To build a more thorough understanding of how failure 
attributions exactly influence a firm owner’s action, additional conceptual ideas are required 
on the matter (Mandl et al., 2016; Yamakawa and Cardon, 2015; Walsh and Cunningham, 
2017). This will enable one to form a more coherent picture of the processes involved in 
restarting a business. Moreover, a string of studies have also demonstrated that firm owners 
often display positive emotions towards their failure (Cannon and Edmondson, 2005; Politis 
and Gabrielsson, 2009; Ucbasaran et al.,2010) and can exhibit overconfidence (Ucbasaran et 
al., 2006; Hayward et al., 2010). These types of studies have predominantly relied on the 
experiential learning theory which have provided valuable accounts of the role of emotions in 
relation to learning post-failure. Yet, the research in this area has only scratched the surface of 
identifying the impact of positive emotions in relation to business failure (Corner et al., 2017). 
There is a specific need to build an understanding of how exactly such differential emotional 
states impact each other. For example, how does feelings of overconfidence lead a failed firm 
owner to display different attributional styles (Eggers and Song, 2015). The primary concept 
of antifragility can potentially provide a clearer explanation of how emotional resources are 
used to form the capabilities to restart a firm and the interrelationships between various 
emotional pathways since the concept explains how individuals can gain from negative 
experiences. 
Third, current works have provided useful knowledge on how firm owners display resilience 
towards business failure (see Cope, 2011; Corner et al., 2017). Yet, further insights are required 
to elucidate how firm owners can build such resilience and the capability to obtain benefits 
from the venture failure to bounce back (Amankwah-Amoah and Wang, 2019). Interestingly, 
Taleb (2012) proposed that entrepreneurs are a subset of the population who have chosen to 
take antifragile career route. To further epitomise this antifragile path, those who have gone 
through bankruptcy are extremely fitting, as they have not only taken a riskier career option, 
but their business collapse and the events that led to the business led may be deemed as 
comparable to black swan events. Such events may not always be predicted and can have a 




to explain how and why certain previously failed entrepreneurs may develop resilience, self-
belief and view returning to entrepreneurship as a viable option on the back of experiencing a 
black swan like event. 
Fourth, most of the literature on entrepreneurial venture failure has taken the competitive 
perspective and examined how firm owners overcome venture failure and the implications 
associated with it (Amankwah-Amoah and Wang, 2019). As discussed earlier, the works on 
recovering from a company blunder rely heavily on emotional regulation and the studies on 
learning, are predominantly investigated through the use cognitive and learning theories. 
Irrespective of the significant value of this research, the use of these theories is an issue given 
that such works are not able to explain the complexities of how one overcomes their venture 
failure and bankruptcy. For instance, it would be beneficial to capture a clearer understanding 
of the interrelationships between coping mechanisms and the length of time such coping 
mechanisms are used for. Further, the works on learning from a venture demise is based on 
contradictory evidence. The use of antifragility alongside the concept of self-efficacy and the 
attribution theory can potentially help explain how a firm owner copes and learns from their 
business failure more coherently. The concepts can specifically help to provide further clarity 
on the interplay between learning and coping as well as the factors which may support and 
hinder such processes. For example, given that a key aspect of “antifragility” entails the 
strategies used to ensure one gains more than they loose from a random event, the concept may 
explain how one can reap benefits from their failure in further depth than previous theories 
used to explore the topic. 
2.5.3 Towards an organising framework of entrepreneurial antifragility  
As shown in Figure 1 is an organising framework developed through the synthesis of insights 






















As showcased, the model identifies the causes business failure that led to bankruptcy can be 
induced by both internal and external factors. The internal factors are typically associated with 
the internal dynamics of the firm and the capabilities of the entrepreneurs. The external factors 
are commonly linked with forces outside of the business owner’s control. Importantly, for some 
entrepreneurs they may choose to exit entrepreneurship altogether following their venture 
demise and bankruptcy. For one to build antifragility to reach the outcome of bouncing back 
from bankruptcy through recovering from the business collapse, re-starting a venture and being 
able to handle business issues better, three ‘separate’ but ‘interconnected’ core phases are 
involved in the process. The aspects entail: i) engaging in reflective, practical, and emotional 
coping mechanisms; ii) undertaking experiential and reflexive learning strategies to identify 
and exploit the opportunity to develop another enterprise; and iii) utilising a range of emotional 
resources which entail the business owner’s resilience capabilities such as their self-efficacy 
and attributional style. Beyond these processes, the context of the venture demise and 
bankruptcy charges can influence the entrepreneur’s ability to restart. For instance, if the firm 
owner encounters issues with bankruptcy policies and other geographical related factors such 
as dealing with varying cultural attitudes towards failure. They may also face issues with how 
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they deal with other social, financial, and behavioural consequences of the entrepreneurial 
collapse. Moreover, aside from the context of the failure, the business owner’s identity such as 
their ethnic background may shape their venture failure experience and restart. Lastly, it is 
worthy of nothing that after restarting, some business owners may not return to 
entrepreneurship, or they may exit entrepreneurship after failing again, hence this route has 
been documented in the above figure. 
2.6 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
To conclude, a critical review of the literature in the domain of the causes, experiences and 
how overcomes entrepreneurial venture failure and bankruptcy has been provided. As stated, 
despite useful research across these areas, further work is required on the topic to solve 
contradictors and advance existing studies. In terms of the approach to investigate these 
research areas, theoretically a fresh theoretical perspective has been recommended to explore 
the research. By utilising antifragility as an overarching theoretical lens, an organising 
framework has been developed.  
In terms of research approach, despite several high-quality qualitative works, a vast number of 
previous studies in the domain of entrepreneurial failure and bankruptcy have been conducted 
using quantitative measures (Ucbasaran et al., 2010, Kibler et al., 2017; Yamakawa and 
Cardon, 2015). Such quantitative measures have not been able to also offer completely rich 
theoretical evidence on the matter. Moreover, as suggested by Walsh (2017) more research is 
required on the topic with a specific focus on a firm owner’s personal, psychological, and 
emotional experience of going through firm failure. Hence, a qualitative study would be 
appropriate to examine such in-depth individual accounts and enable one to delve deeper into 
the research matter. By taking this approach, one can utilise the more informed knowledge on 
the subject to ultimately help entrepreneurs deal better with their business failure and 
bankruptcy.  
Lastly, irrespective of the literature that has included bankrupted firm owners, there is still 
much to learn about entrepreneurs who have gone through bankruptcy and managed to restart. 
Thus, including venture founders who have restarted a business post-bankruptcy could also 
challenge current findings within these areas of investigation and provide a richer 




The next chapter will delve further into the research context, the reasoning for the choice of 
the qualitative approach and the purposive sampling strategy. The chapter will then provide an 







This chapter covers the research methodology underpinning the empirical inquiry. First, it 
provides an overview of the empirical research setting and the UK bankruptcy process. Second, 
the chosen research approach and purposive sampling strategy is outlined. Next, the participant 
recruitment process is delineated, after which a biographical sketch of the research respondents 
is presented. Following this is a description of the data collection procedure. The penultimate 
section then goes on to provide an account of the data analysis and concludes with a reflection 
on the methodological limitations of the study.  
3.1 Research Context  
3.1.1 Research setting 
Rates of individuals facing financial hardships has grown exponentially across the UK, with 
statistics showing that over 10,000 people are declared as bankrupt annually (BBC, 2019) and 
this is likely to grow by tenfold for young people (Miller, 2019). Relatively recent media 
coverage has also shed light on the issue, highlighting soaring insolvency rates in certain 
regions of the UK (BBC Radio 4, 2019; Inman, 2019). In relation to enterprises, over a 
staggering 10,000 UK firms went bankrupt in 2016 which was linked to firm owners not being 
able to pay back high-interest business loans and the influence of BREXIT causing economic 
insecurities (Scott, 2016). It is worthy to note that the UK differs to other parts of the world in 
terms of its bankruptcy processes, as depicted by the cross-country research by Lee et al., 
(2011). For instance, in Chile, the time spent as bankrupt can take up to four and a half years, 
in contrast to the UK where the bankruptcy charges can last for around one year. Furthermore, 
the actual cost of bankruptcy itself varies significantly cross the globe. For example, in 
Thailand, it amounts to thirty six percent of the firm’s assets value which is significantly higher 
than the UK where it only equates to six percent of the estate of the firm (Lee et al., 2011). The 
findings could be linked to the culture of failing fast and returning to entrepreneurship in the 
UK, as highlighted by the relatively short bankruptcy discharge period (Lee et al., 2011; 
National Debt Line, 2019). Beyond these findings, broadly speaking as an Anglo country, the 
UK is likely to have less shame when it comes to failure such as bankruptcy (Begley and Tan, 
2001). However, there is an importance in the UK for bankruptees to pay back their creditors 




UK is still above the average bankruptcy rate, which has been related to the UK’s recent 
turbulent economic environment (BBC, 2019; Dun and Bradstreet, 2019) 
In line with the increase in the numbers of bankruptcies, there has also been an upsurge in the 
development of entrepreneurship companies within the UK. Over 666,000 businesses are 
established yearly (Bound, 2017), which equates to 70 companies being set-up every hour (May 
2019). Globally, the UK remains high for entrepreneurial activity compared to other countries 
in Europe (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2019). Additionally, other statistics have shown 
record figures of over 2.7 million businesses registered in the UK (ThisisMoney, 2019). The 
surge in firm ownership has been linked to a rise in the number of microenterprises, with over 
2.4 million of these companies currently employing less than ten employees (ThisisMoney, 
2019). In terms of the specific geographical locations, London appears to be a central hub for 
UK business ownership, with 1563 firm owners per 10,000 London residents, hence amounting 
for one third of business owners nationally (Rhodes, 2018). 
In parallel with the rise of bankruptcies and new venture formation in the UK, there has been 
a rise in entrepreneurial failure; sixty percent of UK businesses go bust in their first three years 
and 20 percent collapse in their first 12 months (May 2019). It is evident that the increase in 
the number of new firms does not underpin an accurate depiction of business acumen within a 
specified region, as illustrated by London which has the highest business death rates, with 
86,000 firms closed in 2017 (Rhodes, 2018). It has also been reported that BREXIT amongst 
other factors, such as the current pandemic, means that there is likely to be a rise of business 
failures forecasted (Dun and Bradstreet, 2019; Manolova et al., 2020; Cowling et al., 2020). In 
a range of locations throughout the UK such as London, there are however, an increasing 
number of organisations such as debt counsellors and related charities that help those who have 
gone through personal insolvency and bankruptcy to pay their arrears back (BBC Radio 4, 
2019).  
Interestingly, to the researcher’s knowledge, there is no specific data on those who have 
managed to start-up again post failure that led to bankruptcy in the UK. However, one can 
garner from what is known, that venture development and bankruptcy rates remain high and 
continue to grow. Thus, the topic of how one bounces back from bankruptcy is very current. 
Besides this, there is a need to continue to explore entrepreneurial failure in the context of 





It can be surmised, that regardless of the unstable economic outlook of the UK, the country is 
an appropriate one to investigate entrepreneurial recovery from bankruptcy. Specifically, the 
London and Greater London regions are a relevant area to focus on, given the continuous 
growth of new enterprises and venture failures (Rhodes, 2018). The selected research setting 
means that the data could be collected with those who are working amidst such volatile 
economic environments. Subsequently, the research can help to potentially extend theories 
through gaining an understanding from those who are likely to have a varied set of experiences 
(Creswell and Poth, 2016; Collis and Hussey, 2013). 
3.1.2 UK bankruptcy policies 
As previously described, bankruptcy is a point where an individual cannot raise enough equity 
to financially operate and are given no option but to attend a court order that decides how they 
deal with their unpaid commitments (Shepherd, 2003; UK Government, 2019). Bankruptcy 
laws in the UK have changed over the years, but at present, bankruptcy is classed at a personal 
level, in which case an individual acts as a sole trader or partner of a firm who cannot pay their 
debts as opposed to a company, that ‘liquidates’ its assets to pay off debtors (National Debt 
Line, 2019). Going further, bankruptcy is a legal status given to the person and this is 
documented online on The Gazette website which holds a record of all those who have gone 
through bankruptcy (Citizens Advice, 2019). This differs to insolvency which is commonly 
described as a period of economic troubles or where a person is charged with an individual 
voluntary agreement (IVA) (Smith, 2016). An IVA entails an Insolvency Practitioner or 
Agency, such as the Government, to support the individual in financial distress through making 
a deal with their creditors to pay of the debts over a fixed period (StepChange, 2019). Yet, an 
individual can also be made bankrupt if they have broken the terms of their IVA (Azmi, Razak 
and Ahmad, 2018). Therefore, entrepreneurs that breached their IVA and were consequently 
declared as bankrupt were accepted to take part in the study. It is also important to highlight 
that following the charge of bankruptcy, the bankruptee’s assets such as their home, motor 
vehicle and other related items will be given to a dedicated trustee and can be sold to repay any 
outstanding debts (Citizens Advice, 2019). They will also not have control of their bank 
account (UK Government, 2019). Furthermore, if they are a business owner, the company will 
be closed, and they could be classified as a ‘disqualified director’ for up to fifteen years. Hence, 
in this case, the individual cannot be a business owner of a UK-based or overseas company 
during this period (UK Government, 2019). Following twelve months, the bankruptee will be 




their bankruptcy. Yet, any assets specifically owned during the bankruptcy timeframe which 
were not sold during the bankruptcy period could still be subject to being bought to raise funds 
to pay off any uncleared debts. Subsequently, unless restricted otherwise, those wishing to 
start-up an enterprise again can do so following the release from their discharges (UK 
Government, 2019). 
3.2 Research Approach  
3.2.1 Explorative qualitative design, philosophy, and strategy 
A mixture of both qualitative and quantitative studies has begun to investigate how 
entrepreneurs restart a venture post-failure (see Kibler et al., 2017; Yamakawa and Cardon, 
2015; (Walsh and Cunningham, 2016; Mandl et al., 2016). Yet very few existing empirical 
works explore how entrepreneurs who have been ‘legally bankrupted’ restarted their 
business(es) (Ucbasaran et al., 2013; Yamawaka and Cardon, 2015). Owing to the paucity of 
research focussing on restarters who have once been bankrupted, an explorative qualitative 
approach was deemed meaningful to advance current scholarly understanding of the lived 
experiences of entrepreneurs who manage to restart post-failure (Creswell and Poth, 2016; 
Collis and Hussey, 2013). 
In line with the qualitative philosophy and strategy, an interpretive approach was taken. This 
is important as the qualitative paradigm states that individuals perceive every situation from 
their perspective and multiple realities of a topic can co-exist at the same time (Creswell and 
Poth, 2016). Moreover, the qualitative perspective indicates that truth is complex and requires 
studying participants’ in-depth and holistic experiences as an active researcher (Creswell and 
Poth, 2016). Such an approach is exploratory in its nature, which has therefore enabled one to 
fully immerse themselves into the participant’s perspective and discover if there are any 
variances amongst the respondent’s answers (Creswell and Poth, 2016; Collis and Hussey, 
2013). A quantitative approach may not have been able to offer the same richness of data as 
the approach is more suitable to investigate the relationship between variables (Creswell and 
Poth, 2016).  
A qualitative approach was implemented by conducting semi-structured interviews as the 
primary research method accompanied with examining field notes, policy documentation and 
archival data. Semi-structured interviews were the most desirable methodology since it allows 
the gathering of reflective and current accounts from respondents (Creswell and Poth, 2016). 




focused on the stories of firm owners who have managed to cope, learn, and overcome their 
business failure that led to bankruptcy to meet the research objectives. Importantly, the use of 
an abductive analysis approach to develop theory (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). This 
approach is suitable as it involves utilising empirical findings through the use of a theoretical 
lens and systematic methodological examination (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). 
3.2.2 Purposive sampling strategy 
A purposive sampling approach to recruit participants was employed through carefully 
selecting respondents that were appropriate to answer the research questions (Patton, 1990). 
The suitable entrepreneurs chosen would therefore help to add fresh insights to the area being 
investigated (Eisenhardt et al., 2016). The participants could take part if they met the following 
sampling criteria: 
1) Be a UK-based entrepreneur who has been declared as bankrupt within the last 20 
years  
1a) The bankruptcy should be accessible and verifiable via The Gazette 
1b) The bankruptcy must be attributed to the business closure including liquidation of 
venture 
2) The entrepreneur has now re-started a business or businesses  
2a) The current business or businesses must be registered on the UK Company House 
2b) Their current re-established business or businesses have been in working operation 
for a minimum of six months  
The reasoning for this sampling approach, for instance, ensuring that the bankruptcy was within 
the last 20 years meant that the time period was long enough for those who went bankrupt to 
recall how they felt at that moment in time. It was also not too restrictive given that it was a 
hard task to locate these individuals in the first place. Furthermore, the bankruptcy must be 
related to the business failure and verifiable by The Gazette to ensure participant authenticity. 
In relation to the second aspect of the sampling criteria, the subsequent and current business or 
businesses must be verifiable via the UK Company House to ensure that it is a genuine UK 
established firm. Finally, it was stated that the current company or companies must be in 
operation for a minimum of six months to ensure that the entrepreneur has enough familiarity 
of repeat ownership to talk about their experience of running an enterprise again. One criterion, 
although not stated explicitly, was that all participants should be in based in the London or 
Greater London area which also influenced the participant recruitment. However, with the case 
of the one participant who was located outside of the Greater London area, it was decided that 




Another implicit requirement was that participants ideally owned smaller firms given that these 
entrepreneurs are likely to have a close relationship with their firm, yet all firm sizes were 
accepted (Cardon et al., 2005). Furthermore, smaller business owners are also likely to be a 
diverse group of entrepreneurs (Cardon et al., 2009; Byrne and Shepherd, 2015). A micro 
enterprise is defined as an organisation with one to nine employees, small enterprise with ten 
to 49 employees to a medium sized company employing around 50-249 employees (Bowman, 
2017). Taken together, the explicit and implicit requirements meant that the most suitable 
sample was attained to help answer the research questions. It also ensured that participants 
recruited encapsulated the definition of business failure being classed as leading to bankruptcy. 
In effect, the criteria can ultimately enhance the internal validity of the research by ensuring 
that the most appropriate and informed participants are chosen (Amaratunga et al., 2002).  
Beyond the recruitment criteria discussed, it was important that respondents were open to 
sharing their stories during the interviews. Furthermore, to ensure there was a diverse mix of 
stories, the informants were chosen from a range of sectors and included both males and 
females. This meant that the participants were representative of other UK entrepreneurs who 
have restarted a venture post-bankruptcy. Hence, one could perhaps obtain varied insights into 
their failure, coping and learning experiences. It is worthy to consider that generalisability was 
not the main objective of the study though and the research instead endeavoured to produce in-





3.2.3 Participant recruitment timeline and procedure  
The participant recruitment process in October 2018, which entailed a series of steps, as 
highlighted in Figure 2: 

















As depicted by the timeline above, the first step involved completion of the research ethics 
approval. Following this, emails were sent to 140 Insolvency Practitioners, Business 
Incubators, and other Enterprise Organisations via email. The emails to these organisations 
entailed: (1) an overview of the research study, (2) the ethical considerations and, (3) who is 
eligible to take part in the study. The email ended by asking if they knew of any applicable 
participants who could take part. The contact details of these organisations were found through 
various online searches in combination with an online directory of over 546 UK Business 
Incubators, Accelerators, and other related organisations (UK Government, 2019).  
Of the 90 Insolvency Practitioners contacted, only ten replied. They made comments such as, 
“this is not something we can help with”, “we would be interested but cannot support at this 
time” and “we do not want to share the client data and are not willing to contact suitable 
February – September 2019: 
- Advisors from The Gazette were contacted on how to find business owners in the Greater 
London area via their database 
- Face-to-face visits were made with applicable business owners who are listed on The Gazette and 
have an active business on the UK Company House 
- Suitable individuals from the researcher’s networks were contacted 
January 2019: 
- Research ethics application was approved 
- Insolvency Practitioners, Business Incubators and other Enterprise Organisations were contacted 
- Entrepreneurial related events to find appropriate participants were attended 
September - December 2019: 




individuals on your behalf”. This was most likely due to the sensitive nature of the research 
topic. In relation to the 50 Business Incubators and Enterprise Organisations contacted, only 
five responded. There responses entailed, “the study seems really interestingly and can help a 
lot of business owners but what is the incentive” and “we just cannot help”. Subsequently, the 
access to the participant group became exceptionally challenging. However, the sampling 
criteria was not changed irrespective of these obstacles as the researcher remained confident 
that these individuals would generate suitable data to develop existing theory. 
Simultaneously, the researcher advertised for participants on social media, such as Facebook, 
Twitter and LinkedIn. Specifically, a short synopsis of the study and how it adheres to ethical 
guidelines were posted on various pages. However, again, no participants were identified 
through these means as he only got one response which stated, “all the best with the research” 
and that they were “not aware of anyone suitable”. Responses of this nature could again be 
linked to the topic of investigation. 
As part of second stage of the recruitment process, administrative teams from websites such as 
The Gazette were contacted, which proved more helpful. The administrative teams were asked: 
(1) how to locate any previously bankrupted entrepreneurs (2) identify any business owners 
that have gone on to start again, and (3) how to use their sources in the most optimal manner. 
They advised on ways to use their online database in a sophisticated manner to find the 
individuals who have been bankrupted and owned a business by using certain search jargon. 
By following these methods, the names of relevant individuals were searched on the UK 
Company House to confirm that they met the sampling conditions. Specifically, if the potential 
participants had a business listed in their full name currently, the researcher further verified 
that they owned one previously through looking online at other records on the UK Company 
House to find out more about their other firms. The researcher then looked online to find were 
details to contact them and arrange a face-to-face visit to discuss the research study. In the 
instances where the researcher met participants, he briefed them about the study, gave them the 
participant invitation sheet for their completion with their contact details if they would like to 
take part. They were also made aware the data collection would be completed in September-
December 2019 and that the study would be fully confidential, emphasising that their identity 
would be kept anonymous.  
Additionally, in tandem, the researcher attended events in the entrepreneurial realm and tried 




locate prospective participants. He contacted over 40 individuals who may know of those that 
would meet the study details who shared the details of the research. The body of the email 
comprised; (1) the aim of the research, (2) what it precisely entailed and, (3) how the researcher 
would guarantee anonymity as well as confidentiality. The Study Information Sheet (see 
Appendix 1, part b) was also attached to the email. The Study Information Sheet gave further 
study details and the relevant contact details. Through doing so, people who were interested in 
the study, sequentially reached out for further details about the research. However, there was 
one instance when an individual agreed to take part but then decided not to partake and did not 
provide an explanation why. There was also another case, whereby a participant changed their 
mind before the interview commenced due to finding out more about the topic; they stated that 
they refused to take part due to the sensitive aspect of the subject. These instances reflect the 
intricacies faced with investigating entrepreneurial failure as documented in previous research 
(Singh et al., 2015).  
The final step in the recruitment process during the data collection stage involved participants 
suggesting other applicable individuals to take part in the study following their completion of 
the interview. Consequently, a snowball sampling technique was employed which meant that 
appropriate participants were primarily contacted from the researcher’s network and then from 
the participant’s networks (Noy, 2008). Snowballing as a strategy has been frequently used in 
entrepreneurship failure studies given the difficult aspects of recruitment of suitable 
participants (Cope, 2011; Shepherd et al., 2009; Corner et al., 2017). The snowball sampling 
technique had meant that the researcher was perhaps more easily able to find participants who 
would be more inclined to share their experiences (Creswell and Poth, 2016). Following this 
participants were contacted again a few weeks ahead of September 2019 via email to find a 
suitable date, time, and location for the interview. To summarise, about 20 percent of the 
participating entrepreneurs came from the researcher’s network and the rest of them were from 
the participants’ networks or via online sources such as The Gazette. 
The purposive sampling strategy also has two key strengths. First, it enabled one to obtain a 
heterogenous population within a fairly homogenous population of entrepreneurs that have 
gone through bankruptcy and sequentially restarted a venture. Hence, the recruited business 
owners worked across industries which meant variances in these entrepreneur’s accounts of 
their business failure were captured. Second, the key requirements meant the sample was 
restricted to those who have been exposed to dealing with the ramifications that come with the 




instance, if all firm owners had overcome business failure instead of those who went through 
bankruptcy, they may have had distinctly different experiences. The below tables (Table 2 and 




 Table 2: Participant information from previous business(es) 
 
# Pseudonym, Age, 
(Gender), 
Qualifications 




Failure event  Year of 
bankruptcy 
charges  
Financial investment/ Loss in 
GBP 
1 Sam, 60, (M) A Level Automotive 46900 - Non-specialised wholesale trade 3 Employees: 3 
Partners: 1 
Voluntary Liquidation  2002 £100,200 
2 Joseph, 55, (M), A Level Automotive 45320 - Retail trade of motor vehicle parts and accessories 2 Employees: 2 
Partners: 1 
Voluntary Liquidation 2015 Not disclosed 
3  Julie, 44, (F), A Level  Retail  47190 - Other retail sale in non-specialised stores 4 Employees: 4 
Partners: 0 
Involuntary Liquidation 2008 Not disclosed 
4  Lisa, 24, (F), Bachelors Entertainment,  90020 - Support activities to performing arts 1 Employees: 1 and various 
subcontractors  
Partners: 1 
Business Closure 2017 Not disclosed 
5,  Derek, 35, (M), A Levels Retail 47190 - Other retail sale in non-specialised stores 2 Employees: 0 
Partners: 1 
Business Closure 2014 Not disclosed 
6 George, 55, (M), A 
Levels 
i) Gardening  
ii) Printing  
i) 32990 - Other manufacturing not elsewhere classified 
46730 - Wholesale of wood, construction materials and sanitary equipment 
ii)  18129 - Printing not elsewhere classified 
i) 8 
ii) 8 
i) Employees: 25 
Partners: 0 
Turnover: £700,00 
ii) Employees: 8 
Partners: 0 
Turnover: 1,000,000 
Voluntary Liquidation 2010 House, overall £10,000 
7 Scott, 65, (M), no 
qualifications 
i) Food and Beverage  
ii) Food and Beverage  
i) 56103 - Take-away food shops and mobile food stands 
ii) 56103 - Take-away food shops and mobile food stands 
i) 6 
ii) 6 
i) Employees: 6 
Partners: 0 




2015 House, Car, overall £50,000  
8  Damien, 45, (M), A 
Levels 




2014 Not disclosed 
9  Zack, 77, (M), GCSE’s Property 82990 - Other business support service activities not elsewhere classified 
96090 - Other service activities not elsewhere classified 
4 Employees: 0 
Partners: 1 
Business Closure 1999 Not disclosed 
10  Marios, 40, (M), no 
qualifications 
Construction 43910 - Roofing activities 4 Employees: 3 and various 
subcontractors 
Partners: 1 
Voluntary Liquidation  2016 Not disclosed 
11  Carl, 63, (M), Masters Oil 62012 - Business and domestic software development 8 Employees: 34 
Partners: 1 
Business Closure 2016 £232,000 
12 Nigel, 50, (M), Bachelors Fast food 56103 - Take-away food shops and mobile food stands  Employees: 3 
Partners: 0 
Business Closure 2009 Car, figure not disclosed 
13 Dilan, 37, (M), Bachelors Sporting 93199 - Other sports activities 2 Employees: 0 
Partners: 1 
Business Closure 2008 £8000 
14 Jay, 60, (M), A Level Motorsports 45112 - Sale of used cars and light motor vehicles 2 Employees: 1  
Partners: 0 
Business Closure 2015 Not disclosed 
15 Tyler, 23, (M), Bachelors Events 93290 - Other amusement and recreation activities not elsewhere classified 2 Employees: 0 
Partners: 3 
Business Closure 2015 Not disclosed 
16 Michelle, 45, (F), 
Bachelors 
Fitness 93130 - Fitness facilities 1 Employees: 1 
Partners: 0 
Voluntary Liquidation 2009 £10,000  
17 Stefan, 43, (M), GCSE’s Food and Beverage 56103 - Take-away food shops and mobile food stands 9 Employees: 20 
Partners: 1 
Involuntary Liquidation 2006 Not disclosed 
18 Jeff, 50, (M), Bachelors Food and Beverage 46370 - Wholesale of coffee, tea, cocoa and spices 
 
2 Employees: 4 
Partners: 0 
Voluntary Liquidation 2015 £100,000 
19 Denise, 55, (F),  
Bachelors 
Experiences  93290 - Other amusement and recreation activities not elsewhere classified 10 Employees: Not disclosed 




20 Jake, 46, (M), Bachelors Technology 96090 - Other service activities not elsewhere classified 5 Employees: Not disclosed 
Partners: Not disclosed 




Table 3: Participant Information from current business(es) 
# Pseudonym Venture Type Nature of Business (SIC) Years in 
operation 
Venture Size 
1 Sam Automotive 46900 - Non-specialised wholesale trade 10 Employees: 8 
Partners: 1 
2 Joseph Automotive/E-commerce 45320 - Retail trade of motor vehicle parts and accessories 3 Employees: 0 
Partners: 0 
3  Julie Bedding/E-commerce 47990 -  Other retail sale not in stores, stalls or markets 10 Employees: 1 
Partners: 0 
4  Lisa Entertainment 90020 - Support activities to performing arts 1 Employees: 1 and subcontractors employed annually 
Partners: 0 
5 Derek Sporting 93130 - Fitness facilities 1 Employees: 0 
Partners: 1 
6 George i) Financial  
ii) Financial  
i) 80200 - Security systems service activities 
ii) 96090 - Other service activities not elsewhere classified 
i) 3 
ii) 3 
 Not disclosed 
7 Scott i) Food and Beverage  
 
56103 - Take-away food shops and mobile food stands 2 Employees: 6 
Partner: 1 
Turnover: £300,000  
8  Damien Automotive 46900 - Non-specialised wholesale trade 3 Employees: 3 
Partners: 1 
9  Zack i)Accountancy  
ii) Medical  
i) 82990 - Other business support service activities not elsewhere classified 
ii) 82990 - Other business support service activities not elsewhere classified 
i) 19 
ii) 19 
i) Employees: 15 
Partners: 3 
ii) Employees: 5 
Partners: 1 
10  Marios Construction 43910 - Roofing activities 2 Employees:2 and 15 sub-contractors 
Partners: 0 
11  Carl Oil 62012 - Business and domestic software development 
82990 - Other business support service activities not elsewhere classified 
3 Employees: 111 
Partners: 1 
12 Nigel Food and Beverage 56103 - Take-away food shops and mobile food stands 6 Employees 5 
Partners: 0 
13 Dilan Sporting 85510 - Sports and recreation education 
93120 - Activities of sport clubs 
93199 - Other sports activities 
2 Employees: 2 
Partners: 1 
14 Jay Telecommunications 61900 - Other telecommunications activities 3 Employees: 0 
Partners: 0 
15 Tyler Events 93290 - Other amusement and recreation activities not elsewhere classified 2 Employees: 0 
Partners: 0 
16 Michelle Fitness 93130 - Fitness facilities 9 Employees: 2 
Partners: 0 
17 Stefan i) Food and Beverage   
ii) Beauty 
iii) Cleaning 
56103 - Take-away food shops and mobile food stands 
96020 - Hairdressing and other beauty treatment 





18 Jeff Food and Beverage 56101 - Licensed restaurants 2 Employees: 10 
Partners: 0 
19 Denise Publishing 58290 - Other software publishing 
 
7 Not disclosed 
20 Jake i) Technology   
ii)  Hospitality  
iii) Fintech 
74909 - Other professional, scientific and technical activities not elsewhere classified 
93290 - Other amusement and recreation activities not elsewhere classified 








As can be seen the participants all work within various industries, size from those employing 
no staff to the maximum of 111 employees. Participants all had a range of educational 
experiences with a gender split of four males to sixteen females. Furthermore, there was a 
varied age range from 23 to 70. The failure event leading to the bankruptcy also varies and the 
median age of business before their failure event was 4 years. As stated, respondents were 
primarily based in the London region bar one of them who was based in the midland’s region. 
It is also worthy of noting that, all the firms listed in Table 2 are the first enterprises launched 
by all participants. Furthermore, the financial losses from the business venture failure were not 
obtained from all respondents who did not share this information during the interviews, 
The below figure further illustrates a visual demonstration of where and how participants were 
located, their industries and company size. 
Figure 3: Breakdown of participants 
 
Figure 3 shows that participants are from a specific cohort of those have failed and managed 
to start-up again. The sample demographic is not entirely homogenous, and there is 
heterogeneity in terms of is a mixture of company sizes albeit the predominant number of 
participants own a microenterprise. A plethora of sector groups have also been studied but there 




It is worthy of noting that the study followed a similar number of interviewees as per other 
qualitative studies in the field (Corner et al., 2017; Walsh and Cunningham, 2017; Amankwah-
Amoah et al., 2018). In addition, the sample size of 20 is typical of exploratory qualitative 
research that endeavours to capture rich data to answer how, when, and why related research 
questions (Creswell and Poth, 2016). This sample size therefore enabled researcher to truly 
unpick entrepreneurs felt during the point of when they went bankrupt, how they dealt with the 
experience to when they eventually re-started (Creswell and Poth, 2016; Hesse-Biber and 
Leavy, 2010). In sum, 20 participants granted one the opportunity to garner a substantial 
amount of data about the topic explored (Creswell and Poth, 2016; Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 
2010) to reach a point of saturation where common themes emerged across the data set (Gioia 
et al., 2013).  
3.3 Research Methods 
3.3.1 Research procedure and sources  
The initial motivation for this study was to understand how entrepreneurs have overcome a 
business failure that resulted in personal bankruptcy by restarting a venture. Specifically given 
that the research endeavoured to focus on the firm owners’ perception of the causes of the 
failure, general experience as well as coping, and learning throughout the journey. To do so, a 
series of steps in the data collection process were undertaken. First, the ethical protocol was 
completed by developing an Instruction Sheet which stated the interview steps. The interview 
protocol sheet from the ethical application was then developed. This is important since it acted 
as a guide for the semi-structured interviews to ensure all topics were discussed and follows 
Gioia et al’s. (2013) recommendation. As shown in Figure 4, an overview of the timeline of 






























The data collection process commenced in September 2019, with emails sent out to respondents 
who agreed to take part in the study at an earlier date and any other suitable individuals. The 
Participant Information Sheet (see Appendix 1, part b) was shared with them. This gave details 
of the study and invited them to take part. In some cases, participants were briefed in further 
detail about the study ahead of arranging a suitable time for the interview. As per the above 
figure, the actual data collection of the interviews commenced in September 2019 and ended 
in December 2019, yet the ethical application and participant recruitment preceded this. 
Sequentially, the analysis stage followed from January 2020 – September 2020. 
3.3.2 Semi-structured interviews 
The principal source of the data collection was the semi-structured interviews. Eighteen of the 
twenty semi-structured interviews were face-to-face with the participant in a quiet area of their 
workplace, home, or public area such as coffee shop which the respondent had said they would 
September 2019: 
- Potential participants and other entrepreneurs who agreed to partake were contacted 
- Interviews commenced with participants 
October – December 2019: 
- Participant interviews were conducted  
January-September 2020: 
- Data analysis administered 
January 2019: 




be most at ease with. The two instances in which participants could not meet face-to-face meant 
that the interviews were conducted via Skype but were audio recorded. By visiting most of the 
informants in their natural work settings, homes, or comfortable environments, this increased 
the internal validity of the study as the respondents may have felt more comfortable and 
inclined to answer freely as they were in a familiar setting (Galletta, 2013; Hesse-Biber and 
Leavy, 2010). 
Each interview lasted on average a duration of 60-90 minutes, yet there were cases where the 
interviews lasted 120 minutes. The length of the interviews fit the norm of studies of this nature 
(Corner et al., 2017; Walsh and Cunningham, 2017) and was expected due to the thickness of 
the description of the participants’ experiences. In terms of the actual interview protocol (see 
Appendix 1, part h), the interview was divided into eight key sections, with over 50 main 
questions and derivatives that engaged from these questions. Each question was designed to 
obtain more information from the participants but were also phrased in a way to suit the 
sensitivity of the topic and build rapport with each respondent. The interview commenced with 
the first section that captured the participant’s biographical data, such as their age, gender, 
educational background and when they started their first business. The second section 
endeavoured to garner general insight about the participant’s entrepreneurship experience. It 
comprised of questions about their challenging aspects of owning a firm, the industry their 
business operates within and the size of it, in terms of the number of employees the company 
has. This section helped to build a further profile of the individual, shed light on their life 
histories, their current view on business, what made them become a venture owner and the 
future of their firm. This was an important indication to find out how the company founders 
felt at that moment in time. It also helped to ease them into the interview before the next section 
which delved into the participant’s bankruptcy experience. To elicit as much information as 
possible from the informants, they were asked more difficult questions on the topic 
progressively. The third section of questions commenced with querying when the bankruptcy 
occurred, and what their former company did, before probing into the cause of the bankruptcy 
and the experiences of the entire process. Questions were also asked about the financial impact 
of the bankruptcy and if the respondents had to sell any assets. When questioning respondents 
on their experiences, the relevant questions were open-ended, and they gave the firm owners 
the opportunity to talk without any disruption. These questions usually gave one an insight into 
how the firm owners overcame their failure to eventually restart, which helped to answer the 




to glean more information. For instance, participants were asked ‘what was the experience like 
for you?’ and ‘how did you find the experience day-to-day at the time?’. The fourth section 
then explored how the entrepreneurs coped with going through bankruptcy to then re-starting 
a venture. The participants were probed on how they made sense of the bankruptcy, how they 
regulated their emotions throughout the bankruptcy process, and what coping mechanism 
worked best for them. Sequentially, the venture owners were then asked questions about the 
impact of bankruptcy laws and stigma in relation on their coping. These questions included 
‘How entrepreneurial friendly would you say the bankruptcy law is in the UK when it comes 
to starting up a business post-failure?’ and ‘What was the effect of the stigma to you and to 
others view of you?’. The sixth section touched upon how the venture owners learnt from their 
business failure, bankruptcy, and restart process. Further questions were asked about their 
ability to identify entrepreneurial opportunities. These questions included ‘When and how did 
you manage to pinpoint the chance to start-up again?’, ‘How did you learn from the process?’, 
and ‘Did you have any epiphany-like moments of learning?’. Questions about the different 
types of capital (business, social and cognitive) and the most optimal learning strategy were 
then asked. Consecutively the seventh section tapped into the business owners’ emotions and 
modus operandi throughout the stages of re-starting a company. It aimed to uncover the role of 
the entrepreneurs’ emotions in the entire business failure, bankruptcy, and re-start process. 
Within this section of questions, respondents were also to state how they would perceive 
themselves using imagery or a metaphor which symbolises their comeback. This may have 
made it easier for participants to express how they feel and allowed one to decode an accurate 
representation of their accounts (Ray and Smith, 2012). Finally, the respondents were asked if 
they had any advice for other entrepreneurs and for any other comments. This gave them one 
last opportunity to disclose anything relevant. 
It is worthy of noting that the semi-structured interview protocol was iteratively developed 
alongside the data collection process, with additional questions added to the original interview 
protocol. In some cases, not all the questions were asked, and were slightly amended to ensure 
that participants understood what was being asked. Furthermore, in some instances, the 
interview questions were asked in a different order from the original schedule to engage better 
with the respondents. By conducting the semi-structured interviews in a flexible and 
conversational manner, one could truly develop a relationship with the informant. This enabled 
one to better grasp how the participants felt at certain points of their lives when overcoming 




All the interviews were transcribed in real-time, and the audio recordings of the interviews 
were listened to again to ensure they matched the transcriptions within 24 hours of the interview 
being collected. Each of the interview recordings were listened to more than once to make sure 
that the content of the interview was captured correctly (Galletta, 2013). Consequently, the 
reliability of the data was increased through ensuring it was an accurate depiction of the 
interview. All interviews were transcribed by following the Jefferson Lite method as closely as 
possible. This is a suitable for the level of analysis planned, since interpretations from the data 
would be obtained from examining what the participants said as opposed how they said it 
(Edwards and Lampert, 1993; Willig, 2013). There were instances whereby two interviews 
were not audio recorded as they occurred naturally in the participant’s home environment 
which was not initially planned. In these scenarios, detailed notes were taken at the time of the 
interview and sequentially typed up as close to a transcript of the interview within 24 hours of 
it being conducted. The entire set of transcripts equated to around 137 pages of single-spaced 
text. 
The researcher had considered that the respondents’ accounts of their experience may not be 
entirely accurate. However, an understanding of the key moments that formed part of their 
entrepreneurial failure, bankruptcy, recovery, and learning were always obtained. To further 
reduce the impact of retrospective bias, the interview questioning followed a progressive and 
chronological order in a courtroom style (Huber and Power 1985) which steered the 
respondents through the entrepreneurial process from business failure, bankruptcy, recovery 
(if applicable) and restart. Another benefit is that it allowed one to easily compare venture 
owner experiences. Furthermore, as opposed to asking questions that relied on respondents’ 
opinions, a number of questions required answers that would be based on facts. For instance, 
questions were asked about the implications of the individual’s venture closure and bankruptcy 
in terms of financial costs and assets that were sold as part of the process. The researcher also 
asked about the size of their current enterprise or enterprises in terms of number of staff 
employed and the value of their current turnover. 
After obtaining data from sixteen respondents, key themes started to appear, with a point of 
theoretical saturation emerging (Creswell and Poth, 2016). Despite beginning to reach this 
point, one did not change the sampling approach or the interview protocol, as the patterns 
identified in the data seemed valuable. Moreover, the current protocol consistently helped to 
generate the rich data on the business owners’ stories of how they bounced back from 




interviews were completed, the data collection stopped as the respondent’s answers did not 
produce anymore fresh insights (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  
3.3.3 Microstoria approach  
As established, there is limited scholarly work on those who have gone through bankruptcy. 
Due to the stigma and sensitivity around discussing bankruptcy, researchers may be reluctant 
to study bankrupt firm owners (Sellerberg and Leppänen, 2012; Van Kesteren et al., 2017). 
Microstroria is appropriate way to examine previously bankrupt entrepreneurs, as the approach 
endeavours to focus on those commonly side-lined in society (Boje, 2001; Imas, Wilson and 
Weston, 2012). Microstoria aims to explore the narratives from the available stories from 
“hidden” individuals, who fall outside of the typical scholarly zone of research, yet their views 
could help challenge orthodox social conventions on several dimensions (Ginzburg et al., 
1991). Hence, giving the platform for those typically subordinated in society as an under-
researched group to speak (Ginzburg et al.,1991). Firm owners are arguably unique (Anderson 
and Warren, 2011), however, those who have gone through failure such as a company collapse 
that led to bankruptcy makes them even more niche. Further still, those who have gone on to 
restart are even less frequently investigated and have been found to be more optimistic as well 
as more capable at identifying entrepreneurial opportunities than others (Ucbasaran et al., 2009; 
Politis and Gabrielsson, 2009). Therefore, the selected respondents’ answers from the semi-
structured interviews help to form a small unit of research within the entrepreneurial failure 
literature, which can assist in questioning traditional macro narratives that are widely accepted 
(Boje, 2001). Such macro theories are based on grand narratives and may not be able to explain 
all human actions when tested against the actualities of life (Boje, 2001). In essence, the 
microstoria approach helps the author add value by developing current theoretical 
understanding on the matter of entrepreneurial venture failure and bankruptcy. 
Another positive aspect from undertaking the microstoria approach is that it allows one to form 
a close connection with participants from the start of the interviews due to commonalities, as 
other scholars have done through undertaking this approach (see Sarpong and Maclean, 2017). 
Given that the researcher is an entrepreneur and has experience of seeing bankruptcy first-hand 
through witnessing it occur with a close family member, he has familiarity of the issue 
researched. Subsequently, the researcher was able to form a relationship with the participants 
by drawing on his own experiences when discussing his motivation for examining the research 




with a few of the participants, specifically when they referred to their culture in relation to the 
business collapse. Consequently, the research participants developed a relationship with the 
researcher, which allowed them to freely express their failure, recovery, and current 
entrepreneurial experiences in their own stories. This may also reduce the chances of 
participants answering in a socially desirable way and prompt them to give truthful answers, 
which could therefore increase the internal validity of the study (Saunders et al., 2012; Collis 
and Hussey, 2013). Furthermore, the approach may mean that the selected firm owners could 
share their interpretation of the events that unfolded in the way they did, highlighting intricacies 
of the situations they encountered (Boje, 2001). Beyond this connection, a merit of the 
microstoria approach is that it enables the selected entrepreneurs to share their own perspective 
in their own way. Specifically, they were able to craft how they communicate their experiences 
of overcoming their bankruptcy and firm failure which can be traumatising (Sellerberg and 
Leppänen, 2012; Van Kesteren et al., 2017, Boje, 2001). 
Moreover, through using microstoria, one was able to apply an abductive data analysis 
technique as they were able to obtain data about the complex experiences of restarting a 
business post-bankruptcy from a unique group of individuals (Ginzburg et al.,1991). Thus, the 
microstoria approach has provided the optimal setting for an abductive analysis technique such 
as the evolved grounded theory to delve deep and unearth several answers on the research topic 
coupled with develop theory. This was particularly important given the volume of quantitative 
work that has investigated entrepreneurial experiences of failure which has not been able to 
uncover such answers on a deeper level. 
3.3.4 Field notes, policy documentation and archival data 
To further reduce bias, it was it was beneficial to take field notes to triangulate and supplement 
the data collected from interviews. These notes were anything that the researcher found useful 
that should be taken account of during the interview. They were included at the end of the 
transcripts for the relevant participant. Following completion of the interviews, participants 
were asked if they could show their bankruptcy documentation to grant the researcher further 
insight into experiences of these individuals who went bankrupted. The additional checks 
further complemented the online checks using The Gazette and the UK Company House to 
verify the participants were genuine and specifically triangulated the precise questioning about 
the timing of bankruptcy. In addition, archival information about the entrepreneurs and their 




articles, organisational websites, LinkedIn and Tripadvisor reviews from former customers as 
well as relevant stakeholders. The archival information was used to compare the interview 
answers the respondents provided. By doing so, one was able to ensure that the experiences 
participants reported were accurate, and therefore built reliability and reduced bias that may 
come with a single method (Gioia et al., 2013). Finally, the use of multiple methods meant that 
further information on each respondent was garnered which helped to paint a full picture of 
each respondents’ stories. 
3.3.5 Ethics  
The study complied with the Brunel Research Ethics Online (BREO) guidelines (see appendix 
1, part a, for the Ethics Letter of Approval). Adhering to BREO guidelines, once a participant 
was confirmed to take part, they were provided with the Participant Information Sheet with the 
research aims. Simultaneously, a few respondents were also given a briefing call if they 
required further information before taking part and in some cases a few emails about the study 
were exchanged with the informant to ensure that they understood the research objectives. 
During the actual study, both verbal and written consent was obtained before the interview was 
conducted, field notes were taken, and policy documentation was reviewed. When interviews 
were not done face-to-face, consent was gained verbally and the participant also shared a signed 
version of the Consent form (see Appendix 1, part e). Participants were sequentially briefed 
about the interview questions, how the interview would be broken down, and asked if they 
were comfortable with the interview being audio recorded for transcription. They were told 
that the audio recording would be deleted at a later stage. The participants were also asked not 
to disclose anything discussed in the interview and mention any names that would reveal their 
identity, such as company names, names of their colleagues coupled with details of any names 
of individuals involved with their bankruptcy. Consecutively, the informants were briefed that 
they had the right to withdraw at any point of the study and after it is completed. They were 
briefed that if they did not want to answer any questions then this would be acceptable and that 
they could also speak as freely as possible, without any feelings of judgement. It was re-iterated 
that their personal details would be treated with the strictest of confidence with their anonymity 
assured as all participants would be given a pseudonym which helped to enhance the 
truthfulness of responses. Furthermore, they were made aware that transcriptions of the 
interview would be stored on a secure Brunel Server which only the researcher had access to. 
Following this, participants were told that selected verbatim quotes of the interview could 




anonymised transcriptions that will be included in the appendices section of the dissertation. 
After the interview was concluded, each participant was given a Debrief Sheet (see Appendix 
1, part f) which had contact details of the research team and more details about the study. 
3.4 Data Analysis 
3.4.1 Overview of approach  
Upon reaching a point of theoretical saturation whereby no further novel concepts and recurring 
patterns emerged across the data, the analysis process commenced (Creswell and Poth, 2016; 
Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2010; Gioia et al.,2013). The primary concern of the analysis was to 
answer the study’s research questions, that focussed on how, when and what factors enabled 
and impeded the previously bankrupted entrepreneur to restart a venture. Subsequently, 
theoretical concepts on the matter were developed. The most fitting methodologically data 
analysis option would be to undertake an evolved grounded theory approach. This format of 
analysis is appropriate for microstoria based research (Creswell and Poth, 2016) and is suited 
to entrepreneurship research (McKeever et al., 2015). The evolved grounded theory is an 
approach that explores how individuals act within a given social context as well as the 
interpretations that they assign to their social interactions, known as a process of symbolic 
interactionism (Struass and Corbin, 1998; Chamberlain-Salaun et al., 2013; Gioia et al., 2013). 
This data analysis approach is specifically applicable to this study, as it enabled one to examine 
how a previously bankrupted entrepreneur interacted with various individuals in their pursuit 
to launch another firm and in their current operation of this business. 
A constant comparison method was undertaken. This approach aims ultimately to produce 
detailed deep meaningful interpretations of social episodes, actions, and experiences to develop 
theory aligning with the research objectives (Glasser and Strauss, 1967; Tie et al., 2019). 
Adhering to the constant comparison method, prior to the actual write up of the data analysis 
the researcher iteratively developed emerging theoretical ideas through looking back at specific 
coded data and pertinent literature (Chamberlain-Salaun et al., 2013). Characteristic of a 
grounded theory approach, several steps that form part of the constant comparison method have 
been conducted which have involved visiting and re-visiting the data several times as an 
ongoing process (Chamberlain-Salaun et al., 2013). The process commenced by coding aspects 
of the data. By doing so, a link between the data collected and various theoretical constructs 
was formed (Chamberlain-Salaun et al., 2013). The data analysis specifically followed three 




Importantly, despite tenets of the evolved grounded theory approach being undertaken, such as 
reaching a point of theoretical saturation, using the constant comparison method, and writing 
up a developed theory in answer to the research questions, there are three points to note. First, 
the researcher recognises that the purposeful sampling approach implemented is suited for 
microstoria approach, yet the evolved grounded theory approach intends to recruit participants 
as guided by the emergent theory (Tie et al., 2019). Second, an output of the constant 
comparison approach is a Data Structure (see Figure 5) which illustrates the connections 
between themes in the data; this follows the Gioia et al. (2013) methodology. The authors 
recognise that this is not established as part of the evolved grounded theory (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998), yet it is crucial way of demonstrating qualitative rigour (Gioia et al., 2013). 
Third, the researcher understands that an aspect of the evolved grounded theory can entail 
examining only substantiative priory literature to ensure that the researcher does not risk 
contaminating the way in which the data is viewed (Suddaby, 2006). However, the relevant 
literatures in the entrepreneurial failure domain have been critically examined prior to 
conducting the data analysis to build a theoretical lens which can be used to enrich the data 
analysis insights. This approach is in line with work by Murphy et al. (2017) and has been 
applied in recent management studies (see Knapp et al., 2013; Kreiner et al., 2015). 
Besides this, the adopted evolved grounded theory is suitable for abductive work like this 
research which endeavours to build theory whilst using a theoretical lens (Timmermans and 
Tavory, 2012). The evolved grounded theory enables one to form a conceptual link between 
both inductive and deductive research (Murphy et al., 2017). Specifically, by following the 
abductive analysis approach through using the evolved grounded theory one was able to 
perform the constant comparison technique to reach a point theoretical saturation (Murphy et 
al., 2017). Thus, the abductive nature of the evolved grounded theory has crucially granted one 
the opportunity to produce fresh insights about the complex matter of how business owners 
rebound to venture again whilst using a theoretical lens. Consequently, a more complete and 
theoretical deeper understanding of the how individuals return to entrepreneurship post-failure 
was obtained which can be depicted by the robust theoretical model (see figure 8). 
3.4.2 Analysis stages 
Stage 1: Recognising first-order codes. The first stage of the coding entailed detailed coding 
of all the interview transcripts (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) with the aim to break the data down 




Poth, 2016). In order to do so, the data was analysed in great depth, whilst the researcher 
remained open to various theoretical paths (Creswell and Poth, 2016). Each transcript was 
analysed individually as well as read and re-read. Qualitative software such as “NVivo” or 
“ATLAST.Ti” to aid the analysis was not used and instead executed the task manually. This 
helped to ensure that the constraints of such automated coding software were averted, such as 
their tendency to fail to pick up on nuances of expression and contextual cues. Carrying out the 
analysis manually enabled a thorough and conscious examination of the intricacies, metaphoric 
language and idiomatic phrases embedded within the participants’ narratives. The process 
entailed pinpointing and comparing relevant incidents in the data that could be highlighted and 
clustered as a first-order code which represented key concepts (Creswell and Poth, 2016). 
Where relevant, whilst bearing the research questions in mind, a comment in the form of an 
analytical margin memo was added. Such comments highlighted the timing of the applicable 
incident within the entrepreneurs’ recovery and in some cases the significance it holds for them 
as well as the relationship it has with the first-order code it represents (Creswell and Poth, 
2016). The analysis of the transcripts was also triangulated with any field notes where possible 
to ensure that the data was coded appropriately whilst also ensuring a comprehensive 
understanding of the data was obtained. The coding at this stage was very close to the 
respondent’s language such as the following quotes “Oh very positive and very high in terms 
of hope (Joseph)” and “I was very optimistic (Damien)” were linked to the first-order code of 
‘Optimism trumping fear of failure again’. Throughout the process, amendments were also 
made to coded texts and they were recoded. Upon each round of coding, further amendments 
of naming and clustering quotes that reflected the codes were made, analysing whether they fit 
together and if not again re-coding and re-clustering the quotes (Creswell and Poth, 2016). A 
list of first-order codes finally appeared clear and as part of the conclusion to the first stage of 
coding, a table of quotes and the first-order codes that they fall under with any relevant 
annotations was formulated. These first-order concepts ultimately revealed the core aspects of 
the respondent’s values embedded in their own accounts but only at a surface level and do not 
reflect the more intricate connections within the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Creswell and 
Poth, 2016). 
Stage 2: Forming second-order theoretical themes. The second stage preceded with axial 
coding that entailed extracting from the potential open codes to more theoretical notions 
centred on current research findings (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The process began by 




became more and more conceptual. To ensure that one could decipher relationships that could 
aid the foundation for developing a grounded theory, the constant comparison method was 
again undertaken. This involved, comparing first-order codes against each other again, noting 
similarities and differences and where necessary re-grouping such codes. Participant’s 
interviews were therefore re-read to check if the relationships amongst the first-order codes 
were relevant and fell clearly under the applicable categories (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998). For instance, a comparative analysis of the entrepreneurs who believed that 
they did not have a recovery period in between their bankruptcy and starting up again in 
contrast to those who expressed that they had a recovery period was undertaken. This type of 
analysis meant that one could identify any other patterns amongst these firm owners and their 
reasoning for their described narratives. Besides using the constant comparison method, to 
again supplement the analysis, field notes were read when required. Therefore, after several 
reviews of the first-order codes, interview transcripts, analytical memos, field notes, theoretical 
concepts coupled with the resemblances and disparities between the first-order themes, a few 
theoretical second-order themes emerged. These second-order themes encompassed a series of 
first-order codes with commonalities amongst them. Through doing so, the existing table of 
first-order codes, quotes and annotations was refined. Another table was also created which 
encompassed the first-order quotes, annotations, and the second-order themes that the first-
order codes fall under as well as the overarching aggregate dimensions (which was added 
following completion of Stage 3). The second-order themes depicted the journey of the venture 
owner’s recovery and re-start. In sum, the raw data was converted into phrases that are akin to 
the wording of the entrepreneurship research that one endeavours to contribute to. 
Stage 3: Clustering conceptual concepts. The third stage involved selective coding which 
meant that the core overarching categories were formed (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
Subsequently, bringing one closer to transform the raw data into theoretical concepts (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998; Creswell and Poth, 2016). This stage entailed again using the constant 
comparison method, re-evaluating the relationships between the second-order themes and first-
order codes to decide on a distilled category that they can form part of as well delving into the 
theoretical explanations for these concepts. Ideas for potential overarching categories were also 
compared to ideas for other overarching categories to ensure distinctiveness between them. 
These relationships were also scrutinised with a holistic view of the findings in mind before 
arriving at several aggregate dimensions that formed a suitable storyline. The use of the 




which helped to answer the research questions (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). To aid the process, 
codes were drawn out as visual representations on a whiteboard to see the connections between 
each code, theme, and aggregate dimension clearly. This was exemplified by the first-order 
codes: ‘stigma’ which followed on from ‘negative reactions to venture collapse’. Both first-
order codes fell under the second order theme: ‘Previous business failure experience and 
embracing fragility’. This second order theme then formed part of the aggregate dimension: 
‘Exploration of former venture failure and bankruptcy enabled antifragility’. Furthermore, the 
interview transcripts were recurrently re-read to guarantee that both the second-order themes 
and aggregate dimensions aptly depicted the data (Creswell and Poth, 2016). There were 
instances where a decision was made on the applicability of similar first-order concepts and 
their suitability for the second-order themes and overall aggregate dimensions. The aggregate 
dimensions were eventually chosen as they aptly showcased the dynamic process of restarting 
a firm post-bankruptcy. Specifically, they depicted how the firm owners coped with failure, 
identified, and launched opportunities for subsequent ventures coupled with the impact of 
various enabling and impeding factors. These were key aspects in the entire process of re-
starting a business post-bankruptcy.  
To conclude the final stage of the analysis process, after several attempts, a Data Structure 
Framework (see Figure 5) was created that represents the data analysis (Gioia et al., 2013). The 
framework is made up of a composition of first-order concepts, second-order themes, and 
aggregate theoretical dimensions. The Data Structure also visually highlights the relationships 
between them and displays the core ideas embedded within the data and the connections they 
have with the respondent’s narratives. Hence, it shows how an entrepreneur overcomes 
bankruptcy and identifies the opportunity to start-up again through fostering antifragility.  
Throughout the coding process the researcher was theoretical sensitive and paid close attention 
to the data set to extract relevant data elements in the development of theory. Through as 
iterative process, existing theory has been built upon, which the approach can be used for 
(Cresswell and Poth, 2016; Gioia et al., 2013). Despite being open to other theoretical 
constructs, the common patterns in the data set were best explained by the theory of antifragilty 
and components of the social cognitive theory and attribution theory. Whilst antifragility was 
used as an overarching theoretical lens to look at the data set, one has put this gaze aside to 
look at the ideas during the analysis process to ensure that the data was examined objectively 
and took other theoretical constructs into account (Cresswell and Poth, 2016; Gioia et al., 2013; 




explanation is appropriate given the research context but like other theories, such conceptual 
ideas are never failproof, complete and is fallible to a degree (Chamberlain-Salaun et al., 2013; 
Cresswell and Poth, 2016; Gioia et al., 2013). 
For an illustration of the coding process, please refer to the below table which comprises of a 
few examples from three participant transcripts and the questions asked to the participant for 
supplementary context. Examples of how certain verbatim quotes fit under their first-order 
codes, which subsequently fit under the same second-order themes and aggregate dimensions 
are specifically provided (Cresswell and Poth, 2016; Gioia et al., 2013). 
 
Table 4: Example of coding process 






Question: How did you use your business knowledge? 
 
Response: Yeah so I used the knowledge just to start 
again to again companies but in a more streamline way (.) 
a more financially astute way (George) 
Understanding of 









Question: Did you ever have a fear of failure again and if 
you did (.) how did your come to terms with that to help 
you to overcome this and manage any uncertainty? 
 
Response: Yes I still like taking risks but I think like 
taking a more sensible level of risk (Lisa) 
Participant reflects on 
how they weigh risks 
up better 
  
Question: Could you have changed anything and if so, 
what would this have been? 
 
Response:  Yeah just very clear roles and responsibilities 
and causal effects of any breakdown of any relations in 
the future (Dilan) 
Participant discusses 
how learning is 
integral to their 
development and this 




3.4.3 Analysis outcomes  
The outcome of the full analysis stage can be illustrated in the below diagram, which illustrates 
the links between the codes and the applicable theory. Each aggregate dimension corresponds 






















1st Order Concepts 2nd Order Themes Aggregate Dimensions 
• Events leading to bankruptcy 
• External and internal business failure 
causes 
• Ascription Search 












•  Events leading to bankruptcy 
• External and internal business failure 
causes 
• Ascription Search 




• Recovery period 
• Use of sense-making and self-reflection 
• Emotional oriented coping mechanisms 
• Use of other coping mechanisms 
• Impression management techniques 
 
• Recovery period 
• Use of sense-making and self-reflection 
• Emotional oriented coping mechanisms 
• Use of other coping mechanisms 
• Impression management techniques 
(A) Understanding of former 
venture demise  
 
 
(A) Understanding of former 
venture demise  
 
(C) Previous business failure 
recovery 
 
(C) Previous business failure 
recovery 
(B) Previous business failure 




(B) Previous busine s failure 
experience and embracing 
fragility 
 
1) Exploration of 






1) Exploration of 





• Financial implications 
• Negative reactions to venture collapse 
• Stigma 
• Positive reactions to venture collapse 
• Negative experiences and impact of 
bankruptcy  
• Behavioural implications  
 
Financial implications 
Negative r a tions to venture collapse 
Stigma 
• Positive reactions to venture collapse 
• Negative experiences and impact of 
bankruptcy  























1st Order Concepts 2nd Order Themes Aggregate Dimensions 
(D) Entrepreneurial Learning 
Stages 
 
(D) Entrepreneurial Learning 
Stages 
• Recognising an opportunity for 
subsequent venture during and after 
business failure recovery 
• Choosing a time to launch sequential 
company 
• Reasoning for repeat entrepreneurship 




• Recognising an opportunity for 
subsequent venture during and after 
business failure recovery 
• Choosing a time to launch sequential 
company 
• Reasoning for repeat entrepreneurship 
• Strategy of restart 
•  
•  
• Long-term learning  
• Financially aware  
• Re-use of business knowledge and 
innovation 
Strategic Foresight in organising 
• Taking moderate an  calculated risks 
• Strong visual metaphors of themselves 
• Progression with current venture 
 
• Long-term learning  
• Financially aware  
• Re-use of business knowledge and 
innovation 
• Strategic Foresight in organising 
• Taking moderate and calculated risks 
• Strong visual metaphors of themselves 
• Progression with current venture 
• From lower-order learning to higher-
order learning  
• Reflexive learning in practice 
• Displays profound learning moment 
 
• From lower-order learning to higher-
order learning  
• Reflexive learning in practice 
• Displays profound learning moment 
2) New venture formation 
and fostering antifragility  
 







2) New venture formation 
and fostering antifragility  
(E) Opportunity Identification 
 
(E) Opportunity Identification 
(G) Long-term Learning and 
Foresight 
 






















1st Order Concepts 2nd Order Themes Aggregate Dimensions 
(J) Awareness of ‘longer-
term’ issues associated with 
bankruptcy 
 




(J) Awareness of ‘longer-
term’ issues associated with 
bankruptcy 
• Playing hope 
• Driving through the maze 
• Demonstrating civil courage 
• Developing one’s attributional style 
• Dropping the emotional baggage 
 
• Playing hope 
• Driving through the maze 
• Demonstrating civil courage 
• Developing one’s attributional style 
• Dropping the emotional baggage 
• Managing the long-lasting fallout from 
bankruptcy rules 




• Managing the long-lasting fallout from 
bankruptcy rules 
• Re-mobilizing threshold resources 
 
 
3) Organising practices that 
enable or (impede) 




3) Organising practices that 
enable or (impede) 
antifragility and enterprise 
development  
 
(I) Catching the fire: 
‘Building bridges’ with 
stakeholders and ‘Making 
do’ with bankruptcy policies 
 
(I) Catching the fire: 
‘Building bridges’ with 
stakeholders and ‘Making 
do’ with bankruptcy policies 
(H) Positive Emotional 
Practices 
 
(H) Positive Emotional 
Practices • Tapping into external networks and social 
support 
• Engaging the ‘movers’, the ‘shakers’, and 
the gatekeepers  
• Navigating the bankruptcy maze and mines 
 
• Tapping into external networks and social 
support 
• Engaging the ‘movers’, the ‘shakers’, and 
the gatekeepers  




Following on from the coding stages and the development of the Data Structure, as part of the 
research method the most apt quotes were selected to be include in the Findings Chapter. These 
quotes are ones that best answer the research questions and were chosen after re-reading the 
data. The findings chapters also answer the research questions by referring to the theory 
developed from the data and relevant literature. Lastly, the third findings chapter concludes 
with the development of a model (see Figure 8) of how entrepreneurs can form antifragility as 
an organising capability by illustrating the dynamic relationships between the emergent 
concepts. 
3.4.4 Validity of Data  
The chosen methodology and data analysis techniques have ensured that this research has a 
strong level of validity in four ways. First, the purposive sampling method has ensured that the 
study measured the intended research objectives by recruiting a relevant group of participants 
needed to obtain applicable data on the topic. Second, the chosen methodology has enabled the 
researcher to garner accurate data about the how entrepreneurs are able to bounce back from 
bankruptcy. Specifically, the microstoria approach has meant that one could explore the stories 
of a group of previously bankrupt entrepreneurs who are not often included in studies on the 
topic at hand by giving them a voice, whilst ensuring that they felt comfortable to share in-
depth and truthful answers. This is important, as the researcher was able to capture detailed, 
valid, and genuine data which answered the research questions. Third, the use of semi-
structured interviews in combination with reviews of field notes, policy documentation and 
archival data has meant that the researcher could verify findings and crucially build a more 
thorough understanding of each of the participant’s experiences. In doing so, the researcher 
could analyse the data obtained with the benefit of understanding the influence of contextual 
factors that shaped their responses. Thus, the data could be examined in the most accurate way 
possible. Fourth, the abductive analysis approach meant that the researcher was able to utilise 
priory literature and theoretical lenses to guide the research questions. As a result, the 
researcher endeavoured to obtain applicable data to answer the research questions. Ultimately, 
this led to formation of the Data Structure that answered each of the research questions and 
developed theory. 
3.4.5 Methodological limitations  
It is important to reflect some potential methodological limitations of the study. First, given 




due to the retrospective accounts which are subject to cognitive biases that one cannot 
conclusively declare that the participant narratives entirely accurate (Galletta, 2013; Hesse-
Biber and Leavy, 2010). Such biases entail memory losses and recall bias alongside the chance 
that the informants may present themselves in their best possible light during their bankruptcy 
circumstances to a degree (Bellman et al., 2018). Yet, it can be argued that this limitation is 
often associated with retrospective works of this nature and given the issues with obtaining a 
sample of failed and bankrupted business owners this issue is perhaps acceptable (Corner et 
al., 2017; Cope; 2011). In addition, given the emotional value that the failure and bankruptcy 
events hold they are likely to be better recollected by the respondents irrespective of the fact 
that they may be drawn on from over a decade for some of them (Cox and Hassard, 2007). Due 
to the dynamic nature of learning, the participants may have better recall of previous learnings 
associated with their bankruptcy (Minniti and Bygrave, 2001). Second, due to the close nature 
of the microstoria approach, there is a chance that the results may not be examined in a fully 
objective manner. Yet, no research is completely objective and failproof (Chamberlain-Salaun 
et al., 2013; Cresswell and Poth, 2016; Gioia et al., 2013). Third, as discussed previously, the 
study’s objective was not to generalise, although, the sample can be critiqued for their 
representativeness. Despite attempts of trying to have a representative sample, the participants 
were not a fully diverse group of venture owners, with unequal split of genders. Fourth, due to 
using a snowballing technique, there is a slight risk that the participants may be similar to each 
other. Lastly, there was no control group of non-entrepreneurs, specifically those who have 
gone through bankruptcy and not started a venture again to increase the confidence in the 
findings. The sample of previously bankrupted entrepreneurs also may be markedly different 
to other failed firm owners given that bankruptcy can be classed as a unique experience (Van 
Kesteren et al,.2017). Hence, care should be taken if these findings were to be generalised 
further. 
3.5 Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
In summary, this chapter has provided the reasoning for the chosen empirical setting by 
explicitly stating why the UK, specifically the Greater London region is a suitable research 
context. This was followed by a justification of the adopted exploratory qualitative research 
design, philosophy, and strategy as well as the purposive sampling approach. The recruitment 
process and the associated timescales have then been described, and an outline of the chosen 
sample has been offered. Next, an overview of the entire research procedure, including the 




of the study have been discussed. Sequentially, the penultimate section comprised of an 
overview of the suitable data analysis process, before ending with a commentary of the 
prospective methodological limitations. The next chapter will present the finer details of the 






‘Unpacking’ Entrepreneurial antifragility in Organising  
This chapter develops our understanding on how previously bankrupted entrepreneurs form the 
ability to restart a firm, extending evidence on the matter. As delineated in Chapter 2, the 
concept of antifragility was introduced; it is defined as a state in which individuals, systems 
and organisations benefit from stressors, enabling them to handle the same stressors better 
(Taleb, 2012). Drawing on antifragility as a theoretical lens, the chapter aims to provide insight 
into how entrepreneurial antifragility comes to be identified and labelled in discourse on 
restarting a business venture after bankruptcy. In doing this, primacy is given to agentic actions 
and strategies in context, geared towards recovery from entrepreneurial venture failure that 
resulted in bankruptcy. Thus, the chapter addresses and ‘unpacks’ the cultivation of 
antifragility in the form of “entrepreneurial competence” in organising, as explained through 
three key themes. The first section draws on the narratives of the entrepreneurs, who provide 
compelling insight into their journeys from their own understanding of their previous 
businesses in terms of creating and capturing sustainable value to their eventual demise. Next, 
an attempt is made to ‘unpack’ the entrepreneur’s experiences in navigating through their 
recovery to restarting their ‘new’ businesses. Sequentially, the precise approaches used to 
overcome the failure and bankruptcy are analysed to shed light on how the firm owners 
developed the capability to bounce back. The chapter ends with a summary of the research 
findings and a model that represents how the firm owners recover post-bankruptcy. 
4.1 Understanding the Previous Venture Failure and Bankruptcy  
The first theme starts with an overview of the events leading to bankruptcy, before delving into 
the external and internal causes of business failure and ends by focussing on how a firm owner’s 
analysed their role in relation to the financial downfall. 
4.1.1 Events leading to bankruptcy  
An array of factors can lead to entrepreneurial venture failure that results in bankruptcy. These 
have been noted to entail internal firm related issues and external factors (Zacharakis et al., 
1999; Fatowki, 2014; Numani, 2017). Ahead of delving into the main antecedents of their 




so much competition (.) the sales were going down and then when I figured out the 
expenses were so high then and the only way around was to go…bankrupt and consult 
solicitors (Nigel) 
we went down for down in a straight line like a cliff drop and then we bumped around 
the bottom and we were losing money every month and I was borrowing money and 
scrambling doing this (Carl) 
 
A universal trend in the participant’s responses, is that they had landed themselves into a 
position of debt. This was irrespective of their intention of using the money to grow their firms. 
They described it as a significantly low point of their life as they gradually could not financially 
sustain their venture. Carl epitomises how their business was making a loss and describes the 
process as abrupt which led to a real low point, with him “scrambling” in his attempt to support 
the venture. In a comparable manner, Nigel’s account signified that the bankruptcy was the 
only way out due to high rates of competition and increasing expenses irrespective of his 
endeavours to increase revenue (Ooghe and De Prijker, 2007; Numani, 2017). Through sharing 
these anecdotes, the respondents highlighted personal moments that led to feelings of fragility 
as they could not fully control their situation (Taleb, 2012). Similarly, a vast number of 
informants admitted ways in which they tried to pre-empt the business failure by various 
strategies, yet despite their endeavours, they could not generate enough money to keep their 
enterprise(s) operating. For instance, Dilan expressed “there was plans to go and graft to get 
that next bit of money...I was always occupied”, clearly showing how he was continually trying 
his best to add value to his enterprise. Ultimately, participants highlighted that the experiences 
that led to their business downfall were sometimes unavoidable. 
4.1.2 External and internal business failure causes  
Interestingly, some of the respondents highlighted that external factors were integral to their 
business collapse which were out of their control and not always foreseen (Abdullah et al., 
2009; Adobor, 2020). They therefore blamed part of the failure to factors they could not deal 
with (Thornhill and Amit., 2003; Rogoff et al., 2004; Franco and Hasse., 2004). The following 
extract typifies this: 
what happened four five years ago was a perfect storm (.) nobody saw it coming and 
certainly we didn’t (Carl) 
 
Carl refers to the oil crash in his example and by describing it as a “perfect storm” he 
demonstrates the magnitude of the phenomenon. Others commonly specified how the recession 




(Derek), “we didn’t realise the crash had such an impact” (Scott) and “it went down due to the 
recession” (Jay). It is apparent the firm owners faced devastating repercussions due to the 2008 
financial crisis, which can be deemed as destructive from their perspective. Scott like other 
informants also highlighted how other market conditions such as a decrease in their consumer 
base contributed to their business collapse: 
the clientele was quite old and they passed away so we had disappearing customers 
(Scott) 
 
As per these cases, it is evident that a few business owners initially ascribed their bankruptcy 
to external sources which they were not in control of, instead of taking ownership of their 
failure (Kibler et al., 2017). The external factors that led to the bankruptcy can be perceived as 
somewhat akin to a sequence of ‘black swan’ events given that they somewhat meet all three 
attributes Taleb (2007) described. First, as voiced by the entrepreneurs, financial crisis events 
such as the recession and the dot-com bubble were not foreseen and lack predictability, giving 
it an outliner status to a degree. Second, the events that led to the bankruptcy have been classed 
to significantly impact the firm owners’ livelihoods. The third characteristic states that despite 
the events infrequence, the venture founders commonly eventually provided an explanation for 
the occurrence of the events. 
Despite these external sources, it was also found that a few enterprise owner terminated their 
enterprise and declared bankruptcy due to issues they face within their organisation (Bradley 
and Saunders, 1989; Van Auken et al., 2009; Watson, 2003). The participants who blamed their 
venture failure on internal issues shared insights into negatives of their organisations’ internal 
dynamics: 
it got messy with my three other business partners in terms of roles and responsibilities, 
and it spiralled out of control when we did not communicate enough (Tyler) 
 
In the same vein, Dilan reported the difficulties he faced with his friend and co-founder: 
there was no agreement between the two founders so myself and my friend who we 
considered friendship to be enough and we did not have a binding contract (Dilan) 
 
Dilan’s excerpt shows how he naively based his partnership on friendship with no written 
contract which meant there were no formal consequences if the company was unsuccessful. 
Sam further emphasised the prominence of sharing a “common vision” with business partners 




These findings concur with several extant studies that have identified an array of internal 
business factors such as organisational issues stemming from a lack of business acumen can 
eventually induce bankruptcy (Bradley and Saunders, 1989; Zacharakis et al., 1999; Van 
Auken et al, 2009). Yet, there was no link found between the entrepreneur’s business failure 
and their employees not being capable enough (Abdullah, Hamali et al, 2009) except for Derek 
who asserted that his staff “didn’t work”, “really care” and “wanted to get paid and then go” 
as well as Nigel who also declared that that his staff stole money “here and there” (Nigel). 
Irrespective of these accounts, it was mostly found that the firm owners blamed both internal 
and external factors that lead to their venture failure and bankruptcy. Thus, extending previous 
studies that have identified that internal factors such as a lack of functional skills entailing weak 
managerial practices and strategic know how as well as poor financial control coupled with a 
volatile business environment can lead to entrepreneurial venture failure (see Zacharakis et al., 
1999; Fatowki, 2014; Numani, 2017; Nummela et al., 2016; Al-Shami et al., 2019). The 
participants frequently went into great depth to describe these issues: 
it was a mix of both as you know everything is moving as you know things are going 
online and the recession and I paid a high amount to pay off shares off my business 
partner in two thousand and twelve (.) so it was kinda everything hit me in one go and 
I tried to sell online but it was too late (.) I didn’t have the funds and everything was 
just piling up so it was a bit of everything (Derek) 
 
Derek’s account suggests how it was not one single factor that led to the firm demise and the 
range of factors could not be looked in silos of each other. Like Derek, some of the informants 
explicitly referred to both external issues and internal causes, for instance Marios stated: 
it was combined…bad paying clients but also we grew too quickly so our overheads 
and running costs were more than what…the company was generating (.) and also we 
was importing goods from Europe so Brexit heavily affected us with the exchange rate 
and the uncertainty (Marios) 
 
It is evident, that a combination of both internal and external factors can result in bankruptcy, 
and they cannot be looked in isolation of each other. 
4.1.3 Ascription search 
Another identified trend was albeit that the participants highlighted a combination of factors 
caused their bankruptcy, the negative events and issues the entrepreneurs encountered 
gradually led them to an attribution search. This entailed a process where the firm owner 




other factors (Mantere et al., 2013; Franco and Hase, 2010; Zacharkis et al., 1999). For instance, 
throughout the interviews the participants voiced concerns with an array of factors but 
emphasised that their managerial issues and poor decision making were integral to the failure. 
Carl harshly narrated this well, by showing how his investment strategy and business decisions 
did not work out in combination with the “calamitous unprecedent never-heard-of collapse in 
the oil price”. His excerpt indicates the complexities and bleak reality of the venture demise. 
Jake also described the dot-com bubble financial crash as a contributor for his bankruptcy, yet 
he was evident that he understood that it was also his fault: 
I was twenty five years old (.) living around silicon valley and no real direction or right 
advice around (.) yeah you got a little carried away don’t you and no one thought the 
dot-com bubble would burst and obviously when it did burst and then nine eleven 
happened it um (.) you know it destroyed a lot of businesses…but as I said to the judge 
who I went bankrupt it was my own fault (Jake) 
 
Building a similar argument, George and Marios who were bankrupted slightly more recently, 
discussed how they arrived at a similar conclusion that external forces such as Brexit led to the 
bankruptcy alongside the financial struggles which they were ultimately responsible for. This 
entailed taking ownership for the personal guarantees they took from the loans they borrowed.  
It was very frequent for respondents to also stress their analysis of their financial difficulties 
which they gradually claimed as their responsibility, reinforcing prior literature’s findings 
which found similar (Zacharakis et al., 1999; Van Auken et al., 2009; Bradley and Saunders, 
1989). For instance, the entrepreneurs referred to specific problems they incurred due to not 
being financially savvy enough, such as “to many overheads” (Derek). Several interviewees 
frequently explained the reasoning for their issues with managing their cash flow: 
I was borrowing from one card to another to pay off er and that has continued amounting 
more and more pressure (.) erm and not realising at the time that I am just not doing to 
er help myself (Joseph) 
we was not able to sustain the level of spend so we had to change things for sure (Dilan) 
I borrowed a lot of money and spent money that I didn’t have (Stefan) 
 
From these extracts, it is evident the business owners struggled to manage loans borrowed, 
their high distribution costs and made poor financial deals. Furthermore, the participants also 
became open to shedding light on this throughout the interviews, clearly indicating that they 





4.1.4 Analysis of internal firm dynamics of former venture  
An internal attributional style is described as when someone has control over actions and 
events; with an internal locus of control (Heider, 1958). Through the process of going through 
an ascription search, the participants divulged how they formed internal attributional style. For 
example, Jay noted “you know I stuck to the old school ways of doing things” and Derek 
reported what he could have done better as well as George who discussed how his bankruptcy 
was due to his personal guarantees. Several other informants went into great depth of their 
analysis of their firm dynamics in greater details, for instance, Carl shared:  
we expanded into market at the request of our major client who was the one who 
chopped eighty percent or sixty percent of revenue in a period of six months and 
effectively led us to into bankruptcy (Carl) 
 
It can be inferred that Carl demonstrated that his decision making resulted to the eventual 
bankruptcy. Other participants emphasised how they were ingrained in an old way of thinking, 
such as Marios: 
I was never focussed on the accounts you know (.) keeping things like cost low, you 
know, stupidly didn’t think of them and I thought it would manage itself or I could 
employ someone to do that and my job was just to get the work and make sure the work 
was delivered and um and obviously running a business is not as simple as that 
especially a small business you have to be involved in everything so yeah it does scare 
me but…it has basically woken me up (Marios) 
 
Marios also showed that he blamed aspects of the business failure on himself in his attempts to 
add value, he exposed his feelings of fragility (Taleb, 2012). Yet, like others, from his analysis 
he also indicated how the bankruptcy was a turning point of his development (Taleb, 2012). 
He precisely delved into how the bankruptcy was a pivotal moment in his life, which prompted 
his recovery by waking him up. This was a frequent response which illustrates how the firm 
owners internal attributional style increases their self-belief to overcome the bankruptcy. This 
is aptly known as an increase in self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977). 
Taken as a whole, this theme demonstrated that business owners initially blame their 
bankruptcy on an array of internal and external related factors (Zacharakis et al., 1999; Rogoff 
et al., 2004; Franco and Hase, 2010) as well as proclaiming feelings of fragility. However, the 
negative events that led to the bankruptcy eventually encouraged the entrepreneurs to go 
through an ascription search where they commonly deciphered that they were in control of the 




Lee and Suh, 2004; Zacharkis et al., 1999). They therefore displayed an internal locus of control 
(Rotter, 1966; Weiner, 1992). By doing so the firm owners commonly spoke of how they 
increased their self-efficacy of handling the impact of the ‘black swan events’ and the impact 
of the bankruptcy (Taleb, 2007). 
4.2 Business Failure Experience and Embracing Fragility  
The second theme delves into the firm owners’ experiences of the bankruptcy and how they 
dealt with its financial, behavioural, and social implications in order to restart a firm.  
4.2.1 Financial implications  
In many instances, participants spoke about the financial consequences of their bankruptcy. 
Such consequences can be categorised into three sections: (i) loss of assets and monetary value; 
(ii) impact on attaining credit; and (iii) legal implications. First, as part of the bankruptcy 
charges, a few business owners declared a range of assets that were taken from them such as 
their car(s) and house(s). For instance, Stefan, Scott, Damien and Sam all articulated that they 
lost their house. Scott also discussed how others in his business also lost their house showing 
the wider ramifications of the bankruptcy. Other respondents who nearly lost their assets still 
voiced their concerns regarding their financial hardships. The bankruptcy clearly left 
participants at a low point and Stefan described the experiences as “stressful” for his family as 
it was everything that he had “worked for”. Moreover, a number of informants expressed the 
financial consequences in greater depth. For instance, numerous business owners lost large 
quantities of money comprising: “two and half million” (pounds) (Jake), “three million in US 
dollar” (Carl), “half a million pounds” (Scott) and “six hundred grand” (Denise). The 
entrepreneurs noted the adverse repercussions of the losses, for instance, Joseph highlighted 
the lack of help from others and Lisa proclaimed that the bankruptcy led her to become 
dependent on her partner to travel. 
Second, another trend amongst a small number of the participants was the impact of bankruptcy 
on their ability to obtain financial credit. For instance, Sam commented that his bankruptcy 
charges stripped him of all his “credit cards” and “bank accounts”. He declared the experience 
as “severe”, demonstrating the harsh reality of bankruptcy. A few interviewees who were more 
recently declared as bankrupt voiced long-lasting negative financial consequences: 






you cannot always get a loan immediately (Nigel) 
 
Both accounts present the common struggles that business owners face with the attainment of 
credit. Interestingly, despite the respondents receiving the bankruptcy charges relatively 
recently, it is evident that the financial state can evoke issues. 
Third, other participants also reported the legal effects of their bankruptcy: 
I could not cope any more or take it anymore so I had to get professional help to help 
me negotiate with the bank and the lenders (Joseph) 
I was fortunate…I had time to see a professional (.) I have had friends that are not so 
aware of things like that (.) they do not know that and they get themselves in worse 
places (Marios) 
 
Joseph and Marios’ accounts shed light on how they were forced in a position to seek help due 
to the intricacies of their financial positions. Taken together, the firm owners’ stories represent 
how they felt fragile where they have not been able to independently manage. The events 
leading to informant’s bankruptcy charges can again be perceived as a black swan to a degree, 
given the sheer detrimental impact such unforeseen events can have (Taleb, 2012). 
4.2.2 Negative reactions to venture collapse  
Another common trend was the negative reactions that participants encountered from their 
immediate business contacts, other stakeholders and their friends and family. The findings 
therefore mirror those of earlier studies who show how previously bankrupted entrepreneurs 
can jeopardise relationships with a vast number of individuals which can sometimes stem from 
others not showing empathy for their situation (Cope, 2011; Van Kesteren et al., 2017). 
For instance, the bankruptcy impacted a number of the firm owners’ relationships with their 
colleagues, such as: “my business partner…went dark (.) there was no conversation at all” 
(Dilan), and “we do not talk no more” (Damien). Sam and Scott also extended these findings 
indicating the issues their staff had: 
the relationships with people around me changed drastically as they were also 
concerned about their own jobs and instead of being supportive, they choose not to 
(Sam) 
 
the chefs were my brother in-laws they bought a caravan or what you would call them 
as holiday homes (.) as permanent homes but they used my name as credit and then one 
of the chefs during the bankruptcy had the home taken (.) all three of them tried to kill 
me (.) said they would threaten to knock my door down…so yeah there was some 





It is evident from the above, that participants faced backlash from their employees as a result 
of the bankruptcy. Sam showed how his staff were focussed on their own agendas, whilst 
Scott’s extract about receiving death threats from the chefs who worked with him shows the 
dangers of bankruptcy. Albeit Scott’s case was an extreme one, this still represents the 
hardships and pain that the entrepreneurs endured. The findings again suggest that the business 
failure that led to bankruptcy can again be deemed as slightly comparable to a black swan event 
(Taleb, 2010). Such events can lead to fear and feelings of fragility given their harsh 
implications. 
Beyond their immediate business relationships, respondents highlighted how stakeholders such 
as their suppliers reacted negatively towards their bankruptcy: 
suppliers started harassing me even after closing the business (.) writing to my personal 
addresses (.) phoning me (Joseph) 
when you are down (.) your investors and suppliers are not going to be there (.) they 
are going to work for their company…for their assets so obviously they are going to be 
fall outs (Jay) 
 
Jay’s and Joseph’s account suggests how they faced harsh treatment from suppliers. Aside from 
these cases, others such as Dilan delved into other issues with family investors. A few 
respondents further talked about issues with other investors due to the bankruptcy, for instance: 
it was a just a horrible time and because you are on the phone telling your debtors you 
are going to make a payment by the end of the day but really you know that you cannot 
(Marios) 
I had a fall out as I couldn’t pay my creditors and I was no in position to pay them as I 
didn’t have no money to pay them (.) the times have been very hard (Denise) 
 
Marios’ and Denise’s extract indicate the frustration the entrepreneurs felt due to their financial 
position. A common pattern that can be inferred from the participants excerpts is that they 
damaged connections with creditors and suppliers. These dire relations were considered as 
extremely difficult to deal with by the informants. Other respondents such as Joseph and Jay 
further discussed how they had fall outs they had with creditors and suppliers.  
The entrepreneurs consistently were able to share insight on how these negative relationships 
with business stakeholders spilled over to their family life, for instance, participants reported 
issues with their partners and children, such as: 




my relationship with my wife became very strained (.) we had a young child at the time 
also which was very difficult (.) I relied very heavily on my parents and siblings which 
caused a lot of aggravation and arguments (Stefan) 
 
From the above accounts, it is evident the pressure bankruptcy can put on family relationships. 
Jay touched upon the tough times, whereby the harsh consequences of the bankruptcy included 
divorce. Stefan further indicated the impact on other members of their family. A few other 
informants discussed how they lost friends due to their bankruptcy: “people leave you init 
because they think they can’t gain something out of you or benefit” (Derek), and “people 
around you think are your friends…they all abandon you” (Jay). Jake also noted that 
acquaintances looked at his bankruptcy differently: 
acquaintances I guess had obviously been quite jealous and erm and you know were 
kind of most pleased I had got bankrupt (Jake) 
 
In sum, these events in the firm owner’s life appear as highly agonising and can last a lifetime. 
They showcase how the once bankrupted entrepreneurs harm relationships with a range of 
individuals including their family and not only those who they know in a work capacity. Such 
findings support existing works on the social implications of firm failure (Efrat, 2006; Sutton 
and Calahan, 1987; Singh et al., 2007). 
4.2.3 Stigma  
Stigma goes beyond the negative reactions towards a phenomenon and evokes feelings of deep 
shame (Shepherd and Haynie, 2011; Walsh, 2017, Klimas, 2020). In accordance with prior 
work, another recurrent theme identified was that the once bankrupt business owners frequently 
felt stigma attached to their bankruptcy (Shepherd and Haynie, 2011; Walsh, 2017). Several 
entrepreneurs self-stigmatised themselves by giving themselves a negative label feeling 
inferior to others (Sellerberg and Leppänen, 2012; Kirkwood, 2007), suggesting that they felt 
stigma in the period prior to, during and after the bankruptcy charges were given (Singh et al., 
2015). Many of the venture founders further discussed how they experienced stigma throughout 
the process: 
I felt embarrassed (Damien) 
you instantly feel like a criminal (Marios) 





In agreement with extant works, it is evident from the above accounts, that the once bankrupted 
venture owners are condemned for their failure, feeling ashamed and incriminated as they are 
classed as unsuccessful. From all three extracts, the entrepreneurs sadly highlighted the 
struggles that business owners face due to the feelings of guilt and embarrassment. Sam also 
delved into the long-term impact of the stigma of bankruptcy: 
Yes with bankruptcy there is always going to be stigma as when you fill in any forms 
or apply for any loans or try to regain control of your life and business at every stage 
you have to keep declaring your bankruptcy (.) as if you do not declare it becomes a 
criminal offence which can be later on used against you (.) so bankruptcy has its stigma 
regardless of the period (Sam) 
 
The bankruptcy charges from the entrepreneurial venture failure evidently can have a long-
term mark. It is also apparent that stigma stems from a range of stakeholders, further supporting 
research on the matter (Erfat, 2006; Sutton and Calahan, 1987). For example, friends looked 
down at the entrepreneurs due to the bankruptcy as noted by Scott and Jay: 
I have friends (.) they think I am a bit of a failure and they didn’t think I could make it 
but the thing is if they can see me right now (.) I have definitely made it (Scott) 
 
you know all your friends/so called ‘business contacts’; when you are up, you are up 
and everybody looks up to you, but when you are down, nobody wants to know you 
(Jay) 
 
From Scott’s and Jay’s reports it is noticeable that the business owners felt less worthy 
(Sellerberg and Leppänen, 2012; Smith and McElwee,2011) and their friends perceived them 
in a negative light. They both indicated that they felt a lack of compassion was shown by others 
(Van Kesteren et al., 2017). Interestingly, Marios and Denise further faced stigma from other 
sources such as the media and social media, which impacted other perceptions of their venture 
downfall (Wakkee et al., 2014; Fisch and Block, 2020): 
I was on LinkedIn but the problem is when the business collapsed other business owners 
who was affected were on LinkedIn and it all became a bit of a thing you know people 
were posting our stuff (.) like have you seen this guy (.) um yeah it was quite bad (.) I 
didn’t defend myself (.) I just went straight on it and deleted my profile (.) I probably 
could have (.) but I just thought with everything else going I just thought I do not need 
this (Marios) 
 
the temptation is when you lose a business and it is very painful and humiliating (.) and 
you feel a failure and there is a lot of shame (.) and with mine there is a whole media 
thing attached to it (.) so I was shamed by all the newspapers, television (.) so hugely 





Both verbatim quotes showcase the wider stigma and harsh views that can be felt from 
participants via the media and online mediums. They emphasised how the stigma caused grief 
and a reduction in status. This was evident from Denise’s account who had received a 
significant amount media coverage about her bankruptcy, whilst Marios’ statement indicates 
how he felt defeated from an online witch hunt for him.  
Interestingly, Carl further reported that he only faced social stigma from a few employees, but 
his clients and contractors were forgiving, thus demonstrating the mix of responses. Moreover, 
George noted that the stigma is multifaceted and is dependent on the eye of the beholder of the 
bankruptcy due to the varied reactions he received: 
I felt the stigma was (.) well there was a bizarre scenario (.) there was two different 
feelings (.) One, how comes he has gone bankrupt and still got all these cards? and the 
other stigma from people was, well, he can’t be a good businessman because he 
failed...I think stigma is in…the eye of beholder (George) 
 
Another trend voiced by the business founders was the link between their cultural attitudes and 
the stigma they faced from the bankruptcy (Gratzer, 2001; Cardon et al., 2011; Erfat, 2006): 
I was too proud to become bankrupt and it was in our culture…it is taboo because I am 
old school but I had no option and I should have done it sooner…but because of the 
taboo we have as Asians it is frowned upon (Jay) 
in your community there are people who would not like to talk to you or see you as a 
loser or a downgraded person, and then there are people who will support you and 
encourage you even more (Sam) 
 
Jay’s and Sam’s narratives indicate that culture may possibly be a contributing factor to 
elucidate why certain bankrupted business owners encounter more stigmatisation than others. 
They probed into the values of their culture that can intensify the stigma encountered, which 
could be due to their Asian background. Besides these cases, culture was not found as a key 
factor that impacted the business owner’s development.  
In sum, from the entrepreneur’s stories of venture rebound, it is evident that the stigma of 
bankruptcy does still exist, yet this may not be as extreme in all cases. With that being said, the 
business owners who did feel stigma came across moments of humiliation, negativity and 
experienced a loss of social status coupled with self-stigmatisation which led them to a place 





4.2.4 Positive reactions to venture collapse  
Despite most firm owners encountering social stigma from their bankruptcy, a small handful 
of respondents received positive reactions about their financial situation (Sellerberg and 
Leppänen, 2012). Dilan and Lisa noted: 
No, I actually didn’t feel that at all and I think the stigma of going bankrupt um is 
actually more in the industry from the people I speak to anyway and it is almost 
celebrated (Dilan)  
My business relationships didn’t change…overall it has been much more positive than 
I actually thought it was going to be (Lisa) 
 
Interestingly, Dilan noted how business failure and bankruptcy is celebrated in his industry and 
Lisa also shared that failure is common in her sector which lessened the impact of it. Other 
entrepreneurs, such as Marios and Jay also stated that some of his business relationships were 
supportive, which helped their eventual entrepreneurial restart. Zack also highlighted that the 
stigma has decreased from when he was declared bankrupt: 
in those days it was more emotional than anything else and I lost my qualification, so I 
was very upset (Zack) 
 
Carl, also illustrated that besides facing some stigma and guilt from letting his employees 
down, he found that overall, they were quite accepting of it and understood the situation: 
so we had to let thirty forty people go and I think we had one tantrum…but that was 
resolved…we actually handled it very well (Carl) 
 
From these excerpts, it can be inferred that there are a range of responses from the business 
owners who have gone through bankruptcy, highlighting the nuances in their experiences.  
4.2.5 Negative experiences and impact of bankruptcy  
Irrespective of a small number of positive reactions, many of the entrepreneurs discussed their 
negative experiences of the bankruptcy. Such negative experiences can entail grief, 
bereavement due to the loss of the venture and a decrease in their self-worth as well as feelings 
of helplessness. The entrepreneurs’ accounts can be separated into: (i) the negatives events that 
led to the bankruptcy, (ii) the aftermath of the bankruptcy, and (iii) the overall bankruptcy 
experience. For instance, prior to the bankruptcy charges, Joseph claimed that he did not “plan” 




interviewees also welcomed the opportunity to discuss how they felt negatively towards the 
events that led to the financial downfall, for instance Denise: 
I remember just a huge amount of rage (.) actually rage against the system because 
bearing in mind I was a high profile business person as an entrepreneur…and I was 
absolutely dedicated to repaying all of my debts and I was diligently working my way 
through it and being entrepreneurial and resourceful and so I remember phoning the girl 
on the Inland Revenue…I just said that this is crazy I want to repay you this money (.) 
why are you making me bankrupt?…you will not get nothing...she was like ‘no, 
computer says no, you are not compliant (.) you do not pass the criteria for IVA’ 
(Denise)  
 
From Denise’ account, it is evident that she had felt intense emotions of frustration and anger 
as she was forced into bankruptcy ahead of her court case despite her high business status. Carl 
similarly commented how no one could buy his company, so he eventually had to declare 
bankruptcy: 
when a potential buyer thinks the company is in such a shit condition that it is not worth 
putting in one dollar for a share then you could have come out of that feeling a little bit 
depressed, so I was I forced to cope with that and I am happy to say, touch wood, we 
are going okay (Carl)  
Carl’s statement unveils that he was incredibly upset, referring to the situation as evoking 
feelings of depression, yet this eventually spurred him on to recover as it meant he had no 
option but to deal with it. Another recurring pattern was that participants highlighted the long-
term aftermath of their bankruptcy. They described the period between restarting and the 
bankruptcy charges as a low point, such as Derek who was worried about how the failure could 
hinder future ventures. Sam also claimed how he found the period hard and shared that “during 
the course I had lost my driving licenses” due to links with the bankruptcy. Scott also asserted 
after his bankruptcy charges and prior to restarting that his low income as a cleaner was not 
practical: 
you know, we owned things, and now, being owned is not the way we run, and for six 
months that was a bad time (.) and me and my wife worked…in a hospice (.) we were 
cleaners…erm money wasn’t really…ideal (Scott) 
 
Along similar lines, Marios touched upon the longer-term concerns following his bankruptcy 
charges before restarting a venture: 
so I was very worried cos I actually started thinking, have a broken any laws? (.) are 
they going to take my house? (.) am I going to go prison? I already knew it was hard to 
become employed so…what would I do with my future? so yeah, at the start, I really 





Marios’ extracts suggests that the worries that come with bankruptcy can be epitomised by his 
concerns of his career. Other entrepreneurs such as George, also reported how the bankruptcy 
was a hurdle but his sequential failure was more complex and problematic, revealing the 
intricacies that come with business failure: 
when you go bankrupt and you bounce back quickly and there is money, it does not 
affect you, but when you can’t see anything from the trees and it is really going 
wrong…and it has affected people you know by the money being gone and also when 
somebody has vindictively hurt you, then it is a big fucking problem so there is two 
different things here (George) 
From this extract, it is apparent that George described the aftermath of the bankruptcy as 
tolerable, yet it is evident that this is an exceptional case, given that the bulk of the respondents 
deemed the period as being extremely difficult which supports the literature on entrepreneurial 
venture failure (Cope, 2011; Van Kesteren et al., 2017). 
Besides this, the firm owners expressed negative feelings about the bankruptcy in general. 
Participants often conveyed feelings of loss and devastation; “I felt my heart crush” (Michelle), 
“one of the hardest things I have had to overcome” (Julie) and “it was one of the most traumatic 
experiences I ever went through” (Sam). A number of informants delved into how they felt 
annoyed and tapped further into their grief due to their financial lost that came with not being 
able to save their firm. For instance, Nigel and Damien stated the following: 
Very sad, I mean, you put everything into the company to make money at the end of 
the day and it was sad (Nigel) 
it was drastic (.) that does leave a scar (Damien) 
 
It is evident from Nigel and Damien’s account that they faced significant trauma due to their 
venture lost. Damien even further highlighted, how he felt his partners betrayed him, noting 
that “when the shit hits the fan people actually try to hide and you know the true colours try to 
come up”, showcasing how he felt hurt. The trauma incurred is again evidence of the fragility 
that the entrepreneurs encounter (Taleb, 2012).  
4.2.6 Behavioural implications  
Another frequent pattern was the behavioural implications of the bankruptcy which are 
represented by the entrepreneur’s excerpts. A few spoke of the health consequences they faced, 




but when you got thirty people and thirty families, the moral burden you got is not 
intolerable but it is very heavy…I worked my way through it but honestly, two years 
of sleepless night and not knowing where we were going (Carl) 
 
Other participants highlighted the impact of the “very stressful” experience of the bankruptcy, 
its implications on being able to survive, providing for oneself and others as well as the grief 
of the partnership issues they faced (Shepherd, 2003; Jenkins et al.,2010; Jenkins et al., 2014). 
For example, Damien asserted: 
Yes it was very stressful (.) it was very hard, actually, because not only did I have to 
close the business (.) and do the bankruptcy, but it was also on a personal level where, 
as I was a friend with the people I was partnered with (.) it was a betrayal and (.) so yes, 
it was hard on all these aspects (Damien) 
 
Here, Damien’s account showcases the hardships and anxiety that comes from a range of areas 
associated with bankruptcy. He sheds light on how he felt betrayed, having lost a close friend 
during the process which was exceptionally hard to cope with.  
A small number of participants spoke of further implications on their mental health such as 
losing their identity, as they recognised their business as their child. Thus, indicating the 
extremely close relationship they had with their organisation: 
that business was everything (.) it was my baby and when I lost it, for me, it was kind 
of the end of the world (Damien)  
in my case, I am an owner (.) entrepreneur and this was my baby for twenty five years, 
so for me to see my baby dying, I mean, drowning which it was, I felt I was losing what 
I spent half of my life…working on and my personal identity (Carl) 
 
It can be inferred that both Carl and Damien had been impacted severely from their business 
collapse as emphasised by the loss of their identity and aspects of their self-worth. These 
findings corroborate with earlier work by Van Kesteren et al., (2017) by demonstrating how 
the venture collapse is comparable to the loss of a close one, which is highly distressing. 
Several participants also suffered with more severe disorders and conditions which stemmed 
from their bankruptcy, such as panic attacks. A number of business owners highlighted that the 
bankruptcy experience was “mentally exhausting” as commented by Derek, whilst a small 
number of informants felt exceptionally “low” and were diagnosed with depression illustrating 
the severity of the bankruptcy. For instance, Julie and Jay reported that they had been 




“blood pressure” and “depression”. Despite these accounts of severe medical conditions, Jay 
highlighted how it encouraged his eventual recovery.  
George interestingly identified that the bankruptcy was not a significant hardship, although he 
had a breakdown due to a sequential business failure which led him to his admission at a priory: 
I had a breakdown when I couldn’t cope with the consequences of not having any 
money, and doing something against other people (.) so you got here two scenarios 
where there is the embarrassment and not being able to provide for your family that 
would create a breakdown (George) 
 
George’s case is unique, as none of the other firm owners failed after going bankrupt the first-
time round. Nevertheless, the above extract does indicate the complexities of losing money 
from his second entrepreneurial venture failure and the harmful impact it can have. Such 
findings overall support the literature that indicates that entrepreneurial venture failure that 
results in bankruptcy can have severe implications to business owner’s health, contributing to 
the development of affective disorders (Singh et al., 2007; Van Kesteren et al., 2017). 
However, despite these adverse behavioural implications, participants spoke of the relief they 
experienced from obtaining bankruptcy charges, supporting literature on the matter (Jenkins et 
al., 2010; Shepherd et al., 2009):  
once it is done then you know it is a massive weight of your shoulders (Jake) 
so I looked at bankruptcy as my get of jail card as I wrote off millions of pounds of debt 
(George) 
 
From both the respondent’s extracts one can infer that they found that the bankruptcy helped 
to relieve them from their misfortune associated with their previous business blunder. George 
further shared, how he “managed to restart the businesses right of all the debt and reduce the 
staff” which perceived as a benefit as he stated, “I am now back in business with investment 
banking (.) so it is funny I have gone from bankrupt to banking”. These findings specifically 
reflected how the bankruptcy positively freed him from a significant amount of debt. Denise 
further noted: 
going through the bankruptcy experiences you know in the lead up to it (.) fear fear fear 
(.) and the relief of actually walking through the fire of it and realising that is a 
tremendous liberation (.) when you finally go bankrupt (.) because that is when you 
relieve yourself of…all of the pressure so it is like a huge liberation and then of course 





Denise’s claims show how she was able to identify relief from her bankruptcy with clear 
emphasis on the liberation that comes from the experiences. Like her, some of the interviewees 
frequently claimed that their failure gave them a chance to restart on a “blank slate” shedding 
further light on the positives of the bankruptcy. Irrespective of these positive accounts, it was 
noted that most of the once bankrupted entrepreneurs did not acknowledge the positive 
implications of the bankruptcy immediately. In fact, they only truly benefitted from the 
bankruptcy after a certain period. 
4.2.7 Appraising negative experiences  
Importantly, the business owners often spoke of how they appraised their failure experiences 
(Jenkins et al., 2010; Jenkins et al., 2014). The approach entailed evaluating their current 
situation and its relevance to them (Smith and Lazarus, 1993). For instance, participants 
recurrently offered anecdotes of the position they had arrived in due to the bankruptcy, as well 
as how they assessed this position:  
we all make mistakes, but we learn from it and we have to progress, you know, nobody 
is perfect, we all make mistakes (Jay) 
 
Here, it can be suggested that Jay was able to obtain a positive perspective on the bankruptcy 
through a process of analysing it. Dilan also similarly delineated how he appraised his business 
partner issues: 
for me, it wasn’t about him, it was about our situation that went wrong and therefore I 
respected the responsibility for that little part (Dilan) 
 
By forgiving his partner and looking at the failure in this perspective, it is evident that Dilan 
gained more of an understanding for his contribution to the eventual bankruptcy. He further 
developed his internal attributional style as he became more conscious of his responsibilities 
as an entrepreneur (Heider, 1958). 
Several participants reported how they appraised their loss of recognition and independence 
which corroborates findings from earlier studies (Jenkins et al., 2010; Jenkins et al., 2014). For 
instance, Carl highlighted: 
if your ego goes down with your position, then you are completely screwed and so are 
your troops and so is your army and so is your military; as long as I am able to say I did 
my best, it was an untellable position and we lived to fight another day…then you are 





From Carl’s response, it is clear that his appraisal of the failure led to his ability to recover 
from his loss of recognition and stress encountered. He did so by identifying the importance of 
his capability to fight through the adversity of bankruptcy and managing his ego. In this regard, 
it enabled him to build faith in his own ability and increase his self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977). 
A few interviewees also commented how they appraised their financial hardships, which also 
corroborates with extant work (Jenkins et al., 2010; Jenkins et al., 2014). Jake and George also 
evaluated their financial situation, which helped to see the positives of it: 
The bankruptcy we are talking about is a financial disaster, which can be bought by 
yourself and other circumstances, but I think in life there are bigger things (George) 
you cannot stick your head in the ground (.) I think you go through the J curve of it (.) 
I think I definitely went through it (.) um, so my view on it is that by the age of thirty, 
I did more than most people do in a lifetime so go do it again…some people never get 
that chance to bankrupt after having billions (Jake) 
 
From George’s account, it is clear that upon assessing his financial issues, he realised that the 
bankruptcy is not as distressing as it initially appeared. In a similar fashion, Jake’s extract 
indicated how appraising his financial position and comparing it to others aided his recovery. 
Jake’s appraisal of his bankruptcy specifically prompted him to discover what he had gained 
from the financial downfall. Importantly, it also spurred him on to restart, giving the risk-prone 
career choice of entrepreneurship another chance (Bridge, 2018; Taleb, 2012).  
George and Lisa effectively demonstrated how their appraisal in general enabled them to 
convert their failure experiences into constructive ones and recognise the positives of it. George 
specifically remarked upon how “when you are bankrupt, it is not the end of the world and you 
have not died”. Similarly, Lisa stated, “it has made me much better at what I do, so I think there 
is a lot of positives from it”. In a related way, Julie also noted how after a certain number of 
appraisals, she was able to gain from the bankruptcy (Taleb, 2012). The majority of 
interviewees frequently echoed this finding, representing that at a certain point, the bankruptcy 
became a seminal moment in their lives which enabled them to build antifragility as a capability 
to bounce back. For instance, Marios delved into how his appraisal has made him more business 
savvy, less fearful and importantly, more “alert” of what could go wrong. Likewise, Derek 
surmised his bankruptcy experience as something that has encouraged his recovery. He shared 
the following: “what doesn’t kill you makes you strong and I would be able to restart again, 




In sum, it is evident that the respondents shared a mixture of responses, which could be due to 
each of the business owner’s unique circumstances and timing of their bankruptcy. Irrespective 
of this, it is apparent that participants consistently reported that the failure and bankruptcy 
events had a detrimental impact to their health, livelihood, and overall wellbeing. A recurring 
concept is that events that led to bankruptcy are akin to “black swan” which can take over the 
mind of the business owners, as exemplified by their fractured identity (Siegel, 2010). 
Interestingly, despite the damaging effects of the bankruptcy, another pattern was that by 
appraising their negative experiences the business owners identified that the bankruptcy and 
its implications as valuable for their development. They were able to build robustness against 
these events and become stronger by embracing their failure with an increased understanding 
of their worth (Taleb, 2012). Hence, this stage of the entrepreneur’s journey was crucial to their 
restart. 
4.3 Previous Business Failure and Bankruptcy Recovery  
The third theme is one of the most prominent in uncovering how the firm owners were able to 
rebound to venture again. It unravels the range of strategies that enabled the entrepreneurs to 
deal with the bankruptcy and the phases in which they took place. This theme ultimately reveals 
how the enterprise founders formed the capability to restart by developing antifragility as an 
entrepreneurial competence by decoding the coping processes involved. 
4.3.1 Recovery period  
Participants commonly went through a recovery stage as prompted by their failure. Several 
interviewees shared insight on the gradual healing processes as per Jake’s excerpt:  
it was like a two-stage thing right (.) the judge saying it is done was kind of taking me 
out of my misery, and then the second stage, where I was being contempt to court and 
declaring everything (.) um, so that was kind of the reset (Jake)  
 
Jake’s account uncovers two important phases. First, he noted the actual bankruptcy charges 
were given and sequentially he lost his assets which triggered his eventual recovery. Like 
Jake’s extract, it was identified that the recovery process for most participants started promptly 
after their assets were taken away from them, following their bankruptcy charges. Another 
common trend was that the firm owners also recognised the significance of the recovery period 
in relation to their bankruptcy: 
It made me realise that I have to revive and go through it myself and come out at the 





Sam’s account implies that the business owners see the recovery period as an integral way to 
engage in behaviours that will enable their restart. During these stages it can be interpreted that 
antifragility was developed through a more detailed understanding of the events that led to their 
firm’s collapse and eventual bankruptcy (Taleb, 2012). Specifically, the once bankrupted 
business owners were able to develop antifragility as an entrepreneurial competence. This 
means they were able to decipher the deeper positives from their destructiveness of their 
financial demise which encouraged them to return to entrepreneurship. 
In terms of the length of the recovery period, there was an array of responses. The findings 
therefore match the literature, suggesting that bankrupted entrepreneurs’ experiences can vary 
(Singh et al., 2015). The participants prominently cited that as soon as they were able to, they 
restarted a venture. Denise narrated this well; “then boom (.) straight as I came out of it was 
when I created my new business”. There were two cases where Jay and George stated that they 
had “no recovery period” from their bankruptcy; “I wasn’t bottling down and I just started by 
pulling my socks up” (Jay) and “No I didn’t have time to reflect as I had to start the companies 
up again” (George). These specific extracts support literature by Corner et al., (2017) stating 
that the majority of business founders do not have a recovery period due to the resilience that 
they display. In this case, these firm owners showed faith in their ability to bounce back and 
for Jay, specifically, his family values were deemed as a reason for his faith that he could restart 
as soon as he could. 
However, these claims by the entrepreneurs were exceptions, and it was more common for the 
firm owners from this sample to report a recovery period. Dilan stated that he had a very short 
period of recovery lasting “twenty-four hours” where he felt “lost and cried”. The short period 
could be linked to the sporting industry that Dilan’s firm operates within which is noted to be 
more accepting of failure and bankruptcy. The most popular time length was around six months 
as narrated by most participants, except for Stefan, Nigel and Carl who stated that it took a few 
years or more. Joseph also asserted that it took him slightly longer and he still has not entirely 
recovered from the business failure and bankruptcy. This was an exceptional case, and it could 
be due to the severity of the bankruptcy events experienced. In sum, the six-month mark was 






4.3.2 Use of sense-making and self-reflection 
The informants reported several specific recovery strategies, which eventually aided their 
development of antifragility as an entrepreneurial competence. The venture founders 
frequently highlighted that they initially made sense of the business failure and bankruptcy. 
They often spoke of how they started this by being “honest” with others (Sam). The sense-
making process entails an interconnected process of surveying and analysing information from 
one’s environment (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991) to gauge meaning and build foresight (Weick, 
1995; Nathan, 2004). Several participants frequently remarked how they interpreted their losses 
and scanned their surroundings to grasp an understanding of what went wrong in their prior 
enterprise and garner meanings about the bankruptcy. This is in line with research which shows 
that firm owners go through similar steps to make sense of their venture failure (He et al, 2017). 
For instance, Derek highlighted how he accepted it and “there’s always next time”, whilst 
Damien and Marios reported deeper learnings they obtained, indicating signs of strategic 
foresight (Nathan, 2004). They both explored how the bankruptcy allowed them to think about 
what they did not do in their prior enterprises and what they should be doing going forward to 
run their firms effectively: 
it makes you realise it is down to you and you are the only who can make it work so 
whether you like it or not, you have to do it (Damien) 
I just look at it (.) partly, there is a bit of regret for the time I consumed on it and the 
money I wasted on it…because there were too many things I wasn’t doing or I wasn’t 
doing in the right way (Marios)  
 
Both participants demonstrated how they gleaned an understanding that they are the sole person 
responsible for succeeding with their businesses upon their reflection. Marios specifically 
discusses this in depth, analysing what he was not doing, showing aspects of his fragility 
(Taleb, 2012). In this regard, both participants continued to develop an internal attributional 
style (Heider, 1958). These findings are again consistent with work showing that firm owners 
accept responsibility for their failure (Mantere et al., 2013; Franco and Hase, 2010; Rogoff et 
al., 2004; Zacharkis et al., 1999). 
Following the sense-making process and sometimes in parallel to it, another recurring pattern 
was that participants critically self-reflected by setting themselves apart from the business 
failure and resultant bankruptcy to think about their goals. For instance, Dilan discussed how 
the bankruptcy encouraged him to think deeply about his aspirations, what he values, and what 




it was about finding myself…what do I care about (.) what am I motivated by (.) what 
relaxes me (.) what puts me in the right frame of mind (.) that was what I was very 
consciously thinking about (Dilan)  
 
In a related extract, Marios remarked how the bankruptcy enabled him to accept the failure and 
put it into perspective before exploring why he wanted to run a company again:  
when something like that happens, it’s okay for things to go wrong and to take a 
moment to think and recoup your strategy and then quietly go over it, like, what did 
happen? (.) why do I want to run a business? (Marios) 
 
Other accounts also shed light on how their bankruptcy was a ‘real eye opener’, as exemplified 
by Sam who stated how it changed his outlook towards success:  
one who can embrace the failure also knows how to cope with success (Sam) 
 
Moreover, the participants shared similar narratives as they self-reflected on what success 
meant to them, their true purpose in life through the process of being banned a firm owner and 
the importance of learning from others. Beyond these implications of self-reflection, it was 
common for the entrepreneurs to express how they had started to gain more than they had lost. 
For instance, Denise narrated this well: 
the whole bankruptcy and insolvency were a potential part of my business training in 
the bigger picture of my life to become a truly evolved evolutionary entrepreneur, and 
understand that that old style of capitalism; that, in truth, is what needs to be unplugged 
on this planet right now (.) so it has helped me to evolve on a kind of higher octave of 
business (.) having been forced through that (Denise) 
 
It is evident from Denise’s case that the experience enabled her to change her outlook on 
business, garner more knowledge about her worth and obtain more business acumen. She 
specifically described the bankruptcy as ensuring that she “evolved to a higher octave of 
business”, which meant she could handle further business issues and volatility that may come 
with restarting a venture better than she previously did. Ultimately, she was able to develop 
antifragility (Taleb, 2012) by eventually viewing the bankruptcy as positive overall. 
To summarise, these findings paint a picture that the once bankrupted business owners tended 
to initially make-sense of their bankruptcy. In this regard, they were able to develop an internal 






4.3.3 Emotionally oriented coping mechanisms 
Importantly, a further trend was that participants often reported that they self-reflected and 
emotionally regulated, whilst simultaneously making more sense about the bankruptcy (Singh 
et al., 2007; Cope, 2011). Emotional regulation involves managing feelings, their frequency 
and how they are expressed (Boss and Sims, 2008). For instance, Derek emphasised the process 
of sense-making by first “accepting” the failure before developing a “positive frame of mind”, 
demonstrating his emotional regulation. Like Derek, Sam highlighted how he benefitted after 
making sense of his bankruptcy. He proclaimed that the reflection was “positive” and narrated: 
“had I not failed; I would have continued to make the same mistakes (Sam)”. It can be inferred 
from these extracts that Sam was able to grow from the bankruptcy by viewing it constructively 
and as a strength (Taleb, 2012). 
Several respondents also went into great depth about their negative emotions that they 
eventually regulated: 
Yeah, I was quite nervous and had insecure feelings (.) I did not know what was coming 
ahead of me or what would happen to me (Joseph) 
I still feel sad that it had to be closed because it was going so well (.) but it’s something 
which people tell me, ‘you need to get over it’ (.) in a way, I did (.) but also I didn’t (.) 
I wish I could turn the time back (.) erm (.) I am not angry about it anymore, more sad 
than angry (Damien) 
 
Despite these negative accounts regarding the business collapse, these participants eventually 
spoke more positively about the bankruptcy and the stigma associated with their failure that 
they encountered by reframing the events after engaging in a deep personal re-examination. 
Damien described the experience as a “rollercoaster”. Most interviewees, such as Derek 
claimed that he used his anger to “fuel his stamina” and spark his endurance to cope. He also 
highlighted the importance of “falling down” and failing, which prompted him to learn. It is 
evident that the firm owners gradually transformed the bankruptcy from a negative event to 
one of benefit. A few entrepreneurs explored how they managed to overcome their negative 
emotions eventually by recognising the importance of them, as illustrated by the following 
verbatim quotes: 
The emotions I felt were mainly sadness because I lost the company, but I got over it 
eventually and I was able to see the positive of it (Nigel) 
at first, I didn’t think I could do it again (.) my emotions were getting the better of me 
(.) I was angry and stressed...I think emotions in business are what gets you into trouble 




you know I paid millions of pounds, well, generated millions of pounds for the inland 
revenue so I had no kind of guilt…just saying fuck that four hundred grand, without 
any kind of guilt (Denise) 
 
From these excerpts, it is apparent that the business owners were heavily impacted by the 
venture failure, bankruptcy, and its implications. This consequently affected their levels of 
emotional regulation which is in line with Heinze’s (2013) findings. Moreover, it can be 
interpreted that the participants went through an emotional journey in which they could 
eventually gain control of the bankruptcy and regulate their feelings towards it. Marios, in 
particular, expressed the importance of managing his emotions. Denise further asserted how 
she eventually managed to let go of guilt through her sense-making and emotional regulation. 
Additionally, in a similar vein, respondents discussed the deep thought processes involved in 
their emotional regulation which aided their recovery. For instance, Carl imparted insight on 
how he managed his own mental health by controlling his emotions: 
I managed my own mental health and I have never put as much focus or effort into it 
before and I was absolutely determined that I would not get depressed…but I had to 
discipline myself to…remain upbeat and see a way out of it, even though there was 
actually; technically, there was no way out of it but I refused to let it get me down (Carl) 
 
Evidently, most of the formerly bankrupted entrepreneurs went through a process where they 
confronted their emotions to help deal with the grief and make sense of their bankruptcy. 
Furthermore, the findings agree with prior studies that show the significance of emotional 
regulation and self-reflection, which can aid the sense-making process (Singh et al., 2007; 
Byrne and Shepherd, 2015). Interestingly, negative emotions further aided one’s understanding 
of what led to their demise, which is in accordance with findings from Byrne and Shepherd 
(2015). Hence, by starting to emotionally regulate and control their emotions, the participants 
developed antifragility and the capability to rebound to venture again. For instance, Damien 
asserted that following these coping techniques, he had faith that his sequential business would 
work without any doubts. Thus, it can be inferred that the entrepreneurs specifically were able 
to gain an understanding of more of what they can gain from the bankruptcy, using it as a 
strength (Taleb, 2012). 
Through his emotional regulation, Carl further imparts insight from being able to gain from the 
traumatic events due to his recovery of it, making it comparable to post-traumatic growth 




there is a defence mechanism into man, into human beings that when you go through 
enormous privation and suffering your brain, autocorrects afterwards so that you 
recover from it … same way people come back from traumatic injuries or positions of 
stress like this so I can honestly tell you… it was terrible and I had sleepless nights, but 
do I feel the pain or the sleeplessness that I felt then? (.) no, because my mind and body 
has recovered, but it was awful (Carl) 
 
Carl’s story indicates how his use of antifragility as an entrepreneurial competence has enabled 
him to look back at his bankruptcy events more positively. He delved into how he managed to 
recover fully from the painful implications of his bankruptcy. He further commented how the 
bankruptcy experience did not deter him from launching another company and, in fact, 
contributed to establishing his subsequent venture. George further shared the following: 
so for me it is all about a learning curve and every time you do something you are 
learning and you got to think it is not a failure and it is an experience, everything is an 
experience, and the word ‘failure’ is seen as negative and I am saying it is not negative, 
but we can see it as…a learning curve to greatness (George) 
 
From George’s narrative, it is evident that he found the bankruptcy enabled him to perceive the 
entire experience as a useful one, which can forge further success and therefore should not be 
viewed negatively. Hence, he was able to illustrate how the uncertainty and volatility that stems 
from bankruptcy can be used to prosper; therefore, demonstrating the development of 
antifragility as an entrepreneurial competence (Taleb, 2012). 
To summarise, it is apparent that whilst reflecting on their failure and bankruptcy, the firm 
owners engaged in emotional oriented coping mechanisms, such as emotional regulation 
which, continued to aid their sense-making. From engaging in these behaviours, they gradually 
underwent a personal re-examination and reframed their venture demise which helped them 
form antifragility as an entrepreneurial competence as they developed ownership over their 
emotional wellbeing. Specifically, the more the firm owner emotionally regulated, they 
developed a convex response to the stressors of bankruptcy, leading to a positive reaction to 
the same stressor again. They were able to therefore exploit the positives from their experiences 
which they did not initially do. Moreover, they further recognised the importance of having an 
internal attributional style (Heider, 1958), taking more responsibility for their own behaviours, 






4.3.4 Use of other coping mechanisms   
The once bankrupted business owners described a combination of other coping mechanisms to 
deal with the stigma, behavioural implications and other negatives associated with their 
bankruptcy (Miller and Major, 2000). These mechanisms involved engaging in behaviours to 
deal with challenging situations (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). A few business owners 
undertook further emotionally focussed strategies to cope with the psychological aspects of 
their failure, such as using meditation to gain a deeper insight into the events that led to their 
bankruptcy. For instance, Denise delved deeply into how her meditation gave her further 
insight into the causes of her business collapse: 
anger, blame, shame, conflict (.) I mean, the whole 3D reality is hinged on this 
persecution victim drama trial and so I just know from all my spiritual work (.) that 
mastery is transcending that illusion and realising that all of the bad guys out there that 
you been blaming are all master teachers (.) so if only you could transcend the illusion 
and start thinking what is this really about what I am truly angry about what I am truly 
fighting against and it is always, well, it is always rooted in childhood trauma (Denise) 
 
It is evident from Denise’s extract that her coping measures allowed her to precisely reflect on 
all the individuals she blamed and uncover the true cause of the venture collapse, which was 
rooted in her childhood. By doing so, this prompted her to change her attributional style from 
externally to internally by gaining more control of her actions (Heider, 1958).  
Beyond this coping mechanism, most firm owners engaged in problem-based strategies. A vast 
number of respondents suggested that they sought social support by talking openly with others 
who had overcome business failure, which reduced their grief and aided their recovery. For 
instance, entrepreneurs consistently asserted how they openly communicated with positive 
individuals as well as those who had gone through business failure and bankruptcy.  
A few informants discussed other planful problem solving techniques, by focussing on their 
self-development in various ways. The most common technique entailed engaging in physical 
and spiritual related exercises to help deal with the stress faced, such as “training…go 
gym…meditate” (Derek), “physical exercise” (George); “training for a type of healing” 
(Denise) and finding time to "switch off” (Lisa). Through undertaking these activities, the 
business owners were able to handle the venture failure more positively by gaining relief from 
the bankruptcy and learning how they would gain from it. They were thus further able to 
develop antifragility as an entrepreneurial competence (Taleb, 2012). Other problem focussed 




more research (.) more understanding (Sam) 
you know, get educated (.) I went on computer courses (Jay) 
 
Through undertaking these techniques, the entrepreneurs revealed how they benefited from the 
failure and used it to prompt self-development to become a better entrepreneur, increasing their 
self-belief (Taleb, 2012; Bandura, 1977). Jake also specifically highlighted that he carried on 
focussing on setting up another venture unlike others who had been through comparable 
experiences: 
I have seen other people go through bankruptcy and I have seen them literally go and 
drink themselves to death or stuff (.) you know, I didn’t really do that (.) I didn’t feel 
the need to do that (.) I just felt that (.) I got to get on and you know, my thing is not 
about the bankruptcy or living in a bus shelter, you just have to get on (Jake) 
 
From Jake’s narrative, it is clear he put the bankruptcy into perspective, remarking that he 
compared it to his experiences of living in a bus shelter, and how this effectively allowed him 
to solve the problem in a methodological manner by planning his next steps. However, Jake’s 
case was an exception, and it was commonly found that the participants went through a series 
of stages to recover prior to planning their subsequent enterprise; this reinforces findings from 
Shepherd et al.’s (2009) conceptual paper. 
Unlike Jake, there was a small group of participants who undertook activities such as 
consuming alcohol to cope with their grief and escape from the failure and bankruptcy. For 
instance, the firm owners stated, “drinking helped” (Jay), “a big coping mechanism was a large 
glass of wine (laughs)” (Denise), “I started drinking more” (Sam) and “I drank a significant 
amount of alcohol…you have to take actions to get yourself in order, so this was, for me, the 
equivalent of a sleeping pill” (Carl). Despite reports of such techniques, they were not as 
common as the other more positive, calculated strategies that the participants had spoken of. 
4.3.5 Impression management techniques 
The once bankrupted business owners also offered insight into the impression management 
techniques to reduce the social stigma they faced (Sutton and Calahan, 1987; Shepherd and 
Haynie, 2011; Walsh, 2017). Participants spoke of the importance of such techniques as they 
spoke highly of valuing their credibility. This supports Smith and Mcelwee’s (2011) study 
which highlights how failed business owners’ place importance on their personal legitimacy. 
The techniques entailed avoiding others as a means to detach themselves from the perceived 




his financial downfall so he could carry on with his life (Walsh, 2017; Shepherd and Haynie, 
2011; Sutton and Calahan, 1987). A few of the entrepreneurs also embarked on other 
impression management techniques, such as diluting the impact of the bankruptcy to be viewed 
more positively (Walsh, 2017; Shepherd and Haynie, 2011; Sutton and Calahan, 1987). Lastly, 
the participants embraced the business failure and bankruptcy as a tactic to control other 
perceptions, supporting research on the matter (Kibler et al., 2017; Walsh 2017; Kibler et al., 
2020). All participants had moments where they did this: 
I fully embraced it (Carl) 
I fully embraced it, like I said, it is an almost a celebration rather than a downplay in 
terms of the story and things of where I have got to now (Dilan) 
 
It can be interpreted from the above excerpts that these views surfaced after the participants 
were able to express how they accepted their bankruptcy by acknowledging it and taking full 
responsibility for it. In this regard, the firm owners were able to reduce their grief from the 
financial situation (Walsh, 2017). As previously noted, a possible explanation could be due to 
the leniency of the industries within which the entrepreneurs’ firms operate.  
In sum, the business owners undertook several coping mechanisms in their pursuit to restart, 
comprising; emotionally focussed strategies, seeking social support, and planful problem 
solving. Collectively the use of the coping mechanisms allowed the venture founders to fully 
develop an internal attributional style through taking further responsibility for their actions and 
behaviours that led to the bankruptcy (Yamakawa and Cardon, 2015; Markey-Towler, 2018; 
Heider, 1958). Further, the firm owners were able to further deal with the negative implications 
of the failure by harnessing the grief felt, using it as part of their self-development. At specific 
point, the venture founders were able to gain more than they would lose from the bankruptcy 
(Taleb, 2012). Hence, the business owners developed the entrepreneurial competence of 
antifragility and fully embrace their failure by the end of their recovery period (Taleb, 2012). 
Besides this, coping mechanisms, helped to further the venture founder’s self-efficacy 
(Bandura, 1977) by boosting their belief in their own ability to start-up another firm. 
Ultimately, the entrepreneurs showed elements of post-traumatic growth disorder, by being 
able to use the bankruptcy as a strength (Calhoun and Tedeschi, 2014). To that end, the findings 
from this theme advance current research on emotional functioning of a firm owner and how 





4.4 Chapter Summary and Conclusion  
The key objective of this chapter has been to extend conceptual work on how firm owners 
develop the ability to restart their enterprise(s) post-bankruptcy. It is worthy to note that there 
are variances in the entrepreneurs’ experiences, although, most of them had commonalities in 
their stories which enabled one to paint a canvas of their journey of healing from their venture 
collapse and bankruptcy. Through drawing on antifragility as the primary overarching 
theoretical lens, it was revealed that the once bankrupted business owners go through a series 
of three stages to recover from their failure, enabling them to go from fragile to developing 
antifragility as an entrepreneurial competence.  
Figure 6: Steps of developing entrepreneurial antifragility  
 
As per the above figure, the findings are represented by the three themes. First, the 
entrepreneurs experienced moments of fragility where they searched for the root cause of the 
bankruptcy by retrospectively looking at how their firm cultivated and captured sustainable 
value. Eventually, they arrived at the verdict that they were the main instigator for their 
bankruptcy for a multitude of reasons, realising they can control the implications of their 
financial situation by developing self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977). 
Second, the venture founders discussed the extremely negative experiences they had prior, 
during and after the declaration of their bankruptcy charges. They specifically encountered 
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harsh financial outcomes, long-lasting social stigma from various stakeholders, coupled with 
self-stigmatisation and detrimental behaviour implications; thus, yet again deeming the 
bankruptcy as somewhat comparable to a ‘black swan’ (Taleb, 2007). Through undergoing 
these experiences, the entrepreneurs embraced periods of fragility further, although they also 
started to find that these events were valuable as part of their development by appraising them 
(Jenkins et al., 2014). 
Lastly, most of the participants went through a recovery period following the declaration of 
their bankruptcy charges where they were banned from owning another enterprise for a certain 
period so had no option but to look at their failure from a different perspective. This involved 
a string of coping measures, usually commencing with sense-making practices, before critically 
reflecting and emotionally regulating their bankruptcy experiences. In parallel, the firm owners 
also undertook planful problem and emotional focussed coping strategies as well as impression 
management tactics. Taken together, the coping behaviours enabled them to bounce back from 
their bankruptcy in three ways. First, they prompted them to realise their full ownership of the 
bankruptcy, demonstrating an internal attributional style by a personal re-examination. Second, 
simultaneously, the coping behaviours importantly led to the development of antifragility as an 
entrepreneurial competence by reframing the bankruptcy and failure events. The entrepreneurs 
specifically came to a realisation that at a certain point, their negative emotions could deepen 
their understanding of their bankruptcy and build their robustness against the events that led to 
it. Furthermore, they transformed the entire experience into a positive one, exploiting it to gain 
more than they lost. Third, the coping behaviours allowed the enterprise owners to increase 
their self-efficacy to take another risk and rebound to venture again. They specifically 
developed a convex response to the same stressors, meaning they that they handled them better 
than they previously did; hence they showed aspects of post-traumatic growth disorder 
(Calhoun and Tedeschi, 2014; Taleb, 2012). 
In a nutshell, this chapter conceptualises how bankruptcy in the short-term can lead a failed 
firm owner to possess feelings of fragility, yet in the long-term through a set of experiences 
and recovery processes, the firm owners overcompensate for the pain endured and develop the 
capability to bounce back. While these results corroborate related findings in the 
entrepreneurial failure literature, it also exposes the intricacies of the processes embedded 
within how firm owners: i) identify the antecedents of their venture demise, ii) navigate through 




Through focussing on how the once bankrupted firm owners learn and identify opportunities 
to launch their subsequent venture(s), the next chapter endeavours to build an understanding of 
the learning trajectories that result in entrepreneurial re-entry. From this perspective, the 
chapter explores when and how entrepreneurial antifragility leads to the identification of 





New Venture Identification, Formation and Learning by 
‘exploiting’ Entrepreneurial Antifragility 
This chapter provides insights on how and when entrepreneurial antifragility may lead to the 
identification of opportunities for new business start-up post-bankruptcy. Organised around a 
process model illustrating the outcomes associated with the staggered learning steps that 
characterise restart post-bankruptcy, the chapter focuses on how venture founders exploit their 
“entrepreneurial competence” of antifragility to identify and seize new opportunities to restart 
a new business. The chapter is divided into three themes. The first theme uncovers the gradual 
learning processes the entrepreneur goes through prior to, during and after the firm owner’s 
recovery from their business demise. The second theme unpacks how antifragility as an 
organising competence enables firm owners to identify, plan, form and create new ventures as 
well as identify the appropriate timing of launching their subsequent businesses. The third 
theme uncovers how the firm owners develop long-term learning, make use of their knowledge, 
and cultivate strategic foresight during the restart of their subsequent enterprises. 
5.1 Entrepreneurial Learning Stages  
5.1.1 From lower-order learning to higher-order learning by ‘way-finding’ 
Learning can take multiple forms and is generally considered as an iterative process of 
repeating tasks to develop proficiencies in a domain (Burke and Hutchins 2007; Miniti and 
Bygrave 2001). Research has highlighted that learning can fall under “lower-level” and 
“higher-level” learning (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). The former a more superficial level type of 
learning related to routine-based tasks (Brown, 2000; Appelbaum et al., 2003). In contrast, the 
latter entails a richer set of learning processes, transforming one’s thought on a given matter 
(Brown, 2000; Appelbaum et al., 2003). Such higher-level learning usually tends to develop 
from a “crisis” due to the significant impact of an event of this scale (Fiol and Lyles, 1985).  
The vast majority of participants stressed the importance of learning and most of them 
highlighted that there was no way to succeed without developing knowledge. The below model 
depicts the gradual learning steps involved in how the participants found their “way” to restart 
as based on their narratives. The outcomes represent the core learning takeaways the firm-




















The owners commonly did not learn “immediately” (Dilan) and instead went through a series 
“stages of realisation” (George) as part of a “learning curve” (Lisa). Such phases included: i) 
prior to the bankruptcy charges; ii) during their recovery period after the bankruptcy charges; 
and iii) following the recovery phase. Throughout the stages, the firm owners’ learning entailed 
a process of experiential learning, which meant that they accrued knowledge from their 
experiences (Politis, 2005). During the first phase, a few participants learnt through converting 
their experiences that led to their business collapse into useful pieces of knowledge. For 
instance, a small number of participants conveyed how they learnt from their previous financial 
decisions. Such learnings were more short-term and lower-order since they did not involve 
engaging in a complex set of cognitive processes (Singh et al., 2015; Ekanem and Wyer 2007). 
Learning During Key Stages 
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This type of lower-order learning may eventually lose any beneficial significance after initially 
being utilised (Parker, 2013).  
It was almost unanimous that the business owners started to learn in greater detail during and 
after their recovery from their enterprise collapse. Specifically, the recovery stage experiences 
were converted into learnings. Thus, supporting the works that have found a relationship 
between how firm owners cope with their business collapse and their development of 
knowledge (Shepherd, 2003; Cope, 2011). This is also in line with literature that highlighted 
that entrepreneurs may only truly learn from their failure under certain conditions (Cardon et 
al., 2011 Yamakawa et al., 2010) and that they can learn gradually (Mckenzie 2008). For 
instance, participants like Dilan and George expressed insight into how important learning from 
their mistakes were: 
academic stuff is always there, as it gives you confidence in yourself, and reassurance 
to progress, but classic life experiences and learning from mistakes (.) get out there (.) 
meet people and talk to them (Dilan) 
 
Dilan’s account portrays how he was able to effectively harness his bankruptcy experiences to 
push him to take the next step in his career. He emphasised how classic life experiences are 
core to his development, and they prompted his learning. George also highlighted the value in 
becoming bankrupt which he perceives as a crucial learning experience. 
It was found that specifically during the recovery period, participants extended previous 
learnings to a deeper level. For instance, participants often articulated how they could become 
more financially astute in various ways: 
Be careful about giving personal guarantees (George) 
I learnt my next enterprise will be a limited company, so I am covered personally (Zack) 
Both the respondent’s claims illustrate how they had obtained valuable insights from their 
business failure by utilising their experiences (Politis, 2005). They had shown that such 
learning was at a ‘higher-order’ level as the outcomes are not scenario specific and instead, 
they can be employed in a range of situations (Burgoyne and Hodgson, 1983). Such learning 
is based on long-term knowledge (Cope, 2011), which in this case could be used in the 
development of another organisation. The firm owners therefore indicated that they were able 
to use their entrepreneurial competence of antifragility by handling business finance issues 




In a similar fashion, Marios and Sam highlighted deeper financial lessons from their 
bankruptcy which were obtained during their recovery period: 
I learnt cash is key, you really got to watch all of the pennies and the pounds, and the 
minute you take your eye off that (.) especially when you are young you can lose a lot 
of money…look at one stage…when things were well I was going to Formula 1 (.) I 
was driving around in nice cars (.) holidays (.) a great life and what happens, you start 
to believe you are invincible…I do not think we can ever be that confident or 
complacent in business (.) and the minute you are, you are setting yourself to fail, you 
got to constantly be on the ball (Marios) 
What I learnt is that when you are on your own, if you succeed you get the credit, but 
if you fail you can only blame yourself (Sam) 
 
Interestingly, Marios’ narrative represents how he not only used his recovery period to 
emotionally regulate how he felt towards the bankruptcy but what he could do to become more 
financially savvy. He has gained invaluable long-term knowledge about not being complacent 
in business to ensure that he runs a fruitful enterprise. In this regard, Marios displays aspects 
of higher order learning and an internal attributional style since he declared he was in control 
of the company (Heider, 1958). Similarly, Sam’s quote also reveals how he transformed his 
recovery into longer-term and deeper learning, emphasising that he is control of his outcomes. 
These findings support recent work by He et al., (2018) by indicating that there is a relationship 
between how failed entrepreneurs learn and their ability to emotionally regulate how they felt 
about the business failure. Specifically, such findings extend the scholar’s results by 
demonstrating how learning can increase with coming to terms with the failure events (He et 
al., 2018).  
Another area of learning during the recovery period that extended earlier learnings, surrounded 
internal firm dynamic and business partners. This type of learning has been narrated well by 
Sam and Derek: 
you can’t do business with family…cause when you involve them sometimes, it can 
complicate things and the way you speak to your staff (.) you know showing respect…if 
it’s family, they will just take it in one ear and it out the other (Derek) 
Partnerships do not work, so try and have less partners and if you do have to have 
partners, ensure that they are not the decision makers (Sam) 
 
Both excerpts indicate that the firm owners have started to form an understanding of how 
certain firm dynamics may not work following their bankruptcy. They showed aspects of an 




1966; Weiner, 1992). Through taking this attribution approach to their failure, they have been 
able to learn from their venture demise experience. Derek specifically gleaned that he needed 
to employ others outside of his family unit, thus reshaping his experiences whilst, Sam, in a 
similar fashion learnt that having a business partner may not always be fruitful. Both accounts 
also represent longer-term higher-order learning from the recovery stage experiences and 
suggest that the participants have started to exploit their antifragility.  
Following the recovery period and prior to the point in which the entrepreneurs restarted a 
venture, the findings showcase that the firm owners further developed their learning in two 
ways. First, it was identified that the venture owners learnt about how to become more business 
savvy by harnessing their knowledge gained, as recounted by Marios: 
you cannot become detached from the business, and what is going on from the biggest 
thing to smallest thing, and especially, um, the clients (Marios) 
 
It is evident that Marios has gained an understanding of the role he plays within the business 
as a firm owner and what he needs to do to learn to ensure the company does not fail again. 
This is another key example of long-term learning through the transformation of the firm failure 
recovery experiences as well as how the antifragility is continually harnessed to obtain benefits 
from the bankruptcy.  
Another key learning that was displayed by the participants was the growth of the capability to 
bounce back through using their recovery experiences. The majority of the business owners 
referenced how their coping encouraged them “to continue” (Sam) and not “fail in the future” 
(Joseph) as well as recognise that their firm collapse is not “the end of the world” (Scott). These 
quotes reflect how the participants gained an understanding of the business failure as a useful 
life lesson. Damien also asserted, that “you are all by yourself (.) you have to rely on yourself”. 
It can be interpreted that Damien came to a further realisation that he is primarily in charge of 
key decisions related to his firm. Therefore, again supporting literature that illustrates that the 
entrepreneurs learnt from their failure through adopting an internal ascription style (Yamakawa 
and Cardon, 2015).  
To summarise, these findings demonstrate that a few participants obtained lower-level 
learnings from their financial downfall prior to their bankruptcy. Importantly, following the 
bankruptcy, during and after the participant’s recovery period they underwent a gradual 
learning process which led to developing “higher-order” learnings. By doing so, they exploited 




benefits than losses from their prior financial turmoil. Furthermore, they showed how they had 
converted their experiences to develop an internal attributional style.  
5.1.2 Reflexive learning in-practice 
Beyond learning gradually through making use of their experiences, enterprise owners 
undertook reflexive learning which stems from their reflective behaviours during and after their 
recovery period (Minniti and Bygrave 2001; Pretorius and Le Roux 2011; Frota Vasconcellos 
Dias and Marten 2019). For instance, participants stated how they began “pointing out things” 
(Derek), and “learning from those mistakes and knowing what…you need to do next to make 
sure it doesn’t happen again” (Lisa). Such reflexive learning followed a process of prospective 
sensemaking, in which the firm owner looked at what they previously did wrong in relation to 
their future expectations of running a venture (Mackay, 2010; Sarpong et al., 2013). Through 
these reflections, they were able to recognise patterns in their behaviours and become aware of 
the “ways” they should operate as a firm owner. Marios amongst others discussed this in detail: 
The ability to be quiet and listen, that is really, really, very key and I am not going to 
lie that was difficult for me, especially at forty years old and people are telling you off, 
or that is what it seems to be, or they are telling you that you are wrong (.) you got to 
have that ability to learn you are not always right, so one hundred percent listening 
(Marios) 
 
By changing his listening behaviours Marios’ passage represents how he was able to gain more 
from the bankruptcy experience and become fully aware of what he can do better. Likewise, 
Dilan reported how his reflection prompted learning: 
I do think about it, but I never dwell on it, and I refer to it as one of the best learning 
experiences in life, and you learn who all your friends are, you know, who you can trust 
and who can appreciate your own value that is one big thing I have learnt to appreciate 
my own worth because again you can only control your own movement, and cannot 
control anybody else (Dilan) 
 
It is evident from Dilan that he emphasised that a key learning takeaway was that he developed 
more knowledge of his self-worth, demonstrating that he again has been able to acquire more 
than he lost from the bankruptcy (Taleb, 2012). Furthermore, he has been able to recognise that 
he oversaw his behaviours and that he could not control anyone’s actions, therefore 
demonstrating full acknowledgement of an internal attributional style (Heider, 1958).  
Other participants gained an understanding of how their reflexive learning taught them to be 




weapon you can use to succeed”. Sam extends the findings of Dilan by describing that being 
adaptable can be a “weapon”, showcasing that he had learnt a significant amount from the 
bankruptcy. This is a form of higher-order learning as he was able to illustrate how he can 
benefit from the bankruptcy in the long-term. These findings are in line with Cope’s (2011) 
study, which indicates how entrepreneurs use of reflexive learning entails undertaking 
cognitive learning steps to look back at what was gained from their venture failure. 
Furthermore, this finding suggests how Sam could exploit his antifragility to profit from the 
operation of his business by being better responsive to the business climate (Taleb, 2012).  
Lastly, beyond being more adaptable, the participants showed how they went through complex 
processes of garnering how they may run their firms more effectively. For instance, Damien, 
imparted how he has been able to reflect on his experiences during his recovery period which 
enabled him to arrive at the following conclusion:  
As easy as it is to file for bankruptcy (.) the aftermath, the years in regard…credit score 
and its possibilities, that is very harsh and I learnt that you know (.) you do not want to 
go through it again (.) on the other hand (.) I learnt that if it happens (.) it’s not that bad 
(.) actually sometimes it’s better to close the company (.) than trying to drag it out and 
make it even worse (.) and try not to do bankruptcy again (Damien) 
 
Damien’s account illustrates aspect of higher-order learning as he has been able to accrue a 
long-term view of how he can pre-empt bankruptcy. This is a clear demonstration of harnessing 
his experiences as a strength, representing his robustness and ability to grasp what he needs to 
do so he does not end up in financial turmoil. 
In short, it is apparent that the firm owners have been able to learn during their recovery periods 
through being reflexive. Participants asserted that they learnt the most through reflecting on 
their own mistakes, acknowledging how they could become adaptable and realising how they 
engage best with others. These learnings can be taken as key takeaways that the firm owners 
continually exploited their antifragility. 
5.1.3 Displays profound learning moments  
Prior to restarting a firm, the entrepreneurs frequently spoke of rich, profound, and deep 
moments of learning that they encountered. Epiphany like moments are commonly life 
changing moments which change one’s perception (Denzin, 1989). Such moments were akin 
to epiphany like moments described by failed firm owners studied in Singh et al., (2015) study, 




moments were formed from a combination of their reflexive and experiential learning 
behaviours, which were triggered by exploiting the use of antifragility (Taleb, 2012). They 
entailed intense moments of learning and realisation which the participants described as a 
“crunch point…a reality check” (Nigel) and flashes that enabled them to “rise again” (Stefan). 
The participants frequently articulated how these points in their recovery allowed them to come 
to a full understanding of how they should manage their behaviours as venture founders. These 
findings extend the Singh et al’s. (2015) results by illustrating the wider positives of the failure 
experience aside from the positives that are associated with the stigma of venture failure. 
The profound learning moments generally took placed during and after the recovery periods. 
For instance, Dilan stated that during his recovery the following occurred: 
within that twenty-four hour period there was also a realisation of what I call my thirty 
five p moment, and that was because I turned over one morning when staying at a mates 
in London and, er, I had thirty five p to my name, and it was that daunting moment of 
wow I do not have a bank account and I do not have absolutely anything else and I am 
in London, one of the most expensive cities in the world just staying with a mate, wow 
I thought I am screwed in many ways because I thought what I am going to do? I need 
to go and get breakfast but also I got no debt, I got no burden, and I am actually in a 
better position than ninety five percent of this country who might be earning salary, but 
they got debt…so there was a real moment where what does money mean? what is the 
value of money? so all of these thoughts were in mind, and it was, er, definitely a 
realisation moment (Dilan) 
 
Here, it is evident Dilan described the process as one that enabled him to realise what he had 
gained from the bankruptcy and the entire experience. He emphasised how it placed him in a 
better position financially and prompted deeper learnings of what money is as a concept. He 
spoke in great depth of moments like this, describing the experience as “trigger points” of deep 
discovery. In a similar vein, Jake reported how during his recovery period he had profound 
moments about how he arranged his finances as a business owner: 
it also made me probably realise that money does not solve everything both personally, 
and for happiness, and certainly for business, and it made me value different things that 
I valued before with business (.) whereas before I was probably flippant about a few 
things (.) so now I think the opposite of that (.) so you know it gave me a moment that 
what goes up can go down (.) no matter how amazing your business is (.) so yeah I 
think the personal thing was the biggest (.) benefit to come out of it all (Jake) 
 
Through this moment, Jake has been able to use his reflexive learning to gain a further 
understanding of what he values in business. He further addressed how the bankruptcy and 




learning as he was able to cultivate knowledge about how business success can fluctuate, and 
it is not always guaranteed. Furthermore, he understood that money should not be the goal of 
a company as it cannot always create happiness. Others, also agreed with both Jake and Dilan, 
such as George who stated “that I learnt more about business in six months then I did in ten 
years well six years running a business (.) the art of manoeuvring through financial crisis” 
(George). In this regard, George shows the power of his recovery period and the deep learning 
he obtained during this period.  
The informants also expressed how they had these epiphany-like moments following their 
recovery, for instance Dilan further highlighted: 
this kid called me up out of the blue, not knowing my situation and assumed I would 
be interested in helping and okay, so I thought there is a need here (.) there is a bigger 
picture again (.) I do not want to be an agent, but there is something bigger with him 
and other talent like this and maybe this is my calling, this is where I can affect, and 
inspire as well (Dilan) 
 
Here, it can be interpreted that Dilan further was able to gain more from the process and obtain 
a view of what he could do next. He asserted that the moment was a “reality check” and allowed 
him to see there was “more out there”, representing the significance of these points in his 
experience, drawing on his experiential learning (Politis, 2005). Hence, he has been able to 
gain more than he lost from the experience further and exploit his antifragility to develop and 
obtain a view of his next entrepreneurial steps (Taleb, 2012). Developing a similar argument, 
Denise asserted: 
I wanted to get back in the saddle and back doing business and back making money and 
back on the old programme, I very quickly realised in truth I was being called to unplug 
the capitalist programming of business…so it has been a very interesting journey of 
kind of enlightenment and personal transformation (Denise) 
 
Here, it is apparent Denise, found her business recovery as a process which led to her 
uncovering what her true calling is, and she reflects positively on it, describing it as a period 
of “enlightenment”. It is evident that this learning process enabled her to build an understanding 
of how she should restart a venture which indicates aspects of higher-order learning.  
Interestingly, there was one participant who recounted that they did not learn significantly from 
the bankruptcy nor had any profound moments: 
there is nothing much to learn (.) I mean accountants you deal with bankruptcy for 




Zack’s claim support research that shows the heterogeneity of firm owner’s experiences of 
learning post-failure (Sardana and Scott-Kemmis, 2010; Singh et al., 2015). His response could 
be linked to his industry as it is clear from his remarks that accountants are used to dealing with 
business failure. Furthermore, Zack’s bankruptcy charges were given over twenty years ago 
which could also impact how he felt towards the events, due to retrospectively looking at them 
(Bellman et al., 2018). Thus, he may not recognise the value in contrast to other more recent 
critical events. 
Put simply, most of the firm owners, utilised their reflexive and experiential learnings during 
and after their recovery periods to gain deeper understanding about their roles as an 
entrepreneur. They specifically, gained a view of when they should restart a company and the 
positives of going such moments. Subsequently, they were gradually able to exploit the 
stressors associated with their bankruptcy discovering the deeper benefits of the process.  
The deep learning moments the participants encountered the venture founders to learn in three 
ways: i) develop their relationships, ii) change their business outlook, and iii) eventually 
identify the opportunity to restart. First, relationship-wise, the firm owners cited how they 
changed their perceptions of the connections they had with others they knew from a work 
capacity. For instance, Sam shared the following: 
Yes because once you fail once, you know why you failed, and once you dig deep and 
ask questions and are also willing to accept the facts about your weaknesses that does 
reform one, and I realise my weaknesses in business is I used to trust people and accept 
them with open arms (.) I always compare business with war and every day you either 
have a new enemy from within the organisation and at times from other organisations 
who are your competitors (Sam) 
 
Sam’s account reflects how he has been able to garner deeper insights on who he should trust 
in business both inside and outside of his firm. He drew on how his experience of failure 
allowed him to probe deeply and ask questions, accepting and embracing his weaknesses, such 
as naively forging relationships with others. Through decoding his experiences, he has been 
able to gain from the bankruptcy and learn how to judge characters more effectively. In a 
related extract, Damien also narrated similar learnings from his bankruptcy: 
you have to become stronger, you know, you have to …you find out about people …yes 
it opens your eyes (Damien) 
Damien recurrently revealed his issues with his business partnerships and how they were 




“stronger”, and he had experienced profound moments in which he obtained knowledge as to 
who he could trust. He further narrated that he has been too “nice” which he learnt from which 
led him to trusting others too easily in the past. 
Second, participants deep moments were noted to impact their business outlook, describing it 
as a: “U-turn” (Derek); a moment where “you are at crossroads” (Dilan); and prompting 
“personal development” (George); as well as realising what “life is all about” (George). George 
went into great depth about his learnings from his bankruptcy, remarking several profound 
moments of learning that changed his perspective on business:  
a lot of business men, their identity is their business…so I think actually to me the 
whole process has been a benefit…you actually realise you are a person who is loving 
and caring and it is not just about the money or the success of the ego, I am the ego look 
at me, so a lot of business is ego driven by I have made this money, I have done this, I 
have built this up, and that is the business world, it is all about me (.) right whereas 
actually there is a bigger me…there is a bigger I which is the I of the collective 
consciousness, which is the I of helping other people (George) 
 
George’s excerpt illustrated that due to the severity of his bankruptcy, it forced him to think 
about recurring behaviours that led to his ego driven identity and how owning an enterprise is 
in fact about helping others. In this regard, he was able to consider that he has gained so much 
from his previous financial position (Taleb, 2012).  
Denise also went into great depth of how her profound learning moments ameliorated her 
business outlook. For instance, she noted that “if your relationship with your money is as 
effortless as your relationship with breathing, to me that is mastery”. Her deep insight illustrates 
how money should be valued in business as it can shape how an organisation is run. She further 
described how she found her true self-purpose from the bankruptcy: 
when you kind of transcend of the business of business, and you start to see it in the 
context of your higher soul purpose, and true life armour that is a real like oh my god 
moment of realising that the business was a bit of a decoy (.) it is a bit of a red herring 
in a way (.) we all get so caught up in the business of the business, and understanding 
that this is a spiritual training programme…so business will show up and bring up 
everything we need to learn to heal, and so it is business is the first step towards 
enlightenment in a way, as it is about unplugging from the system (Denise) 
 
Denise’s passage indicates her deep insights of what it means to be an entrepreneur as she 
described owning a business is a “decoy” and really it is a “spiritual training programme”. She 
further demonstrated that her ownership of a company enabled her to realise that she needs to 




the business failure and bankruptcy, realising the experience has been a valuable one (Taleb, 
2012).  
Another prevalent theme was that the participants imparted how they altered their business 
outlook, precisely how they blame things was further developed through the deep moments of 
learning. For instance, George clearly emphasised that “once we understand that we control 
nothing then life becomes easy” (George). Sam, also shared a similar perspective like, stating 
that “you can either find yourself as a looser or you find yourself as a winner (.) and loosing 
and winning is the same thing in business” (Sam). Both participants reinforce the idea that firm 
owners oversee their fate and actions, with an internal locus of control (Heider, 1958).  
Third, participants recounted how their profound learning moment led to their eventual 
capability to identify an opportunity to restart a venture. They discussed how their recovery 
prompted them to “never give up hope” (Michelle) and combatted any “fear” (Derek) they had 
with restarting. Denise went into great detail of how she was only able to launch a venture after 
she “rehabilitated” herself and described that she “had to experience the highs and the lows”. 
Marios shared a comparable experience, stating that during his recovery, he made an 
unsuccessful job application which “inspired” him to start-up again by converting his 
experiences. This supports literature by Cope (2003) by showing how certain events enable the 
venture owners to reach a level of higher-order learning. Furthermore, the findings again 
reinforce Cope’s (2011) results that states by undergoing a series of stages, such as reflection, 
the entrepreneur can start-up again. Yet, the results demonstrate that this type of learning more 
commonly originates from the deep learning moments the firm owners came across. Therefore, 
again supporting Singh et al’s. (2015) findings. They also extend the Singh et al’s. finding by 
suggesting that after the business owner’s recovery, a combination of reflexive and experiential 
learning led to these deep moments of discovery and the capability to restart. Besides this, the 
findings disagree with He, et al’s. (2018) specific findings that demonstrate learning can be 
hindrance to firm owners, since such learning has consistently helped the firm owners navigate 
through uncertainty and rebound to venture again. 
Taken together, the combination of both the experiential and reflexive learnings, enabled the 
entrepreneurs to learn in multiple ways. It was inferred that during the early stages of the 
learning journey, that firm owners learnt at a lower-level. Sequentially, during and after their 
recovery period they progressed to a higher-order learning. Crucially, they were also able to 




learning moments. Through these moments they obtained insights into how they could develop 
their business relationships, enhance their business outlook and attributional style as well as 
form the capability to restart a firm coupled with helping others. 
5.2 Opportunity Identification  
As suggested by its name, the second theme aims to explore how the business owners were 
able to utilise their antifragility as an organising capability to allow them to identify the 
opportunity to restart. Next, it explores how the participants identified the timing of their new 
venture, their reasoning for starting up another venture and their strategy of entrepreneurial 
rebound. 
5.2.1 Recognising an opportunity for a subsequent venture during and after business failure 
recovery  
Opportunity identification can be deemed as the ability to recognise, develop, and launch a 
business idea (Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2018; Cope, 2011). Scholars have deemed it as a 
crucial step in a firm owner’s restart after bankruptcy (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). From 
relatively early on in the learning phases, all participants articulated how they developed the 
know-how to identify the potential to restart a venture. This supports literature that highlights 
how learning from failure evokes the pursuit of new entrepreneurial opportunities (Politis, 
2005; McGrath, 1999; Ucbasaran et al., 2003) and how the knowledge gained from their failure 
can be used to develop a new venture (Singh et al., 2007; Singh et al., 2015; Cope, 2011). 
Specifically, reinforcing works that have shown how experiential learning can help business 
owners restart-post bankruptcy (Huovinen and Tihuala, 2008; Boso et al., 2019). 
Intriguingly, a common trend was that firm owners knew they would restart, describing it as a 
“matter of time” (Scott), with a few even stating how they pinpointed the opportunity before 
they went bankrupt and promptly after their “last venture went bust” (Michelle). They 
frequently spoke of how they looked for ideas to find a “niche in the market” (Jay) after they 
had been given their bankruptcy charges. A few entrepreneurs shared deeper accounts of their 
enterprise planning as they foresaw that they would need to identify another venture. For 
example, Damien stated that he planned “straight away yeah it was kind of within days…I have 
to do that”. Lisa specifically remarked how she identified the chance to restart as soon as her 
bankruptcy charges were lifted. In a similar manner, Carl proclaimed that “never did it cross 
my mind” in relation to launching another company, indicating that he had self-efficacy in his 




Despite these descriptions of firm owners often alleging that they planned to restart a firm 
immediately, the concept behind their subsequent enterprise was fully developed during and 
following their recovery period. Hence the recovery period guided their venture progress. Here 
the participants, further made use of their antifragility (Taleb, 2012) and garnered more insights 
about their forthcoming ventures. Dilan amongst other participants narrated this in great depth: 
so for the specific next one it was an organic transition, whereby the athletes I was 
working with presented me with the opportunity, so it wasn’t me that created it from 
scratch…it was the trigger for, like, this charity I set up now…so it is not like I went 
into one specific thing from another, it was an experience that allowed me to realise the 
scope of what could be and know that I am never going to sit still (Dilan) 
 
It can be deciphered that Dilan has been able to harness his recovery period to naturally 
progress into his new venture. He narrated how he classed these experiences as enabling him 
to develop as an entrepreneur, utilising them to his benefit and allowing him to see the full 
capability of what he could do. 
In a similar fashion, both Julie and Denise revealed how their recovery period prompted and 
aided their planning of their next venture: 
I was able to (.) overcome the bankruptcy and then I started to do the research on my 
next trade (.) which gave me a thought and I enrolled on an online course so I could get 
more knowledge about online businesses (Julie) 
what I eventually realised through spiritual practice was what they actually needed was 
more much than advice…to raise a digital platform, so that was the concept and that 
was how it as created out of that need with all those clients in mind to have those 
practical tools to create products and to market them (.) promote them (.) that was the 
starting point anyway (Denise) 
 
It can be deemed that the entrepreneurs were able to gage an understanding for their sequential 
venture from taking time to recover from their bankruptcy. In Julie’s case, she expressed how 
her reflexive learning aided her to grasp her next steps in setting-up another company. 
Likewise, Denise shed light on how her reflections and learnings from her recovery period 
allowed her to recognise a business opportunity. She particularly reflected on how her spiritual 
work guided her to learn in this way during her recovery period. Hence, during their recovery 
period, the firm owners overcame their bankruptcy and gained more understanding of their 
own skill set. Furthermore, at this point they planned for another enterprise and made decisions 




The findings on the firm’s owner recovery and opportunity identification are in line with 
existing research (Atsan, 2016, Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2018). They support Jenkins et al., 
(2014) and Cope (2011) who have shown how once bankrupted, entrepreneurs find their failure 
experience a valuable one. Precisely, the sample of business owners suggest that in the long-
term they do gain from their bankruptcy and have harnessed it to look out for chances to 
rebound to venture again. Additionally, the results are consistent with literature which has 
demonstrated that those who have undergone firm failure can identify more innovative 
opportunities to restart than those who have not (Ucbasaran et al., 2006; Ucbasaran et al., 2009).  
In sum, the respondents only truly started to develop a concept for their next enterprise during 
and after their recovery period, albeit a few of them initially planned for another venture ahead 
of their bankruptcy charges. At these points, they made use of their entrepreneurial competence 
of antifragility to develop their learning from their bankruptcy.  
5.2.2 Choosing a time to launch sequential company  
In terms of exactly when the firm owners were able to rebound to venture again, participants 
often discussed that this usually occurred after they recovered enough. Hence, there was no set 
time frame required to restart, yet for many this was as soon as their charges were lifted. A few 
went into detail about this such as Denise and Sam: 
It was really that watershed year for me where my main objective was to not make any 
money which was really difficult for me as an entrepreneur…so I did a lot of charity 
work and low-cost free stuff and then boom (.) straight as I came out of it was when I 
created my new business in two thousand thirteen (Denise) 
I never gave up the idea of not starting again, so the moment I got my discharge 
certificate I started talking to certain people and I restarted the business (Sam) 
 
Denise’s account displays how during the year she had bankruptcy charges she was not able to 
restart, although this prepared her for when she was able to do so. She was able to harness her 
antifragility at this point and revealed that she had gained from the bankruptcy experience. 
Developing a similar argument Sam, explained how he retained faith in his ability to bounce 
back and did so as soon as it was possible. Both entrepreneurs demonstrate high self-efficacy 
to launch another company (Bandura, 1977). Dilan further shed light on how he exploited his 
antifragility (Taleb, 2012) which allowed him to identify and develop his next venture soon 
after his bankruptcy: 
if I had been down in the dumps and beating myself about just going bankrupt twenty 




definitely wouldn’t have got on a plane with him not knowing where my job is and not 
even knowing what is my job…but my attitude was why not (.) let’s go and see what 
Malaysia is like and let’s go and meet some people and...it has opened up the world in 
which I have now set-up my next venture (Dilan) 
 
Dilan’s extract demonstrates how following his recovery he was able to see more opportunities 
and develop them into an enterprise, therefore capitalising on his antifragility. He described 
the moments after his recovery as “it instantly started to pick up” and further stated how he 
was “super confident and had no doubts at all after that twenty-four-hour period”. These quotes 
exemplify how he also spoke highly of his self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977), which enabled him 
to develop his business idea. 
Unlike Dilan and Denise, another trend that was discussed by participants was how there was 
no correct time to rebound to venture again: 
I do not think a lot of people set out on their own to go this is the window, this is the 
opportunity, this is the right time (Jake) 
there is no right time to do it, and it could be the next day…you just have to keep your 
eyes open (Derek) 
 
These accounts demonstrate the heterogeneity of the entrepreneur’s experience, agreeing with 
literature that has illustrated the differences in firm owner’s failure experience (Sardana and 
Scott-Kemmis’s, 2010; Singh et al’s. 2015). Despite this, both business owners discussed how 
they eventually did manage to use their recovery period to learn from their bankruptcy and 
restart a firm. Thus, again indicating the importance of recovery in the venture restart process. 
5.2.3 Reasoning for repeat entrepreneurship  
The entrepreneurs listed a range of reasons that encouraged them to take a risk again and start-
up another venture (Bridge, 2018; Markey-Towler, 2018). The most common being their need 
for leadership, with several sharing remarks that it was important to be your own “boss” (Scott). 
Jay narrated this well by expressing:  
I restarted because I could never work for anybody else, and…I have tried and you 
know the mentality I was brought up with and my self-independence and what have 
you, so you know I always have done that and stuck to it, you know, I borrowed money 
from family friends and started up another business (Jay) 
 
Jay’s behaviour demonstrates an internal attributional style (Heider, 1958, Rotter, 1966; 




control of his own actions and career. Jay evidently has high self-efficacy in his ability to restart 
(Bandura, 1977). Others made comparable comments such as Tyler: 
Again it was the fact of just, like, (.) I think I can do this…if I can implement more of 
my ideas rather than, like, getting lost in the crowd essentially and I thought I’m gonna 
do it (.) but yeah I think there’s a gap in, like, music events in the UK, actually, 
worldwide but there’s very few events that leave, like, a mark and, like, a moment in 
history (Tyler) 
 
It can be interpreted that Tyler’s opportunity identification and reasoning for his restart is 
linked in his self-efficacy as well. He evidently shows that he has belief in his ability to form 
another firm. Anecdotes like these represent how the enterprise owners have been able to make 
use of their antifragility to encourage them to work for themselves again and thrive despite the 
uncertain nature of owning a company (Taleb, 2012). They also are consistent with prior 
literature that found how former venture failure prompts the pursuit of new business 
opportunities and alleviates the concerns around these firms succeeding (Politis, 2005; 
McGrath,1999; Ucbasaran et al., 2003). 
Other entrepreneurs also shared similar experiences, and despite having self-efficacy in their 
ability to succeed again, they made comments about their culture and family values that 
encouraged their restart, such as Zack and Jay: 
future of my family business (.) future of family (Zack) 
there is only a certain amount of funding, so you got to look after your family and 
family comes first and obviously because of Asian culture, but it is changing now, but… 
you know the old values (Jay) 
 
Both participants uncover how their values embedded within their culture fuelled their restart. 
Specifically, the firm owners emphasise the importance of owning a venture to look after 
family as a key value in their culture. These findings support the literature that has uncovered 
the impact of cultural and societal attitudes can impact an entrepreneur’s comeback (Heinze 
2013; Wakkee et al., 2014; Wisenfeld et al., 2008).  
Taken together, it is apparent that a range of reasons prompt entrepreneurial re-entry post-
bankruptcy. The need for leadership is paramount though which develops with the 






5.2.4 Strategy of restart  
Upon identifying when they would restart a company, a few firm owners touched upon their 
strategy of restart and justified their choices. For instance, Marios and Tyler amongst others 
explained how they went back to the industry that their prior company operated within due to 
their learning gained from their bankruptcy: 
So look, I’ve always been in construction and I did think about getting out of it, but 
when it is all you know then obviously you have invested a lot of your years…it has to 
be construction (Marios) 
as I wanted to use more of my knowledge and insight gained from my last firm (Tyler) 
 
Both cases demonstrate that the firm owners remain adamant about utilising their knowledge 
gained from their past companies. Others such as Joseph and Sam launched firms in the 
automotive industry and made remarks about gradually seeing “really positive results” (Joseph) 
and commented on the “sheer size of the industry” (Sam). Sam narrated the following about 
the automotive industry that encouraged him to restart: 
Well, the industry I work within is very vast and large and it has its own divisions so I 
knew that if I continue on the same path…I will succeed (Sam) 
 
It is evident that Sam has gained an understanding from his prior venture of where he could 
succeed, and he was able to learn from his recovery of his bankruptcy to make use of his 
antifragility and restart. Others also touched upon how they altered their initial financial 
strategy by “raising investment” (Lisa). A few firm owners like Jay borrowed money from their 
personal contacts such as friends and family. Through undertaking these early financial 
decisions, the enterprise owners have indicated that they were able to make better business 
decisions. They linked these initial decisions to their business models which they deemed as 
more successful. For instance, Denise declared how her new model allowed her to be a 
“creator”, whilst Marios, went into great depth about the positives of his enhanced business 
model: 
a big change, and I spoke to another guy about this so when I had my old company, we 
was striving around the big contracts, because our overheads were growing because we 
was always chasing the big jobs and what you do not realise is the time and resource to 
secure those big contracts, let alone, when you want them so what we done and what I 
have done is target small works and quick turnaround time so that we are going in 
charging five hundred to a thousand in a day, or two days so that you have lots of little 
orders and a quick turnover of cash flow… yeah that is the main thing about why the 





Marios’ passage indicates that he has been able to learn from his business failure and 
bankruptcy to alter his approach to getting sales for his firm. He has shown how this strategy 
has allowed him to succeed by further aiding his financial processes. Hence, he has been able 
to reap the rewards from his new operating model. Sam further noted “it’s just not buying and 
selling (.) many elements (.) marketing (.) sales and business (.) implementing Quality Control 
and a successful business is one that gets repeat business”. It can be inferred that Sam’s 
approach to his subsequent business has clear ways of measuring his success which is crucial 
for his venture to prosper. 
To conclude, the firm owners overcame adversity and restarted successively by harnessing 
their antifragility. They did so in phases of drawing on their learning during and after their 
recovery period. This allowed them to benefit in four ways. First, despite numerous 
respondents knowing that they would always restart a firm, their antifragility allowed them to 
recognise fleeting opportunities to rebound to venture again. Second, it aided their planning 
and formation of the companies from their initial enterprise concept. Third, it reinforced their 
reasoning for repeat business ownership and self-efficacy. Lastly, it allowed them to identify 
the suitable timing to launch the venture and develop the enterprise.  
5.3 Long-term Learning and Foresight 
The third theme focuses on how the entrepreneurs developed their long-term learning, utilised 
their knowledge and cultivated foresight in various ways. Thus, the theme attempts to examine 
the long-term learning behaviours that the firm owners utilised as part of their restart. 
5.3.1 Long-term learning  
Once the formerly bankrupted entrepreneurs had formed another enterprise, they did not stop 
their learning from their prior experiences; this therefore extended their existing higher-order 
learning. In fact, a common trend was that the business founders continued to learn 
significantly. For instance, Sam narrated how he is still “willing to learn”, Stefan noted that he 
truly learnt as soon as he restarted by “putting the wheels in motion”, whilst Dilan went into 
great depth about his passion for learning: 
learning is key, like, always try and learn something new, like, whether it is 
language…learning a new book so whether it is every day and I still live by that 






Here, Dilan has shared how learning is crucial to his development and that he undertakes 
various behaviours to help him build knowledge. He refers to this as a mantra and that he is in 
“control”, indicating that he yet again displays an internal attributional style (Heider, 1958). 
This is like other participants and represents the ability of the entrepreneurs to continue to 
utilise their experiences to grow. 
It was identified that firm owners specifically learnt in two main ways: (i) continued 
relationship development, and (ii) a refined understanding of operating a firm. The participants 
cited how they consistently developed their relationships with their stakeholders throughout 
the process of re-starting a firm. They commonly noted that they do not “trust people blindly” 
(Zack) and discussed how they were firmer in their approach to staff relationships, such as 
George, who declared “if something is not right just get rid of it”. Yet despite this approach, 
George also recounted the importance of “working as a collective business with people”. It is 
evident that the venture founders had grown from their prior failure and focussed on how they 
engaged with others. Dilan also agreed with others and explicitly stated that he introduced team 
sheets with “very clear roles and responsibilities and causal effects of any breakdown of any 
relations”. He also declared that he would openly raise issues with staff to work towards a 
solution, noting that “communication is key” and “every scenario is used for a story”. Taken 
together, the behaviours of working with others demonstrate how the firm owners are 
continually developing their antifragility as an entrepreneurial competence. They have 
specifically been able to work out how best to get out of their business relationships which has 
meant they can operate their organisation more effectively, which has been found by prior work 
(Polistis 2008; Masuda 2008; Atsan 2016). 
The second way the entrepreneurs continued to develop their learning during their sequential 
venture(s) was through enhancing their approach to running their organisation. For instance, 
George articulated this well as he stated, “do the humanity stuff at the beginning and then do 
something for other people”. His quote exemplify how he has restructured his tactics to 
operating a company. Denise, further voiced the importance of attaining better support around 
her: 
get a really really good advisor on board (.) um because you know I didn’t have a good 
advisor and the people who I thought were advising me (.) who I thought were on my 
side weren’t (.) yeah and I think in retrospection (.) I would have got a much better 
advisor on my side and just paid money for a top person to help me navigate my way 





Denise’s extract implies that she is continually endeavouring to seek out ways that she can pre-
empt failure. She specifically emphasised that she wishes she had better advisory support which 
is something that she recommends others do. By doing so, this again epitomises how she is 
utilising her entrepreneurial competence of antifragility to profit.  
Aside from this, Marios further shared how he continues to adopt a more enhanced business 
model. He stated that he is in the office “two days” a week and “and three days out on site 
because in a construction company that is really where the money can be lost”. He stated that 
this approach showed his clients that he cared and eventually led to his firm becoming a part 
of a “board of approved contractors”. He narrated how being “consistent” is a core part of 
entrepreneurship which he has learnt over the years. Like Marios, a lot of other venture owners 
referred to their enhanced business processes and how they frequently developed them, 
indicating that they have continued to grow their internal attributional style (Heider, 1958). For 
instance, in reference to his firm succeeding, Damien proclaimed that if you “don’t put the 
work in, its not gonna happen” and Carl, asserted that “there are two business processes 
that…we have streamlined and made more efficient”. 
In summary, through developing their higher-order learning (Cope, 2011), the firm owners 
made use of their knowledge in their everyday organising. These findings also extend He et 
al’s. (2018) findings by indicating that that learning does not significantly stop at a certain point 
and continues throughout the operation of a firm. Yet, there is a limit to the impact of such 
learning. The findings also support literature that indicate firm owners build a know-how in 
the form of capital (Ucbasaran et al., 2008; Zhang, 2009; Luthans et al., 2007). 
5.3.2 Financially aware  
The entrepreneurs discussed ways in which they had extended their learning about their 
finances. They made several remarks about becoming financially astute and developed this 
throughout the organising of their current venture(s). The participants often stated how they 
continually made changes to how they invested in their corporations and worked out their 
costings as well as increased their financial awareness.  
The firm owners discussed how they consistently strived to ameliorate their investment 
strategies. They stated that they did not borrow money “unnecessarily” (Joseph), whilst they 
ensured that their company was “hundred percent organic” (Scott). Lisa narrated how her new 
philosophy towards charging for her services due to her developed understanding of her own 




someone said to me to ask for as much money you can ask for without laughing, which 
I now live by, which tends to work (Lisa) 
 
It is evident that Lisa has grasped where she can reap more monetary value to benefit her 
cashflow. Others also spoke about their changes to their costs to improve their finances, such 
as, having “less overheads” (Derek), being more “financially astute” (George), avoiding 
“overbuying” (Joseph), thinking “for the bad days” (Jay), being more careful “with spending” 
(Stefan) and “offload our own excess headcount to cut our office space, to cut our 
expenses…stop entertainment, stop flying around the place so we had to tighten up things and 
going forward we will be much tighter and leaner on all that kind of stuff ” (Carl). Likewise, 
Derek commented on having little overheads and operating a more financially savvy venture: 
When I made a thousand pounds in a day and then I realised I haven’t made that kind 
of money for long time (.) I used to make that money during Christmas time…the only 
thing I did in the day was put in six hours, so it was very good money, so I am not 
buying stock to make that fifty percent or twenty profit, I am purely using my time, and 
no overheads apart from the place, so I realised the opportunity, and I started 
merchandise as it got more famous and more people came (Derek) 
 
In this regard, Derek appears to have revealed how he has been able to use his financially savvy 
business model. He specifically remarked on how he has generated a significant amount of 
money more often than in his prior company. Therefore, he has used this money to develop his 
firm and grow further. Jake, also similarly shed deep insights on how he ensured that he 
continued to be more cost-effective with his current venture: 
I have never purchased anything again that I cannot afford (.) so I do not do 
finance…literally any assets I have is my asset (.) um so it is has definitely taught that 
to me…before I went bankrupt, I used to think well you know, you should go and buy 
a place in Monaco you can afford it (.) but why pay for all of it when you can get half 
of it on finance (Jake) 
 
Through taking this approach, Jake described how he could pre-empt himself getting into debt 
whilst ensuring he is as cost-effective as he can be by avoiding interest rates that is attached to 
certain purchases. 
Besides this, the entrepreneurs spoke of increasing their financial awareness by monitoring 
their cashflow closely. They claimed that they continually learnt “different programmes around 
the computer…to help manage your services and products better” (Sam). Marios expressed this 




I am definitely not as much in touch with the accounts as I am now and…I have Zero 
on my phone and I sit there checking (.) my bookkeeper has trained me in how to use 
Zero, and my account keeper has trained me with how to read a set of accounts (Marios) 
 
It can be interpreted that the entrepreneurs have become more financially savvy and are still 
going through steps to be more financially healthy. They exhibit aspects of higher-order 
learning as they have been able to continue to develop their understanding of operating their 
business more effectively (Cope, 2011; Minello, 2014). This is in line with previous literature 
that have highlighted failed venture founders are often able to negotiate better financing deals 
in comparison to novice firm owners (Zhang, 2011; Paik, 2014; Nahata, 2019) Hence, they 
have continued to exploit their entrepreneurial competence of antifragility to utilise current 
opportunities in their business in financially appropriate ways. 
5.3.3 Re-use of business knowledge and innovation  
Beyond the longer-term learning and financial knowledge gained, the firm owners described 
innovative strategies they undertook in their existing firms by utilising their former business 
knowledge. They specifically harnessed their capital obtained from their prior venture that 
failed (Zhang, 2009; Bosma et al., 2004) which helped them to develop another firm (Amaral 
et al., 2009; Stam et al., 2008). Such capital entailed business capital, through making the most 
of the opportunity to restart a firm (Choi and Shepherd, 2004; Luthans et al., 2007; Bosma et 
al., 2004). 
The entrepreneurs commonly stressed the importance of the ways they learnt to pre-empt prior 
mistakes by exploiting their knowledge in their current enterprise. For example, Derek 
highlighted that due to his current business model he does not rely on his colleagues, which he 
stated was one of his “problems” previously. As a result, he demonstrated that he had become 
more agile with how he operates his company. A minority of the participants also discussed 
how they used their business knowledge continually to mentor others, for instance George and 
Jay: 
I went on to do consultancy and consult other businesses on how to liquidate the 
businesses…it is what I call the art of the possible (George) 
my son is progressing but even now he is like ‘share your ideas…to progress’ and, you 
know, because he understands the value I have, you know, because I have gone through 
a lot of years in my life going through ups and downs and I share that and I hopefully 





Both entrepreneurs impart insights on how they share knowledge that they have obtained 
throughout the years with others. In George’s case he uses it formally to train other business 
owners as he declared that he learnt more from his failure than success whilst Jay offered his 
entrepreneurial insights to his son. These findings may be linked to the fact that George has 
over eight years of experience of running his previous firms in addition to owning multiple 
large enterprises. Nonetheless, it is consistent with findings from Singh et al’s. (2015) study, 
who found that firm owners harness their learnings from their prior failure by advising others. 
The findings extend these results by illustrating how enterprise owners do not always officially 
set up mentoring sessions with novice entrepreneurs and it can exist in their everyday 
organising. 
Another significant finding was that a vast number of firm owners also touched on how their 
new organisations were more innovative compared to earlier firms they had created. They 
emphasised that their internal attributional style had impacted how they were able to adapt. The 
entrepreneurs recounted that: “the old experience played its role to camouflage and adapt to 
the new situations (.) if one can achieve that (.) he or she becomes the master of their own 
destiny” (Sam), and that their new companies were “well planned out” (Marios). Sam further 
noted the importance of adapting and if one does it “will always lead you out of any problems 
you may encounter”. It is evident that the participants have recognised the power of adapting 
their organisations to meet various needs. Thus, they have demonstrated the power of taking 
control of their actions, yet again developing their internal attributional style (Heider, 1958). 
This could again be related to the firm owners’ years of experiences of owning a prior company, 
especially for Sam’s case whose current business is over ten years old. 
The enterprise owners commonly asserted that they harnessed their business knowledge to 
ensure their new firms were more cutting edge. The following comments by Joseph and Jay 
highlight this: 
Well it is a lot better with the current system (Joseph) 
To prosper, you know, you have to go online and trade that way (Jay) 
 
It is apparent that both entrepreneurs have started to make use of technologies to develop how 
they run their organisations. Jay further narrated how important it is to utilise more modern 
systems to run a corporation and investing time into making use of these resources. It is worthy 
of noting that the specific quotes shared by the firm’s owners could be related to the fact that 




expressed that their firms would have a longer life span as they became aware that such 
technologies had been able to handle the stressor of time and survive. This demonstrates how 
they are using their antifragility yet again to profit from their prior business failure.  
The venture founders asserted how they progressively made better business decisions which 
made their enterprises more innovative. For instance, Dilan amongst others noted: 
Massively more innovative, oh yeah, that is probably the biggest thing, by learning the 
need for it and learning all the way through, and really seeing where differentiation is 
possible, and disruption, so one thing I have always been associated with is doing things 
slightly differently from the norm and working with a sport that isn’t the norm (Dilan) 
 
It is evident that Dilan has been able to grasp ways in which he can be more innovative and has 
set this as a standard. Other participants reported the innovation from changing industries, such 
as Jake: 
the stuff I do now is innovative but it is also bread and butter of business, but it is about 
making revenue (.) and we have lost touch with making revenues in a lot of businesses, 
um, and, um, it is not about fundraising (.) and some of the most boring businesses on 
the planet are some of the most successful ones, so I have a view and I look at what I 
do now and I do not do it for innovation, I do it for the people, I do it for the businesses 
(Jake) 
 
Despite Jake reflecting that his business does not aim to be innovative, he highlighted how he 
has been able to take an alternative stance on what innovation means. Other firm owners 
discussed how they continually improved their relationships with their staff: 
I learnt how to be a hands-off director, so I learnt more skills (.) so I let the people in 
my business run the businesses (George) 
do not rely too much on staff because if you rely on them and they are not good then it 
is not good…it was the staff that were going to let me down (.) so I do not have to worry 
about that (Derek) 
other key members of staff and I would say I haven’t changed them, but I have 
considerably enhanced them (Carl) 
 
The business founders illustrate how they have adapted their connections with others that they 
employ. George has shown how he has granted his staff more independence, whilst Derek has 
decided to take on more responsibility to ensure that he did not face any other issues. Aside 
from these cases, it was identified that Damien and Scott highlighted how their firms were not 
innovative. Nonetheless, the entrepreneurs did discuss how they had enhanced their subsequent 




Overall, these findings are consistent with literature that has demonstrated how business failure 
experiences can be used to help run organisations in an efficient way (Zacharakis et al., 1999; 
Politis and Gabrielsson, 2009). The enterprise owners have been able to show how they can 
pivot, which refers to the ability to make a “change in a firm’s strategy that reorients the firm’s 
strategic direction through a reallocation or restructuring of activities, resources, and attention” 
(Kirtley & O’Mahony, 2020, p. 3). The entrepreneurs have been able to specifically enforce 
ideas, apply a series of several ideas together and develop their relationships (Grimes, 2018; 
Kirtley & O’Mahony, 2020) as well demonstrate innovative thinking (Rerup 2005; 
Kuuluvainen 2010; Wakkee and Moser 2016; Lin et al., 2019; Yu et al., 2014). In sum, it was 
found that the bulk of entrepreneurs harnessed their business knowledge in various long-term 
ways so that their new venture is innovative, making use of their business capital (Choi and 
Shepherd, 2004; Luthans et al., 2007; Bosma et al., 2004). 
5.3.4 Strategic foresight in organising  
Foresight has been found to entail a process that allows one to extend the borders of their 
perception (Slaughter, 1995). This can involve reviewing the consequences of present actions, 
averting issues and acknowledging the ramification of forthcoming events (Slaughter, 1995). 
Strategic foresight extends these processes by not only anticipating future events but by taking 
the demonstrating exceptional capability to take advantage of opportunities that can be 
disregarded by competitors in turbulent climates (Chia, 2008; Sarpong and Maclean, 2011). 
Participants often spoke in great depth about the strategic foresight they had obtained from 
their bankruptcy. Such foresight enabled their ability to navigate through intricate business 
decisions, increase revenue and the longevity of their current enterprises. The two types of 
foresight can be categorised as internal firm related foresight and foresight about the external 
environment.  
In relation to the internal firm related foresight the participants commonly touched upon their 
developed knowledge that they used within their organising of their company. For instance, 
they asserted that they covered their assets, ascertained ways to control their revenue streams 
and as highlighted by Sam he reduced the “cost of logistics”. Other participants also reported 
more careful planning to ensure they operate their firm as effectively as they possibly can and 
pre-empt failure resulting in bankruptcy as they found themselves to be more “vigilant” 
(Joseph). Hence, the venture founders often acknowledged the positive learning from their 




I think the experience of the first bankruptcy made me more cautious to not fail again 
(.) I already knew the warning signs and therefore was able to make better choices 
(Stefan) 
Now I am more focussed on the consequences of stuff rather than it all being driven by 
financial means (George) 
 
Such comments indicate that the firm owners are more aware of their consequences associated 
with their actions. They have been able to become conscious of how they can adapt their 
internal firm dynamics strategically to reap further benefits. The firm owners yet again 
demonstrate their internal attributional style and locus of control which has prompted their 
ownership of their learning behaviours (Heider, 1958). 
A number of entrepreneurs discussed how they had increased their commercial awareness, in 
relation to the external environment that their current firm operates within and became more 
forward looking following their bankruptcy. They made comments on being a “good planner” 
(Zack), having their “fingers on the pulse…to adapt” (Sam), “you got to maintain flexibility 
and versatility in order to be nimble in the market” (Dilan), and “always keeping up-to-date” 
as well as “always thinking about something new (Derek). Carl further spoke in detail about 
fluctuating oil prices and the need to plan, he also narrated the following key learning from his 
bankruptcy and failure experience: 
never assume that a single sector or single revenue client stream will continue 
indefinitely because market reality it won’t (Carl) 
 
Carl’s quote again displays strategic foresight as he has been able to become more conscious 
of future events in unstable environments. He has been able to predict the outcomes of various 
events to eventually benefit from the randomness associated with such events (Taleb, 2012). 
A few participants also described their plans to ensure that their current business would not 
fail. They discussed measures in place to ensure that they would survive, such as Carl again 
who recounted that “we will be standing three legs instead of one” whilst Sam asserted that 
“applying the SWOT analysis always helps” and Jay claimed he was able to “save for a rainy 
day” by altering his internal processes. Marios also divulged that his current business also has 
a strategic exit plan: 
I am more concerned with having certain business longevity and something that will 
have an order book and will have re-sellable value and those are things I am focussed 





Marios’ account showcases how he has thought about what he could do differently in his 
current firm, and he openly admitted that he did not think of this previously. This may be linked 
to his age as he mentioned he is in his “forties”, and this was an influencing factor. 
Notwithstanding his age, Marios like other participants had continued to develop profound 
insights how they can develop their firm in the future. He commented on about changing the 
type of work and clientele he serves as he stated he is concerned with having “longevity”. This 
can be linked to his antifragility by ensuring that that his current firm is robust enough to handle 
the various stressors that come with time (Taleb, 2012). 
The findings about the venture founders’ ways of thinking supports literature by Singh et al., 
(2015) who reported failed entrepreneurs had discovered new ways of thinking. Specifically, 
the business owners’ ways of thinking were linked to how they organise their new venture by 
thinking pro-actively about issues and the future. Such learnings and strategic foresight are 
consistent with Cope’s (2011) findings on higher-order learning, as it can be inferred that the 
firm owners have started to make use of more cognitive processes. This involves undertaking 
double-loop learning process in which the participants develop their decision-making due to 
their prior failure experiences (Cope, 2011).  This also supports the research that has found that 
habitual firm owners build a “know-how” by forming cognitive patterns to repossess relevant 
information (Baron, 1998). Hence, the findings represent that the learnings from the bankruptcy 
and entrepreneurial failure experiences are not always temporary as identified in former works 
(Parker, 2013; Baumard and Starbuck, 2005).  
In sum, the strategic foresight stemming from the firm owners’ antifragility, helped guide their 
everyday organising in their current ventures in two ways. First, the evolved way of thinking 
allowed them to help pre-empt issues and plan for them more effectively. Hence, strengthening 
the participants internal locus of control and attributional style (Heider, 1958). Second, their 
long-term learning extended their prior knowledge from the bankruptcy and built their 
commercial awareness associated with the business climate in which their company operates 
within so they could enhance their current operations to stay competitive.  
5.3.5 Taking moderate and calculated risks  
Risk taking can involve engaging in behaviours that can have uncertain outcomes, hence 
deviating from decisions that usually have predicted consequences (Wiklund and Shepherd, 
2003). Participants often recounted that they developed the capability to take risks, whilst 




decisions to reduce the likelihood of failure (Murmann and Sardana, 2013). A few participants 
commonly deemed their subsequent ventures as less risky, despite having an “an addiction to 
risk” (George) and describing entrepreneurs as being “addicted to the money and winning” 
(Denise). The firm founders commonly attributed their age as a factor that influenced their 
approach to risks, for instance Damien noted that “yes you need to take risks, but I think I am 
taking less risks, the older I get” and George noted that he is more “pragmatic and looking at 
the situation with more gun hope and maybe that is because I am getting older”. Along similar 
lines, other business founders mentioned additional factors that influenced their capability to 
take risks, for instance children, as declared by Dilan “I have an eight year old boy now, so 
your perspective on things change now, and your risk factors increase so I um I am more 
thoughtful now” (Dilan).  
Despite these accounts, a recurring trend was that participants still acknowledged that they took 
risks. For instance, Damien emphasised that if “you do not take risk then you will be still the 
same as where you were yesterday” and George noted that “I think there are different types of 
entrepreneurs (.) I think this is the point you are going to have an entrepreneur whose starts his 
business very slowly does things or you going to have the serial entrepreneur who is not content 
to stay under the status quo (.) they are more riskier”. Both cases showcase the importance of 
risk-taking. George’s quote specifically implies that certain entrepreneurs are more inclined to 
take risks though. Moreover, irrespective of his concerns around his family life, Dilan also 
commented that: 
I realised that finance is not worth worrying about (.) things will happen, but your 
wellbeing is the main thing you got to look out for, and also you are in control of that, 
you can do things every day to stay in control of that (.) so yeah when you realise that, 
then you realise you can enjoy life (Dilan) 
 
In this regard, it is evident that Dilan is still conscious of the risks he takes, yet his financial 
concerns do not impede his decision making. He highlighted, the importance of maintaining an 
internal attributional style (Heider, 1958) by being in control of his decision making.  
The participants stressed the value of taking more cautious and sensible risks. For instance, 
Lisa commented that her decisions were more “commercial”. They frequently arrived at the 
conclusion that the risks they took would reap greater business benefits, as depicted by the 
following narrative by George. 
now saying that in two thousand and seventeen I rolled the dice again and I had bought 




land, and everyone had thought it was a million to one chance of me pulling of the deal, 
and four weeks ago I…sold it to a housing association and made half a million quid 
(George) 
 
George’s excerpt showcases the capability for the firm owners to take risks that yield 
significant return. His approach is akin to the barbell strategy that is mentioned to obtain 
antifragility (Taleb, 2012). Precisely, from George’s perspective, he spoke of taking the chance 
to encounter smaller risks by investing in a specific property, whilst also trying to avoid certain 
larger risks with harsher outcomes (Taleb, 2012). By undertaking his approach, he has been 
able to gain from the unpredictable risks, stressors, and volatile environments; therefore, 
strengthening his use of antifragility as an entrepreneurial competence.  
Marios also emphasised a similar technique that he had embedded in his business model, which 
he highlighted: 
I basically looked at the lowest risk clients and I have developed…a secure model (.) it 
is smaller and is going to take time and that is another thing I learnt from the previous 
company which is not to rush anything (.) the second you start rushing things in 
business it means you have not really thought it out properly and that is a danger 
(Marios) 
 
It can be perceived that Marios has learnt to control various market factors and followed a 
series of steps to gain from smaller risks whilst avoid larger ones. This is in line with the 
portfolio strategy by “choosing market positioning to achieve an optimal combination of risk 
and return at each instant” as noted by (Cressy, 2016, p 1). The findings extend work from 
other studies that have found how former entrepreneurial failure experience can help firm 
owners deal with future uncertainty better, by uncovering the strategies they undertake to do 
so (Politis, 2008; Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright 2009). Other participants also similarly 
shared ways in which they obtained antifragility as epitomised by Jake: 
I don’t get hooked on the megger high risk stuff (.) you know I say to people there is 
only one big Facebook and one Tesla out of millions of businesses (laughs) but you 
know, that small company down the road that is doing ten million turnover and pays all 
its employees (.) and has no debt, with no investors is doing as good a job, and will 
probably last a lot more longer and not cause issues (Jake) 
 
It can be interpreted that Jake’s except represents that his approach to risk taking has enabled 
him to reap greater benefits by avoiding taking larger risks. His story also demonstrates a strong 




In sum, participants were often found to reduce the impact of certain risks whilst also taking 
strategic risks. Such strategic risks enabled them to yield significant benefits and continue to 
improve their running of their firms. Ultimately, they were able to develop their antifragility 
as an entrepreneurial competence by gaining more than they lost as well as continuing to foster 
their internal attributional style. 
5.3.6 Strong visual metaphors of themselves  
The participants often shared examples that emphasised how their learning had led to where 
they are now. They included, an “Italian stallion” (Jeff), “a comeback kid” (Marios), “the 
ocean” (Michelle), “something solid with wisdom” (Jake), an “oak tree with loads of acorns, 
creating loads of abundance, but in a much more connected way, connecting heaven and earth” 
(Denise), and an “a man running free as he knows what to do and how to run faster due to his 
trips before” (Nigel). All our enterprise founders also stressed that they become stronger and 
used the business failure experience positively.  
A few participants went into greater depth about how they have developed from their 
bankruptcy, as demonstrated by the following quotes: 
I’l be back and that is how I feel and I am going to win and I am going to win the next 
one (Carl) 
I have become stronger and with a few punches and when you pick yourself from that 
floor you know what to do and this makes your stronger and a stronger businessman 
(Sam) 
 
Again, it can be surmised, that for most of the firm owners, if faced with the prior failure 
scenario again they could react to it better now and take more proactive steps. Thus, showcasing 
how they continued to make use of their antifragility obtained from their prior failure and 
bankruptcy (Taleb, 2012). 
5.3.7 Current venture progression 
The business owners demonstrated their success from their learnings from their failure through 
their descriptions of their performance of their current venture. For many of the sample of 
entrepreneurs stated that their present firm(s) were “heading in the right direction” (Sam), 
“doing much better” (Lisa), and compared it to their prior enterprise, by acknowledging it was 
“definitely better than the last one” (Stefan). Zack even remarked that he made his “business 





now we have been getting fifteen to twenty thousand a month of repetitive orders from 
that client…and these are the things we forgot (Marios) 
 
Marios’ account also refers to the growth of the venture founder’s customer base and how this 
is a measurement of their fruitfulness. He demonstrates how his long-term learning has helped 
to yield the current firm’s progression. However, irrespective of these findings, it is worthy of 
noting that the firm owner’s antifragility has its constraints and for a minority of cases have 
encountered failures post-bankruptcy. Moreover, most of the participants have been able to 
reach a satisfied level with their current ventures, suggesting that there are limits to their 
entrepreneurial competence of antifragility (Taleb, 2012). 
In relation to existing literature, the findings are consistent with works that have demonstrated 
that prior ownership of a venture aids the performance of future entrepreneurial pursuits 
(Headd, 2003; Kato and Honjo, 2015; Huovinen and Tihula, 2008) as well as other positive 
firm-level implications (Stam et al., 2008; Nielson and Sarasvathy 2016). Furthermore, the 
results reinforce works that have found the benefits of learning from firm failure are harnessed 
through knowing how best to operate subsequent enterprises (Shepherd et al., 2009; Cope, 
2011; Ucbasaran et al., 2013). The findings also indicate that formerly bankrupted venture 
founders are not always likely to fail again, unlike findings from other studies who have found 
that they may (Van Kesteren et al., 2017; Metzger 2006; Gottschalk et al. 2017). Lastly, overall, 
the majority of the once bankrupted firm owners are not likely to struggle financially as 
reported in previous literature (Wakkee and Mosser, 2016; Toft-Kehler., 2014).  
Taken together, following the launch of their subsequent firms the entrepreneurs have been 
able to continue their higher-order learning by utilising their entrepreneurial competence of 
antifragility. Such learning has enhanced how they operate their firm financially, their business 
model(s) and how they develop relationships. They have been able to pivot in situations to 
ensure their new firm is innovative whilst develop strategic foresight. Such foresight has 
ultimately aided the respondents in their organisation of their enterprise, increasing their locus 
of control and internal attributional style as well as the ability to stay competitive. Furthermore, 
they have been able to take strategic decision making to obtain further antifragility whilst 
demonstrate that they can handle the same stressors more effectively, illustrating the long-term 
benefits of their failure experience. They demonstrate their antifragility in their language they 





5.4 Chapter Summary and Conclusion  
This chapter endeavoured to develop research on when and how firm owners form the 
capability to start-up a subsequent venture post-bankruptcy. Through identifying key patterns 
of the participant’s accounts and by using the concept of antifragility as a theoretical lens, a 
process model was formed that depicted the gradual learning steps involved in restarting a 
venture. The model is constituted of three key phases that demonstrate how the firm owners 
harnessed their “entrepreneurial competence” of antifragility to recognise and seize new 
opportunities to restart a new business. 
First, the firm owners encountered moments of lower-level learning prior to their bankruptcy 
charges. Next, during their recovery period, the venture founders engaged in reflexive learning 
that involved prospective sense-making as well as experiential learning behaviours which led 
to higher-order, deep moments of realisation (Cope, 2011). Such moments shaped their 
relationships and business outlook as well as strengthened their internal attributional style to 
recognise entrepreneurial opportunities that enables them to help others effectively. Ultimately, 
during this stage the firm owners were able to truly exploit their antifragility as an 
entrepreneurial competence by gaining a positive view of the stressors that were associated 
with their prior business demise. 
Second, by harnessing their antifragility, the entrepreneurs were able to identify fleeting 
opportunities to restart a firm, enhance their planning and idea formation of their subsequent 
venture as well as expanding their reasoning for repeat business ownership. Through making 
use of their antifragility, the business owners were also able to form knowledge of when they 
should exactly launch the company and develop it as well increase their self-efficacy (Bandura, 
1977). Thus, there was no exact time for restart, yet the launch of another firm generally 
occurred during and after the firm owner’s recovery of their bankruptcy charges. 
Third, after starting-up another venture, the enterprise owners were able to continue to exploit 
their antifragility by continually learning, which enabled them to effectively operate their firm 
financially, apply a suitable business model and foster stronger relationships as well as reuse 
their knowledge through mentoring others. Furthermore, the business founders were able to 
pivot by adjusting their strategic orientation to stay innovative and forge strategic foresight. 
Such foresight allowed them to, again, increase their attributional style and locus of control in 
their ability to control the organisation of their firm as well as stay competitive. In addition, the 




founders recognised that such antifragility had aided their firm progression, enhanced their 
ability to react to failure and benefitted them in multiple ways in the long-term. Yet, the 
antifragility does have its limits. 
To summarise, this chapter has been able to shed light on when and how the venture founders 
have been able to learn and bounce back from bankruptcy by utilising their entrepreneurial 
competence of antifragility. The findings support numerous existing findings in the current 
entrepreneurial learning post-failure literature, showing the significance of learning following 
a venture demise, yet they also uncovered several learning trajectories that have not been 
researched. These areas entail the use of strategic foresight and enhanced decision making 
coupled with the capability of the firm owners to pivot post-failure. 
The next chapter aims to explore what factors have enabled the firm owners to recover, restart 
and develop their organisations post-bankruptcy as well as what factors impede such processes. 
Thus, an insight into what truly enables the entrepreneurs to build enough entrepreneurial 





The influence of organising Practices on Entrepreneurial Venture 
Restart 
This chapter is concerned with the practices undertaken by the entrepreneurs that enabled them 
to rebound to venture again. Specifically, this chapter endeavours to uncover the myriad of 
organising practices which potentially contributed to the venture founders’ recovery, 
entrepreneurial opportunity identification, learning and new venture development. By drawing 
on antifragility as a conceptual gaze, the ability to bounce back and the organising practices 
that enable and impede the development of antifragility as an entrepreneurial competence will 
be explored. The following research question will be answered: ‘What are the organising 
practices that enable (or impede) the entrepreneurial antifragility required to restart a 
business venture after bankruptcy?’. In doing this, a process model is devised that highlights 
the organising practices of our entrepreneurs that appears to enable (or impede) their potential 
to restart.  
The chapter consists of three themes. The first theme uncovers the positive emotional practices 
that the enterprise owner undertakes which predominantly facilitate, and sometimes endangers, 
the capability to restart. The second theme unpacks the other enabling factors, which entail 
how the entrepreneurs made use of their social networks, engaged effectively with 
stakeholders, and employed strategies to build an understanding of the bankruptcy processes 
to assist their ability to find their feet and restart. The third theme taps into how the business 
owners deal with policy, stakeholder, and financial issues associated with their bankruptcy that 
can jeopardise their ability to bounce back. Next, a presentation and discussion of the grounded 
theoretical process model and a summary of the entire of thesis findings is presented before 
ending with a chapter summary. 
6.1 Positive Emotional Practices 
Emotions can be perceived as an act in relation to a particular social situation (Scheer, 2012; 
Davidson, et al., 2012). Scheer (2012) specifically noted four emotional practices: mobilising, 
naming, communicating, and regulating. As implied by its name, this theme aims to unpack 
the positive emotional practices that the firm owners undertook, which helped them to form 




themes which include: i) playing hope, ii) driving through the maze, iii) civil courage, iv) 
attributional style, and v) dropping the emotional baggage.  
6.1.1 Playing hope  
A prevalent trend that has been identified was that most participants reported high amounts of 
hope which they claimed helped them to overcome their fear of failure. They gave a range of 
responses stating that “you cannot live in fear” (Tyler), “Well a lot of hope (.) because I 
couldn’t see me surviving without it” (Damien) and “if you lose that faith then what is there in 
life?” (Michelle). More intriguingly, another recurring pattern was that informants made 
remarks about their spirituality, by demonstrating a relationship with a higher power (Liu and 
Robertson, 2011). Extant work has indicated that spirituality can aid a firm owner’s ability to 
deal with stress in relation to owning and managing a business (Herriot, Schmidt-Wilk and 
Heaton, 2009). Along these lines, the respondents often proclaimed that they “thank God so 
far” (Derek) and they made several references to a higher force which guided their faith, such 
as, the following: 
if you realise there are no problems (.) they are all created in the mind, um, I use the 
phrase which is spiritual, which is let go and let God take over and then you realise you 
are actually just hear to be, and that you are just a free spirit, and so we create our 
problems, and it is very easy to uncreate those problems but just accepting that you are 
in control of nothing (.) once we understand that we control nothing, then life becomes 
easy (George) 
 
George’s narrative shows how “God” acts as a guide for his everyday activities. Further, by 
admitting that letting “God take over”, he has been able to pre-empt issues and deal with them 
appropriately. He further emphasised “that the Zen Buddha says nine times down and you stand 
up ten times”. This quote encapsulates his spirituality and signifies the value he places on 
higher forces that can help him to embrace his failure. Denise shed light on her way she 
practiced her spirituality to guide her through her bankruptcy: 
so this is the kind of the way of Buddha, to transcend the illusion and realise it is all 
one energy and all our own creation, and that is very powerful I mean that is 
enlightenment essentially…and to realise that every single piece in it, and part of it is 
your own creation, and it is all a mirror to anything out there that triggers you into anger 
to, to, fear, fight, flight (Denise) 
 
Here, Denise’s passage indicates that she has been able to transcend from her failure, which 
she later goes into much detail about. By describing the external forces around, her as “inner 




antecedent of her failure. As a result, she has further proclaimed that she could clear “the path 
for something new to bear through” with reference to her new firm and being able to help 
others. Denise also noted that, “most entrepreneurs have got huge amounts of unresolved 
childhood trauma which has hardened them…it took a lot of cracking open of that armour on 
my spiritual journey to unfreeze all of that”. This quote epitomises how Denise’s spiritual 
values have been able to guide her through her previous hardships associated with her 
enterprise prior to her bankruptcy. Furthermore, by referring to “enlightenment”, her faith has 
allowed her to shape her emotions towards her bankruptcy (Scheer, 2012), viewing the 
occurrence in a positive light by reaching a “higher self”. It is worthy of noting, that the firm 
owners undertook these moments of spirituality during their recovery period, in which they 
could not own a company, so they were often forced to reflect on their true purpose. 
Interestingly, both participants went through bankruptcy at a similar point which could have 
influenced their likelihood to engage in spiritual practices.  
Taken together, these findings illustrate how the entrepreneurs’ faith acts as a mobilizing 
practice which allowed most of them to become increasingly stronger by allowing them to 
recognise and build on their current strengths (Scheer, 2012). Moreover, their faith has allowed 
them to deal with issues better and overcome obstacles. Ultimately, it can be inferred that the 
firm owner’s spiritual faith not only trumped their feelings of fear associated with failure, but 
it also enabled them to further progress in their entrepreneurial careers, guiding their decisions, 
actions, and intuitions. Therefore, the participant’s spiritual faith has aided their development 
of antifragility (Taleb, 2012) as an entrepreneurial competence, which has allowed them to 
become stronger and reap the benefits from their earlier business shortcomings. These findings 
support and extend literature by Singh et al. (2016) by showing how spirituality can guide the 
process of restarting an enterprise post firm failure. 
6.1.2 Driving through the maze  
Throughout the process of restarting a venture from prior, during and after the bankruptcy 
charges, most entrepreneurs engaged in ways to display exuberance which enabled them to 
“drive through the maze” (Sam). Exuberance can be defined as a highly positive emotion that 
is linked with displaying sheer passion for concepts, delivering ideas with optimism, and 
showing resilience (Jamison, 2005). The firm owners specifically demonstrated passion for 
their new venture as well as multiple forms of resilience coupled with being extremely 




participants were key emotional practices that helped to overcome obstacles associated with 
their failure. This enabled them to foster antifragility by acknowledging the scope of what they 
were capable of. The findings therefore extend literature which indicates that entrepreneurial 
passion for a new venture is linked with the firm owners’ self-belief by showing how the 
emotion is a core part of their recovery (Cardon and Kirk, 2015; Mayr and Mitter, 2014).  
However, Damien did admit that his passion did interfere in the final declaration of his venture 
failure:  
if I would close it earlier, I would not probably stand proud, and say I tried everything 
…so the passion we took all the way to edge and then it fell over (Damien) 
 
Whilst Damien, acknowledged that his passion allowed him to save the prior firm for a while, 
the emotion delayed the closure of it and prolonged his initial IVA. Therefore, it can be deemed 
his passion has been a slight hindrance in the grand scheme of things. This finding provides 
insight into whether passion is of a hindrance for failed venture owners showing that overall, 
it is not (Walsh and Cunningham, 2017). 
Aside from passion, most entrepreneurs demonstrated aspects of social, cognitive, and financial 
resilience (Hayward et al., 2010). Some of the venture founders expressed how they displayed 
their persistence by “buggering on” “riding this horse up the hill as long as possible” (Carl), 
and that “you just got to phoenix out” (George) whilst others such as, Nigel claimed they were 
like a “soldier”. Jay and George also acutely emphasised the significance of their resilience 
which is interesting as they both did not have a recovery period. This corroborates findings 
from Corner et al.’s. study (2017) as a reason why a few firm owners may not have had a set 
recovery period as this could be related to their high levels of resilience.  
Additionally, the informants expressed that their resilience spurred them to be “mentally fit to 
handle running another company” (Nigel). They stated that their hunger to restart was rooted 
in their ability to be self-critical and the desire for personal development, as explained well by 
Jake: 
anyone can criticise me, but I am my biggest critic and that is what drives me to do stuff 
(Jake) 
The above narrative indicates that Jake’s resilience is derived from his capability to succeed 
and do better than he previously did. He remarks that he is his “biggest critic” which suggests 




comments and stated how their resilience effectively allowed them to start again, as highlighted 
by Denise:  
all of these things have given me a tremendous, a tremendous tool box, and tremendous 
resilience, to be able to be super strong, and to keep my centre, and stand in the eye of 
the storm, no matter what the storm is raging…and to not be pulled into, erm, kind of 
meltdown, or chaos, and that is not to say that I do not wobble occasionally, but I find 
it much easier to come back to centre now (Denise) 
 
Denise’s account represents how her resilience has allowed her to learn further about herself 
which is consistent with other findings that have shown that resilience can prompt learning 
from venture failure (Lafuente., 2019). It can further be deduced that her resilience has allowed 
her to foster antifragility (Taleb, 2012), as she is able to face further trauma more readily than 
she would have been able to prior her bankruptcy. Her comments about being able to “stand in 
the centre of the eye of the storm” encapsulates how she has been able to communicate how 
resilience as an emotion (Scheer, 2012), has allowed her to profit from her prior shortcomings. 
Ultimately, Denise, like other participants, has been able to strengthen her robustness against 
negative scenarios in addition to leveraging positive situations to her advantage (Taleb, 2012). 
The findings also support and extends existing research that has highlighted the significance of 
passion and persistence as emotions which support failed entrepreneurs to restart in the context 
of firm owners who have restarted post-bankruptcy (Yamakawa et al., 2015).  
Beyond passion and resilience, high optimism has been an extremely integral emotion 
associated with aiding the firm owners to drive through the maze. Optimism is regarded as the 
ability to view the future outcomes of events in a positive light, which can impact the formation 
of enterprises (Rigotti et al., 2011; Carver et al., 2010). There was a universal expression found 
amongst the respondents of engaging in extremely positive related emotions following a series 
of unfortunate failure events. This supports Ucbasaran et al.’s (2010) results, which 
demonstrated how failed entrepreneurs experience more positive events as opposed to negative 
events. The participants have specifically taken an optimistic lens to view their misfortune, 
which allowed to garner important life lessons to try again and prevent another venture demise. 
For example, the interviewees, often claimed that they were “very optimistic…possibly too 
optimistic” (Stefan) and that they were highly optimistic that their current firm would be “more 
successful” (Zack). The venture founders commonly felt that their optimism was part of their 
“spirit” and “can do attitude” (Marios), as well as that they had a “positive mental attitude” 




mind” as well as be the “best person you can everyday”. He also shared the following quote 
about how he perceives his outlook: 
everything is an opportunity…if something is horrible then think ‘right, what next, 
right, what next’…resilience is a classic word but it is more than that (.) what you 
project is what you attract and the next move, and instantly there was then ten business 
ideas of what I could have gone into, and I was thinking where do I go with this next 
(Dilan) 
 
Dilan’s account suggests that he values the power of his optimism greatly, which drives his 
ability to seize opportunities in his everyday organising. He refers to how his outlook goes 
beyond resilience, naming the emotion (Scheer, 2012), which has helped him. Dilan further 
noted that he “hit rock bottom to appreciate the good things” and that his bankruptcy led to a 
series of “inspiring moments” and even a “TEDx talk”. It is apparent that, Dilan’s optimism 
has been a key driver in viewing the failure in a positive light, and by recognising the emotion 
as a practice he has been able to foster antifragility. Other entrepreneurs also frequently 
imparted methods in which their positive emotions led them to alter their behaviours to benefit 
them. For instance, they often proclaimed that their buoyancy enabled them to “forget the 
negative aspects of what happened” (Jay) and it has made them more “vigilant” (Joseph). 
Participants even made remarks such as “good fortune is coming my way” (Scott) epitomising 
their highly optimistic outlook.  
Beyond this, the venture founders commonly expressed insights into how their buoyancy drove 
their entrepreneurial re-start such as, Lisa who declared that if she “wasn’t optimistic it 
wouldn’t have happened” in relation to the creation of her new enterprise. Derek also expressed 
how his optimism allowed him to “work towards another chapter”. George further narrated the 
significance of how their positive emotions allowed him to perceive the failure:  
as an entrepreneur you always look at the glass half full, so I bounced back from it very 
quickly, and I look upon it as a positive…I look upon it and think this is my best 
business (.) I made a million pounds in one day because I wrote off a million pounds of 
debt (George) 
 
George’s case represents how his positive emotions have allowed him to see the constructive 
aspects of his venture demise. His account exemplifies how he has reframed his moments of 
fragility that come from his financial loss. Likewise, Dilan advocated how his buoyancy 
coupled with his “why not” attitude, as well as his ability to be highly appreciative have been 
integral in helping him to “celebrate” the bankruptcy. It is evident that the failed entrepreneurs’ 




activities as per prior literature on the matter (Ucbasran et al., 2006; Jenkins et al., 2014; 
Sarasvathy et al., 2013; Cotterill, 2011). Furthermore, a positive attitude towards an 
entrepreneurial demise can assist the business owner in dealing with it better, which is 
consistent with other extant research (Cannon and Edmondson, 2005; Politis and Gabrielsson, 
2009; Hayward, Forster et al, 2010). 
The respondents also spoke of how their positive emotions were of great importance following 
their entrepreneurial restart, as exemplified by the following quote: 
a positive attitude, as without that, you cannot manage a team, you can’t present to a 
client to rebuild business, you can’t represent yourself to a bank (Carl) 
 
Here, it appears that Carl acknowledges the wider ramifications of his positive behaviours. He 
refers to the economic impact, which is crucial for his venture to succeed, given the influence 
of financial issues in his former firm. Other respondents imparted similar claims about how 
their positive mindset has allowed them to retain faith in the progression of their current firm 
and has alleviated their concerns. Taken together, it can be deduced that the participants’ 
comparative optimism aided the development of antifragility as an entrepreneurial competence 
and their recovery by allowing them to focus on future events as opposed to past occurrences 
(Taleb, 2012). 
In sum, it is evident that the entrepreneurs’ elevated exuberance, comprising their inflated 
optimism, sheer resilience and passion fundamentally aided their coping. Specifically, the 
entrepreneurs recognised and communicated that their exuberance as a practice, enabled them 
to combat their worries, as well as help them to learn and develop their existing organisations 
(Scheer, 2012). In doing so, the elevated exuberance granted the participants to form and 
exploit antifragility as an entrepreneurial competence. 
6.1.3 Demonstrating civil courage 
Courage from an Aristotelian perspective involves overcoming fears through a series of 
challenging actions to reach a virtuous outcome (Sanford, 2010; Pakaluk, 2005). Courage is 
the first virtue in Aristotle’s Nicomachean ethics, and is linked to an individual showing 
confidence, whilst making sacrifices which can lead to happiness (Rabieh, 2006; Ward, 2016; 
Davis, 1996). The virtue can involve undertaking brave and sometimes painful acts (Curzer, 




that involves one showing bravery, by following their consciences and self-reflections 
(Schwan, 2004; Greitemeyer et al., 2007).  
During the point of restart, the respondents recurrently displayed evidence of high civil 
courage, which they developed during their recovery period. The participants expressed the 
emotion as a “matter of survival (.) you just have to do it” (Scott) and referred to the importance 
of demonstrating courage by claiming it “hundred percent” (Nigel) helped them. Other 
entrepreneurs echoed these sentiments, emphasising how their heroic emotions acted as a 
practice that were essential parts of her recovery (Scheer, 2012). One can infer that courage 
has enabled the firm owners to develop antifragility, by being open to seeking and developing 
knowledge from novel, uncertain and risky situations, for instance, restarting a firm (Markey-
Towler, 2018; Taleb, 2012; Taleb, 2018).  
Confidence refers to the capacity to have faith in one’s ability (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002) and 
is a key part of the respondent’s civil courage. They often claimed they always had confidence 
as noted by Jake, who referred to it as a “subconscious thing”. Yet, a more prevalent trend that 
was expected, was that the entrepreneurs suggested that their confidence had grown 
exponentially, especially following their business re-start, as commonly depicted by the 
informant’s accounts: 
Yeah I think it grew (.) it grew because of the bankruptcy…I took it quite personally 
so…I could do it again and I’ve done it again, you know…it is all positive (Damien) 
 
The above quote represents how confidence as a practice grows by recognising the regulation 
process (Scheer, 2012), enabling the firm owners to combat their prior mistakes again which 
is a key part of their antifragile competence. Furthermore, the participants spoke about the 
importance of their confidence. They reported that the emotional resource allowed them to 
realise that “if I failed again…it is not a problem” (Scott), as well as how their confidence 
prompted them to make “better deals” (Lisa) and “go wherever you want and do whatever you 
want next” (Dilan). It can be interpreted, that the entrepreneurs’ confidence is integral to their 
restart, as they have been able to develop their skillset in order to bounce back effectively, 
which is consistent with prior findings on the matter (Ucbasaran et al., 2006; Hayward et al., 
2010; Sarasvathy et al., 2013). The findings also extend previous studies’ results (Hayward et 
al., 2010; Sarasvathy et al., 2013) by indicating that venture founders foster antifragility as an 




business owners did not experience over-confidence, disagreeing with research that has found 
failed firm owners can display excessive levels of confidence (Ucbasaran et al., 2010).  
In line with confidence, the firm owner’s self-efficacy is a core part that underpins their courage 
and allows them to trump the fear of failure again. Self-efficacy is linked with one’s ability to 
accomplish an action (Bandura, 1977). Whilst a small number of informants referred to how 
their self-efficacy decreased prior and during their bankruptcy, the majority of the participants, 
stated they had formed high levels of self-efficacy following the bankruptcy charges. This was 
a key part of their civil courage. Most informants claimed that they could harness their prior 
experience effectively due to their self-efficacy. For example, Nigel stated that because he 
knew the “ropes”, his restart was more achievable, and Sam declared how he became “bolder 
and perhaps aggressive in selling” his products and himself. It appears that the interviewees 
had almost complete faith in their own ability. On a more extreme end, George expressed 
compelling insights into his venture demise: “a business man is a business man…bankruptcy 
is a little problem (.) it is an opportunity”, showing his extremely high levels of self-efficacy. 
Two things can be unpacked here; first, comments of this nature demonstrate how the firm 
owners continually aid their development of antifragility as they see issues like bankruptcy as 
minute which can be easily dealt with. Second, the business founders recognise that they can 
develop from mistakes which should in fact be viewed positively as they allow one to grow. 
Besides this, other respondents shared that they had high belief in their ability to restart and 
discussed how they developed their self-efficacy throughout stages. They showcase, how their 
self-belief acted as a catalyst for their restart by communicating the impact of the emotion as a 
practice (Scheer, 2012): 
I thought I’m not gonna feel sorry for myself (.) people lose millions, so I said I’m 
gonna, give it a try and as long as I know in my heart, in myself, I give myself one 
hundred percent (Derek) 
 
I didn’t want to fail and that is not what I am on this earth for (.) you know, when that 
happened, of course, I was upset but I picked myself up and once I knew I could, I 
thought right, let’s do this properly…also I took all the worst parts of that 
business…and I thought I am not going to do that again (Marios) 
 
Here it can be inferred that Derek and Marios were gradually able to increase their belief in 
their capability to run another organisation again. Mario’s claim about not being on this earth 
to fail signifies his sheer determination and faith in re-starting. In the same vein, Derek’s 




accounts highlight how self-efficacy can prompt the development of new opportunities, which 
is consistent with work by Shepherd et al. (2009). 
Furthermore, a few respondents acutely emphasised the importance of self-efficacy (Scheer, 
2012), which they deemed as the “main ingredient” (Sam) as well as: 
approaching the right people with the right attitude and knocking at a door (.) having 
accepted the fact that that door may still open…and eventually you succeed (Sam) 
 
From Sam’s account, it is apparent that consistent self-belief crucially enabled him to not only 
take the courage to restart but to prosper in his subsequent venture post-bankruptcy by making 
effective decisions to build key relationships to learn from others. An explanation for his high 
self-belief could be linked to his age and experience as a few older participants like Sam, 
reflected the same approach to their self-efficacy. In a comparable fashion Dilan, highlighted: 
you wouldn’t set something up if you didn’t believe in it whole heartedly, so that is for 
me the best way of portraying yourself (.) it is getting on with it (.) if you got an idea, 
do it (.) and yeah it is ninety percent not going to work for a lot of people, but it will 
then evolve into something else (Dilan) 
 
It can be perceived that Dilan advises that a core aspect of entrepreneurship is about having the 
courage to have faith in oneself to launch a firm in the first place irrespective of any issues that 
follow. This finding about the significance of self-belief and courage, also supports recent 
works that have found that previous business failure does impact a firm owner’s intention to 
create a new business (Acheampong et al., 2018; He and Xioa, 2020) 
Taken together, the venture founders’ civil courage that encapsulates their heroic nature, high 
levels of confidence and self-efficacy may have always existed but grew significantly during 
their recovery period. They communicated how their courage, as an emotion (Scheer, 2012) 
enabled them to engage in the risk-taking behaviours of restarting and managing another 
organisation coupled with fostering their antifragility, with a view that they can grow from 
their mistakes. 
6.1.4 Developing one’s attributional style  
Another important aspect related to the participants’ emotional functioning that enabled them 
to nurture their entrepreneurial competence of antifragility was the development of their 
attributional style. Attribution is linked to how an individual ascribes an explanation to an 
event, action, or instance (Heider, 1958). A few interviewees declared that they displayed a 




have an impact” (Sam) despite their own mistakes (Cope, 2011). Interestingly, all three 
respondent’s ethnicity are from an Asian background, so their culture could impact how they 
view failure and attribute blame (Heinze 2013). Aside from this, two interviewees, Dilan, and 
Stefan recognised early on that they were in control of their venture demise, displaying an 
immediate internal attributional style (Amankwah-Amoah, 2015). Interestingly, these two 
cases were unique, which could be linked to the firm owner’s high levels of optimism 
displayed. 
Importantly, a more common pattern identified, was that the participants’ formed an internal 
attributional style over the course of becoming bankrupt to their early stages of their failure 
recovery. During these points, they claimed that they were in “charge of their own destiny” 
(Sam) and recognised that the practice of internal attribution evoked positive emotions (Scheer, 
2012), which helped to form the competence of antifragility in two ways. First, the participant’s 
internal attributional style led them to form a sense of achievement, independence, and a drive 
to succeed, as typified by the following narrative: 
those who believe we are waiting around for the world to tell us what to do, or those 
people who get up and make it happen, and the internally motivated ones are the ones 
who make it happen, so forget the external nonsense (Carl) 
 
Carl’s emphasis on forgetting extraneous variables, which are “nonsense” showcases how he 
values his internal attributional style significantly. Likewise, Sam noted “in order to succeed 
one needs to be in control of his or her emotions and it is these emotions which leads to failure 
or success”. It is evident that through taking an internal attributional style, Sam has been able 
to emotionally regulate effectively (Cope, 2011) and continually foster antifragility as an 
entrepreneurial competence (Taleb, 2012). 
Second, the interviewees demonstrated how they prompted the development of antifragility as 
an entrepreneurial competence by setting their own standards for running their firms. This was 
exemplified by Lisa who noted how she now relies on her “gut” as opposed to doing what 
“other people expected” her to do. Likewise, Dilan claimed: 
everyday there are triggers, there are moments of decision making, and how we react 
to all those scenarios is key and defines…where you go (Dilan) 
 
By adopting an internal locus of control and internal attributional style, in this regard, it is 
evident that Lisa and Dilan are now able to deal with issues effectively by relying on their 




been able to control his everyday decisions in response to moments of pressure and failure, 
which he values highly. He further narrated additional benefits from undertaking this approach:  
 
so I never blame…others (.) yes, I know when others are to blame, but I would always 
try to get the best out of them, and, actually, this is something I am still going through 
with one of my current business partners who (.) doesn’t, well, he is someone who is 
never in the wrong but…it is allowing him to slowly embrace (Dilan) 
 
 
It is apparent that Dilan’s approach has allowed him to form solutions in his current venture by 
controlling his response to his current business partner and, therefore, represents how he has 
benefited from his failure experiences, feeling positive about it. He further noted how “you can 
only control your own movement” (Dilan), thus demonstrating an internal locus of control as 
it is evident, he took ownership of the outcomes of the events that unfold in his lives 
(Rotter,1966; Weiner, 1992). Other participants, like Marios expressed comparable excerpts 
about resolving existing issues by making use of their internal attributional style: 
 
instead of getting stressed out with things I have no control over (.) I have adopted the 
attitude of, if that is meant to be it will be, and if it is a problem then it is problem today, 
but let’s sleep on it, and see if it is a problem tomorrow (.) that has been a massive game 
changer in what I am doing (Marios) 
 
Marios’s quote indicates how an internal attributional style has allowed him to control his 
worries, rather than let external factors guide his behaviours and therefore form better business 
decisions. George also narrated how his attributional style shapes his perception which guides 
his behaviours: 
I think everything outside yourself is not real, it is all an illusion, and so the only place 
you can make, and create is from inside, so everything is an outward look of what you 
see, which is a perception, so if you want to see a red car, you see a red car, so 
everything is created from the mind, so has to be internal (George) 
 
Others agreed with this approach, which shaped their perceptions and thus helped them to deal 
with issues but recognised that they “don’t always make the right choices within business” 
(Stefan). Thus, highlighting the limits associated with an internal attributional style and their 
entrepreneurial competence of antifragility. 
In line with other works, the firm owners’ internal attributional style, shaped their learning and 
the development of antifragility, thus reinforcing and extending prior works (Yamakawa and 
Cardon, 2015; Yamakawa et al., 2015; Eggers and Song, 2015). One can also deduce that the 




claims that the approach can jeopardise their entrepreneurial restart for some business owners 
(Yamakawa et al., 2015). Aside from this, the venture founders did not distance themselves 
from their failure by making external attributions about enterprise demise (Kibler et al, 2017; 
Rogoff et al., 2004). 
 
In sum, the respondents’ attributional style and internal locus of control developed during their 
recovery stage and early stages of learning from their venture failure, acted as a mobilising 
habit to shape their perceptions, ultimately evoking positive emotions (Scheer, 2012). 
Specifically, the internal ascription style enabled the venture founders to learn, build a sense of 
self-achievement and recognise their own standards of working. This builds their antifragility, 
which consequently, enables them to make better business decisions to aid their entrepreneurial 
restart and firm progress. Furthermore, it aids their ability to take responsibility for their actions 
and realise their limits in doing so.  
6.1.5 Dropping the emotional baggage 
Another key trend identified was how the venture founders engaged in ways to develop 
emotionally. They did so by letting go of their “emotional baggage” by regulating certain 
emotions (Scheer, 2012), such as emotions associated with their ego: 
I didn’t realise at the time, but I am quite egotistical and self-driven at all costs, and 
even at the detriment of my own wellbeing and various crisis…I am more grounded 
and co-operative (.) and connected, and seek more advice from people now (George)  
 
Here, it appears that George’s bankruptcy has developed his ability to realise his egotistical 
nature, which previously led to issues with his own personal wellbeing and business growth. 
Precisely, it is evident that George has been able to learn from his experiences by managing 
his own self-efficacy, claiming that the bankruptcy and his period of depression are part of the 
“tapestry and journey of life” which he can exploit to help others. Echoing these sentiments, 
Jake admitted “I actually did not think I was a pretty nice person and I think bankruptcy 
humbled me pretty quickly”, regulating how he felt about himself. 
Denise also imparted the significance of not being ego driven, by reflection on restarting a firm 
following failure: 
looking back, I think, that is the biggest pitfall, and I would urge anyone that is losing 
a business to really take the time and the space to really have a sabbatical, and to just 
have the stillness of really questioning the okay, what do I want to do next (.) and not 





Denise’s narrative indicates the significance of ensuring that subsequent firms should differ in 
some capacity to enterprises that failed previously. In the same vein Zack, like other 
participants, highlighted the value of being able to “re-invent” himself through his 
entrepreneurial comeback, letting go of his previous emotional issues by regulating how he felt 
about certain emotions. It is evident that failure events allowed the entrepreneurs to decode 
their old ways of thinking (Cope, 2011) and regulate their emotions (Byrne and Shepherd 2015; 
He et al., 2018; Scheer, 2012). For the bulk of the participants, this allowed them to grow, 
nurture their antifragility and recognise their full potential.  
It can be surmised that the informants are able to realise that although they need to sustain self-
efficacy, their positive emotional practices that involve letting go of emotional baggage by 
regulating their emotions has meant they have not become over-confident, which they have 
perceived as a strength. Therefore, the entrepreneurs’ positive emotional practices have helped 
them to perceive the limits of developing antifragility as an entrepreneurial competence. It can 
be argued that informants possess psychological capital in the form of positive emotional 
practices to help them to navigate through their bankruptcy experiences and restart, reinforcing 
prior work by Jenkins et al. (2014).  
In conclusion, the first theme has shown that a range of positive emotional practices (Scheer, 
2012) have enabled the interviewees to build antifragility (Taleb, 2012) from their recovery to 
their re-start. In particular, their capability to utilise their hope, ability to navigate through the 
maze, exhibit civil courage and an internal attributional style as well as effectively discard of 
emotional baggage. Such emotional resources have specifically allowed the entrepreneurs to 
trump any fears associated with starting another firm, and to remain highly positive, resilient, 
and courageous as well as to exhibit self-efficacy throughout the process, whilst recognising 
the limits of their antifragility. 
6.2 Catching the fire: ‘Building bridges’ with stakeholders and ‘Making do’ with 
bankruptcy policies  
The second key theme explored the external factors that aided the informant’s development of 
antifragility. Within this theme, the firm owner’s social networks, understanding of how to 
develop their relationships with stakeholders and form knowledge of bankruptcy procedures 





6.2.1 Tapping into external networks and social support  
Social capital links to the formation and use of social networks, which firm owners can utilise 
to restart a venture (Choi and Shepherd, 2004; Luthans, Avolio and Avey, 2007; Bosma, Praag 
et al, 2004). Such capital has been commonly harnessed by the entrepreneurs through the 
process of overcoming their bankruptcy, launching another enterprise, and developing it. The 
participants referred to the multiple benefits of making use of their existing and growing social 
networks. For instance, they made remarks such as: “stress levels can be extremely high at 
times and can also get extremely low and given the support from loved ones (.) one can 
definitely cope or one can definitely break down” (Sam), “I need to be around people and I 
thrive of learning from others” (Dilan), and “when you have positive people around you…you 
have positive mindset and see an idea that can be a business” (Derek). Others such as George 
also reported that his social networks allowed him to realise that he does not need to launch a 
consecutive venture “all on your own”. Put simply, the enterprise owners’ comments 
demonstrate the positives that are associated with making use of their social support, 
highlighting that it allowed them to be more financially secure by enabling them to cope, learn 
and maintain a positive outlook as well as continually fostering their belief in their aptitude to 
restart independently or with others. Carl further narrated the significance of reaching out to 
others: 
I socialised with positive people and I kept myself positively engaged with people who 
had no knowledge of my business, so…I could focus on a conversation without demons 
around my head (Carl) 
 
From the above excerpt, it can be implied that the benefits of harnessing social ties with others 
is a crucial aspect to aiding the recovery process. Specifically, such discussions allowed Carl 
to regulate how he felt towards the bankruptcy by giving him time away from thinking about 
the failure event (Singh et al., 2007; Cope, 2011). Dilan also similarly expressed how “people 
around me were very understanding and very supportive, so that ultimately was key to picking 
me up”. This quote showcases how the enterprise founders gained great value from their 
ongoing social support, which they perceived as a crucial aspect of aiding their recovery. 
A few touched upon how their family and friends as a social network were an instrumental part 
of their recovery and continuous growth of their current ventures. For instance, the enterprise 
founders stated, “my brothers were very supportive” (Sam) and “I was confident that I would 




me along” (Stefan). It is evident that the participants felt the benefits of their family and friends, 
who strategically and emotionally helped them with their enterprises and boosted their faith in 
their ability to excel (Bandura, 1977). This continued support aided their formation of 
antifragility as the entrepreneurs were able to handle issues better than they did in the past. 
Interestingly, some of the respondents recognised that to further increase their antifragility as 
an entrepreneurial competence, forming mentoring networks was critical. George noted that a 
mentoring group has been a “trick within business” and in a related extract Denise narrated: 
they were mentors and I think they have…helped me pick on some stuff … it is a team 
effort (Denise) 
 
It is apparent that seeking professional help in the form of a mentoring from an advisory board 
was an approach that aided the participants to continually succeed in business. Denise’s 
emphasis on utilising one’s team showcases her value in social capital, as well as George who 
spoke of how his ventures post-bankruptcy always involved another business partner as 
opposed to him solely owning the firm. Furthermore, Denise stated how such support allowed 
her to develop their entrepreneurial competence of antifragility as she discussed that her 
mentoring led her to acknowledge how to prevent issues that could have negative consequences 
as well as deal with any stigma. Hence, these findings demonstrate that mentoring schemes can 
help once bankrupted business owners to ask for help to reduce feelings of isolation, which has 
not been reported by prior studies (Politis and Gabrielsson, 2009; Cope, 2011).  
It can be inferred that making use of social support is an integral organising practice that allows 
the firm owners to facilitate the development of antifragility in a range of ways. The 
participants’ networks have enabled them to grow their capacity to succeed, cope and learn 
effectively, as well as to continue to be optimistic, prior and during their entrepreneurial restart. 
6.2.2 Engaging the ‘movers’, the ‘shakers’, and the gatekeepers 
Another factor that enabled the firm owner’s development of antifragility stemmed from 
understanding how they could iteratively foster relationships with their stakeholders, deemed 
as the “movers, shakers and gatekeepers”. There were three common trends for how the 
entrepreneurs made use of such social capital. First, the enterprise founders actively 
communicated with their stakeholders. For instance, they declared that they were “more open 
and honest with customers and suppliers” (Damien) and involved these stakeholders into 




techniques enabled the venture founders to highlight the strengths in their business, retain the 
support that they had been given by their suppliers and in turn compensate for any weaknesses. 
These findings show that irrespective of the issues stakeholders may have with enterprise 
owners, specifically suppliers, it does not impede the formation of another venture, which is 
consistent with earlier work (Sutton and Calahan, 1987; Shepherd and Haynie, 2011).  
Second, the participants emphasised that they needed to build relationships with others to form 
large groups of networks of gatekeepers, movers, and shakers. The entrepreneurs commonly 
asserted that they were conscious of not having “all the answers” (Dilan) and thus networking 
carried great importance. Jay and Dilan spoke of this in detail: 
try and meet different people and find different avenues to progress further without 
looking at your previous business (Jay) 
the way I build relationships and build trust in people is how opportunities have been 
created, so, I guess then a cause and effect there (.) the network around me has 
constantly grown (Dilan) 
 
Such approaches to speaking to others, often forging connections with new contacts, and 
building these relationships, have allowed the enterprise owners to progress by being able to 
continually learn and enhance their business operations. 
The last identified trend for a few informants was how they continually aimed to create their 
“own niche in the market” via continuously researching their consumer base as highlighted in 
the below narrative by Sam: 
you also need to gage and engage yourself into critical research into your customers (.) 
their needs, their demands, their attributes, their financial strength, and their financial 
position and, their market position, and if you can support them, then they will support 
you (Sam) 
 
It is apparent that by continually developing one’s knowledge about their customers that Sam 
has highlighted how he has enhanced his business offering. This is an organising practice which 
represents how Sam, like other respondents, has been able to utilise ways of working with 
stakeholders to grow his firm. Collectively, the three approaches have allowed the business 
founders to increase their entrepreneurial competence of antifragility by forging deeper insights 






6.2.3 Navigating the bankruptcy maze and mines 
Despite, recognising that how the policies worked “was quite difficult at times” (Joseph), some 
of the firm owners claimed that they were able to deal with the short-term implications of the 
policies, by putting them into perspective. For instance, Carl claimed: 
by and large, I do not feel strongly about it, er, I think at the moment they are reasonable, 
if they were a lot laxer, I do not think that will be safe for investors, or creditors and if 
they were harsher, I do not think that would be fair for entrepreneurs (Carl) 
 
Other interviewees also agreed stating that the UK bankruptcy laws are “very, very good…in 
other countries it is harder” (George). Accounts like this show that although there are issues 
with the UK bankruptcy laws, overall, the entrepreneurs can deal with issues associated with 
the law by forming an understanding of a few short-term benefits from the system, thus aiding 
the ability to utilise one’s antifragility. Besides this, such statements corroborate with the 
literature which has formed the link between bankruptcy polies and entrepreneurial restart 
(Armour and Cunningham, 2008; Lee et al., 2010; Lee, et al, 2011; Damaraju et al., 2020). 
Specifically, that a forgiving bankruptcy can lead to high rates of firm ownership (Cumming, 
2012; Primo and Green, 2012; Eberhart et al., 2017; Estrin et al., 2012; Ayotte, 2007).  
The second theme has uncovered that the organising practices of continually using social 
networks and working effectively with stakeholders enabled most firm owners to harness their 
social capital as well as boost their self-efficacy and ability to emotionally regulate. Ultimately, 
such practices enabled the respondents to increase their entrepreneurial antifragility during 
their recovery to their entrepreneurial restart, which extends the studies that show the positives 
of using social capital post firm failure (Choi and Shepherd, 2004; Bosma et al., 2004). The 
third, organising practice, entailing working with, and understanding bankruptcy policies 
benefited a smaller number of firm owner’s antifragility in the short-term. 
6.3 Awareness of ‘Longer-Term’ Issues Associated with Bankruptcy  
The last theme taps into the organising practices that impeded the entrepreneur’s development 
of antifragility. Within this theme, two key trends were identified: i) managing the fallout from 
bankruptcy rules and ii) attaining financial credit. 
6.3.1 Managing the long-lasting fallout from bankruptcy rules 
Irrespective of identifying the short-term positives of the UK based bankruptcy policies, a few 




Informants highlighted issues with a lack of clarity about bankruptcy policies which can 
influence both failed and novice entrepreneurs’ experiences: 
I remembered when opening a company and putting myself as a director and I didn’t 
remember anything…about trading insolvency until such a time I was faced with that, 
and I remember that why the hell not, like, a test…or guidance or telling people who 
was going to be a director, do you realise this cos…I was fortunate to cope with it…but 
what about those who are not and…a lot of bad things could happen (Marios) 
 
It is clear from Mario’s narrative that even though he has been able to decode how the UK 
bankruptcy law works, he voices his concerns for others who may not be able to, and in doing 
so, demonstrating the severity of business failure. He further discusses the changes required to 
the law to provide further guidance for entrepreneurs to truly recognise their responsibilities, 
as well as what is required to be done if the firm is terminated and the business owner needs to 
declare their bankruptcy. Developing a similar argument, Sam discussed the issues that both 
bankrupt and novice enterprise founders can face, highlighting that “a regulatory body will 
definitely have an impact towards guidance and ensuring that…businesses who are given 
licences…under the regulator do succeed”. It is apparent that Sam feels that the significance of 
further government regulation can help to give failed and non-failed entrepreneurs the best 
possible start.  
In the same vein, Jake explained that the “bankruptcy law is stuck in the stone age and…there 
should be more consideration that, actually (.) the debt can actually be paid off and it does not 
have to… go through that process and government money”. Jay similarly noted how the 
government does not “take on board that this guy has been in business since he was twenty-
five, has years of experience”. Both Jake and Jay recognise the issues faced with working with 
bankruptcy policies which do not consider an individual’s financial history in enough detail. 
Each emphasise the changes required which could help venture founders financially with their 
asset management. Aside from the legal implications from the bankruptcy, the interviewees 
faced issues with administrators. 
Beyond this, Jake, like a few other participants also highlighted the negative implications that 
the UK bankruptcy charges can have: 
I can imagine for some people it is, er, it is a never-ending hole of despair and without 
having anyone to look after you and, you know, when you go bankrupt and bust no one 
goes and probably says you should go and see a shrink, but you know it is not far off 





Other respondents have spoken about the difficulties with managing the social stigma from 
creditors due to the charges. Marios declared that such problems were difficult, stating “it was 
hard, you know, what had happened” in reference to his bankruptcy as well as the ability to 
manage the business failure stigmatisation he endured. Whilst the participants identified 
methods to manage, it is evident that the stigmatisation and handling stakeholder reactions 
could impact their entrepreneurial re-entry. Specifically, higher rates of stigmatisation lead to 
a higher likelihood of punishment for the firm owner, which could influence their ability to 
bounce back (Simmons et al., 2014; Kirkwood, 2007; Shepherd and Haynie, 2011). It appears 
that the lack of professional support available for bankrupted firm owners can impede their 
comeback as they may struggle to cope with the failure due to the severe nature of losing their 
enterprise. 
It can be summarised even though the firm owners were able to overcome issues with managing 
certain stakeholders and work with the UK bankruptcy policies, the impact of the charges were 
challenging. The challenges specifically involved dealing with negative stakeholder reactions, 
grasping the long-term impact of governmental policies and processes as well as not obtaining 
enough governmental support to aid one’s wellbeing. In essence, it is evident that such issues 
could hamper an entrepreneur’s development of self-belief and antifragility. 
6.3.2 Re-mobilizing threshold resources 
Attaining financial backing has been noted as a significant factor in allowing a formerly failed 
business owner to restart a firm (Metzger, 2008) especially whilst dealing with the adverse 
financial impacts of bankruptcy (Metzger 2006; Mathur 2013; Cusin and Maymo 2016). A 
final trend noted for some of the informants was that they struggled with accruing enough 
equity for their next firm following their bankruptcy, deeming the experiences a “punishment” 
and their charges as everlasting “black dots” (Dilan). For instance, Stefan remarked “As the 
bankruptcy remains on your credit file for many years (.) this meant that getting credit cards, 
mortgages etc was impossible (.) I found that this was very difficult and meant that I was 
restricted in doing things” and Jake, similarly claimed that the financial situation was 
“constraining”. Other respondents also voiced their concerns with the implications of managing 
finances following their possession of credit, such as Joseph who noted that “lenders need to 
calm down… particularly the interest rate is very high”. Moreover, Jay raised the issues he had 




I find the government should be helping more for businessmen and, you know, others 
who have helped pay taxes… even though there are schemes (.) it is all about finances 
at the end of the day (Jay) 
 
From Jay’s excerpt, it is evident that he realises the government did not help him with dealing 
with his bankruptcy and the development of his new venture. This lack of governmental 
assistance could endanger the ability of entrepreneurs to bounce back and learn from venture 
failure, due to the deficiency of social support to aid the formation of antifragility.  
In sum, the narratives signify that the financial issues which the venture founders encounter 
post-failure can hinder their development of antifragility as they struggle to set-up a subsequent 
firm. Indeed, these findings extend literature by showing that despite encountering financial 
issues, the firm owners do often eventually obtain equity following bankruptcy (Cusin and 
Mayo, 2016). Irrespective of this indicating that investors show compassion towards 
bankrupted venture founders, entrepreneurs may still struggle in the process of obtaining of 
equity (Cope, et al., 2004; Nahata, 2019; Mathur, 2013). 
Overall, the third theme has highlighted a smaller number of organising practices that hamper 
the development of the respondent’s antifragility. These practices can be summarised as issues 
linked with the ramifications of bankruptcy charges and the ability to obtain financial credit to 
run an enterprise.  
6.4 A Grounded Process Model of Developing and Exploiting Antifragility  
Antifragility has been uncovered to serve as an entrepreneurial competence for one to bounce 
back from bankruptcy. The stories from the formerly bankrupt entrepreneurs have provided 
insights into the steps involved in the development and exploitation of the competence. In this 
section, the analysis is extended by presenting a grounded model that highlights the three 
phases involved in restarting an enterprise post-bankruptcy which is formed from a synthesis 
of the data analysis findings.  
As noted in Chapter 2, following our review of research, in combination with the primary 
concept of antifragility (Taleb, 2012), secondary aspects of the social cognitive theory 
(Bandura, 1977) and attribution theory (Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1992) were deemed an 
appropriate theoretical gaze. The grounded model is therefore, offered in the context of how 
entrepreneurs can overcome the severe financial outcomes, prolonged social stigma from 
numerous stakeholders and harmful behavioural implications that stem from the bankruptcy 




model can illustrate how venture founders can navigate through such social contexts to bounce 
back as well as highlight key factors that facilitate and endanger the process. Hence, the model 
expands existing knowledge on the behaviours associated with re-starting a venture post-
bankruptcy and develops comparable frameworks on the topic (Cotterill, 2012). By doing so, 
the theoretical model can aid academics’ evaluation of the firm owners’ experiences of starting-
up a venture following a collapse that ended in bankruptcy and prompt further works on the 
matter. Furthermore, the model has applicability for both venture owners who have obtained 
bankruptcy charges or failed without such charges. Acting as a guide, the model can also 
support all types of failed entrepreneurs to cope and learn from their prior firm demise. This 
can increase new venture development and subsequently, boost the economy. 
























1) Recovery  
 








































Enabling Organising Practices: 
i) Engaging in positive emotional practices (playing hope, driving through 
the maze, demonstrating civil courage, and developing an internal 
attributional style, as well as dropping emotional baggage) 
ii) Tapping into external networks and social support  





Impeding Organising Practices: 
i) Managing the fallout from bankruptcy rules 


























Looking at Figure 8, the first stage is characterised as the recovery step. This involves three 
phases: i) tapping into the antecedents of the failure and bankruptcy, ii) harnessing experiences 
by embracing their fragility, and iii) engaging in emotional and practical coping strategies. 
Collectively, all three phases enable one to form an internal attributional style (Heider, 1958), 
increase their self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977) and allow the entrepreneurs to gain more than they 
lost, thus forming antifragility as an entrepreneurial competence. The second stage involves 
undertaking a series of steps to gradually learn prior, during and after the entrepreneur’s 
recovery, whereby the firm owners eventually utilise their antifragility. They do so by forming 
the capacity to identify opportunities for subsequent ventures as well as developing the ability 
to seize such opportunities and restart effectively. Following this, the venture founders exploit 
the antifragility during the third stage as typified by how they manage their current enterprise, 
where they reap long-term benefits from their previous business demise. Such benefits entail 
engaging in continual learning, which enables the venture founders to form strategic foresight 
to pre-empt another enterprise collapse and streamline their business operations to leverage 
market conditions to their advantage. As discussed in this chapter, there are several enabling 
practices that prompt the development of antifragility and a few impeding organising practices 
that hinder the formation of antifragility, which are depicted on both ends of the model. It is 
noteworthy that the participant’s ethnicity, age, years in business and nature of their firm did 
have a slight influence on one’s development of antifragility. Such factors did so by shaping 
the firm owner’s attributional style, influencing the amount of stigma associated with the 
bankruptcy coupled with the ability to cope and learn from the venture demise. Nevertheless, 
the influence of such proxies is marginal, which is counterintuitive given prior findings on the 
matter (see Headd, 2003; Mendy and Hack-Polay, 2018; Hack-Polay et al., 2020; Baù et al., 
2017; Lin and Wang, 2019) and therefore may perhaps warrant further investigation. The key 
findings that underpin the framework are summarised below: 
6.4.1. Identifying and developing entrepreneurial antifragility 
The first aggregate dimension uncovered that the business owners recover from their 
bankruptcy through a series of three inter-connected phrases. First, the informants often 
underwent an attribution search by determining the main antecedent of their business failure 
which involves shifting their core assumptions that drive their behaviours (Cope, 2011). In 
doing so, the participants believed that they were the main instigators for their firm collapse 
and bankruptcy from their initial thoughts that a combination of external and internal factors 




respondents fully embraced their feelings of fragility (Mantere, Aula et al., 2013; Franco and 
Hase, 2010; Rogoff et al., 2004; Zacharkis et al., 1999). In this regard, the participants exhibited 
an internal locus of control (Rotter, 1966; Weiner, 1992). This helped increase their self-
efficacy which crucially assisted their ability to handle ‘black swan’ events and the undesirable 
impact of bankruptcy (Taleb, 2007).  
Second, the respondents experienced a mixture of experiences, which was dependent on their 
perceptions. Importantly, the impact of a business demise and bankruptcy were inferred as akin 
to a black swan event (Taleb, 2012; Siegel, 2010). Importantly, the participants were able to 
utilise the negative effects of their bankruptcy and failure as part of their development through 
a range of appraisals (Taleb, 2012; Jenkins et al., 2010; Jenkins et al., 2014). 
Third, the respondents underwent a range of sense-making, reflective, emotional, and practical 
related coping mechanisms during a recovery period (Singh et al., 2007; Cope, 2011; Shepherd, 
2003; Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2018). Sense-making has been identified as a mechanism that 
usually precedes reflection (Cope, 2011; Mandl et al., 2016) and emotional regulation (Singh, 
Corner and Pavlovich, 2007; Shepherd, 2003). Importantly, the mechanisms were undertaken 
simultaneously, corroborating prior works that show how these mechanisms occur in a similar 
sequence (Shepherd and Cardon, 2009; Amankwah-Amoah, Boss and Antwi-Agyei, 2018), 
given their interrelated nature (Heinze, 2013). Interestingly, prolonged periods of self-
reflection were not found to hinder failure recovery which has been identified previously 
(Cope, 2011). The findings also contend that resilience can influence coping behaviours 
(Corner et al., 2017). Yet, most firm owners engage in emotional coping mechanisms which 
lead to a deep personal re-examination as well as the development of self-efficacy, an internal 
attributional style alongside and antifragile state of functioning in the form of an 
‘entrepreneurial competency’ whilst reducing their grief. Besides this, the results within this 
sub-theme highlighted that the business owners made use of impression management 
techniques; they often embraced their failure as highlighted by other scholars (Kibler et al., 
2017; Walsh 2017; Kibler et al., 2020). By doing so, the participants were able to further 
develop an internal attributional style, self-efficacy and at a certain point use their failure as a 
strength (Taleb, 2012). Hence, the respondents displayed elements of post-traumatic growth 
disorder which has not been reported previously (Calhoun and Tedeschi, 2014).  
Taken as a whole, this aggregate dimension has helped to form a more concrete understanding 




deal with their venture demise and undertake coping mechanisms to build antifragility. 
Thereby, this answers the research question ‘how does entrepreneurial antifragility come to be 
identified and labelled in discourse on restarting a business venture after bankruptcy?’. 
6.4.2 Use of entrepreneurial antifragility 
The second aggregate dimension was concerned with ‘when’ and ‘how’ entrepreneurial 
antifragility could evoke the recognition of opportunities for enterprise creation following 
bankruptcy. The process module highlights the steps in the process, demonstrating the learning 
trajectories that the participants undertook and their outcomes. Three sub-themes exist within 
this aggregate dimension. First, the participants were found to undergo a series of gradual 
learning phases (Mckenzie, 2008), prior to, during, and after their recovery period from their 
venture demise which involved experiential learning processes (Politis, 2005). Besides this, it 
has been found that by increasingly coming to terms with their failure, the entrepreneurs were 
able to gradually learn, extending work on the matter (He et al., 2018). Through their 
experiential learnings, the participants managed to accrue knowledge on how to manage 
another enterprise in terms of their finances and company organisation. Furthermore, the 
informants demonstrated how they had converted their experiences to continually develop an 
internal attributional style used to restart a firm (Yamakawa and Cardon, 2015). Thereby, the 
participants were able to exploit their antifragility as an entrepreneurial competence to ensure 
that they were able to profit from their losses incurred. Beyond this type of learning the 
entrepreneurs simultaneously engaged in reflexive learning during and after their recovery 
period (Minniti and Bygrave, 2001; Pretorius and Le Roux, 2011; Frota Vasconcellos Dias and 
Marten, 2019). This learning led to prospective sensemaking (Mackay, 2010; Sarpong et al., 
2013) and further “higher-order” learning in the form of identifying “ways” that they should 
act as an effective business owner. Importantly, through a combination of both the 
entrepreneur’s gradual experiential and reflexive learnings they experienced deeper epiphany 
like moments of realisation. The second sub-theme within the second aggregate dimension 
uncovers how antifragility as an organising competence allows the firm owners to recognise, 
plan and develop new enterprises as well as identify the suitable timing to launch their 
consecutive ventures. Through undertaking their learning during and after their recovery 
period, the participants discussed that their antifragility stemming from their learning enabled 
them to form knowledge about their ability to recognise the opportunity to restart an enterprise. 
Notably, the participants did take a different amount of time to restart their companies. The 




higher-order learning (Cope, 2011) throughout the formation of their subsequent firm by 
making use of their antifragility.  
Overall, the second aggregate dimension has demonstrated that venture founders consistently 
make use of their antifragility to learn, build strategic foresight and take risks. In doing so, the 
entrepreneurs have been able to reinforce their internal attributional style, identify and grow 
their ventures and obtain further antifragility. Hence, the aggregate dimension has answered 
the second research question: ‘when and how does entrepreneurial antifragility lead to the 
identification of opportunities for new business start-up post-bankruptcy?’.  
6.4.3 Influence of organising practices and antifragility  
The third aggregate dimension focussed on the range of practices which enabled and impeded 
the formation of antifragility as an entrepreneurial competency. Within this aggregate 
dimension are three sub-themes. The first sub-theme shed new light on to the five emotional 
practices that the venture founders undertook which primarily helped them to rebound to 
venture again. The second sub-theme within the third aggregate dimension provided insights 
into the other practices firm owners engaged in to effectively rebound to venture again. The 
participants often reported that they made use of their social support, which consequently, aided 
their ability to cope, learn and develop their optimism as well as antifragility. Besides this, the 
informants identified three ways they could develop relationships with their stakeholders, 
known as the “movers, shakers and gatekeepers”. The approaches the business owners 
undertook entailed: i) engaging frequently with stakeholders; ii) forming large networks of 
gatekeepers, movers, and shakers; and iii) building knowledge about their consumer base. By 
undertaking the three approaches, the firm owners not only increased their entrepreneurial 
competence of antifragility but understood how they could form a more fruitful venture. This 
finding also suggests that despite problems with stakeholders, this does not hinder the progress 
of a subsequent firm; therefore, complimenting existing literature (Sutton and Calahan, 1987; 
Shepherd and Haynie, 2011). Some of the sample of participants also forged an understanding 
of the short-term benefits of their bankruptcy charges in the UK which aided their ability to 
exploit their antifragility.  
The last sub-theme that forms the third aggregate dimension provided knowledge on how firm 
owners combat policy, stakeholder and financial related issues linked to their bankruptcy which 
can hinder the formation of antifragility needed to bounce back. A common trend identified 




overcome, entailing clarity around governmental policies and professional support available. 
In sum, the third aggregate dimension has offered a nuanced view about the supporting and 
impeding practices which guide a business owner’s development of antifragility. In this way, 
this aggregate dimension has answered the third research question: ‘what are the organising 
practices that enable (or impede) the entrepreneurial antifragility required to restart a business 
venture after bankruptcy?’. 
6.5 Chapter Summary and conclusion 
This chapter aimed to understand the enabling and impeded practices that influence the 
development of the entrepreneurial competence, antifragility, which helps one to restart a 
venture post-bankruptcy. Three broad themes of organising practices emerged.  
First, the entrepreneurs engaged positive emotional practices, by making use of their hope and 
navigating through the maze, which entails being highly optimistic coupled with displaying an 
abundance of resilience coupled with passion. The firm founders recognised that such practices 
built their strengths, helped them to overcome their fears as well as obstacles and ultimately 
continually aided their coping and learning behaviours. Furthermore, other positive emotional 
practices, involved making use of their civil courage, forming an internal attributional style as 
well as offloading emotional baggage during and after the recovery period. These practices 
prompted the venture founders to take heroic steps to restart whilst building on their 
confidence, self-efficacy, and ability to undertake appropriate business decisions as well as 
recognise that they can learn frequently from their mistakes. In essence, the firm owners’ 
behaviours stemming from their positive emotional practices (Scheer, 2012) led to the 
formation and exploitation of their antifragility (Taleb, 2012).  
Second, another organising practice which the entrepreneurs undertook was utilising their 
social networks and identifying methods of working effectively with certain stakeholders. 
These practices enabled them to utilise their social capital, as well as cope and learn effectively, 
coupled with reducing the culture of perceiving failure as a secret which can be harmful for 
entrepreneurs. The practices also allowed the participants to continually remain optimistic, 
develop their self-efficacy and insights into how they can make profit as well as avoid mistakes; 
thus, nurturing their antifragility. Third, the last organising practice, entailed the processes in 
which the entrepreneurs formed an understanding of how they could deal with bankruptcy 
policies to restart at an appropriate time and alleviate financial concerns, which also boosted 




Third, the last theme of organising practices was found to hinder the formation of antifragility 
in two ways. First, the implications of the bankruptcy laws caused issues. The firm owners 
stated that there was a lack of clarity around the bankruptcy laws as well as not enough 
professional support to help them navigate through the effects of their financial situation to aid 
their wellbeing. A minority of the firm owners also shared how they experienced difficulties 
with managing certain stakeholders when they restarted a venture, jeopardising their self-belief. 
Second, some of the venture owners struggled with obtaining equity to run their consecutive 
organisations.  
In summary, this chapter conceptualises the organising practices that enable and impede the 
development of antifragility. Collectively, the two themes of supporting practices help the 
entrepreneurs to develop antifragility in various ways, by specifically developing their capacity 
to cope, learn and form an internal attributional style. In tandem, the impeding practices which 
entail a lack of professional support, difficulty in managing fallouts with certain stakeholders 
and problems gaining finances can endanger the development of antifragility and the business 
owner’s ability to restart effectively. Whilst the findings have corroborated several results from 
prior studies, they have also extended findings on the research about failed business owners’ 
emotional functioning and learning. To end, the findings have revealed inconsistencies with a 
few areas of research, which call for further investigation. This includes looking at: i) 
overconfidence that entrepreneurs experience, ii) adopting an external attributional style as a 
coping mechanism, and iii) the effectiveness of current entrepreneurial failure support 
programmes and whether these schemes prompt firm owners to ask for assistance. 
The next chapter aims to provide an explanation of the contributions to knowledge and practice 







Through the in-depth analysis of the stories of firm owners who have bounced back from 
bankruptcy, three proposed research questions were investigated: 1) ‘How does entrepreneurial 
antifragility come to be identified and labelled in discourse on restarting a business venture 
after bankruptcy?’; 2) ‘When and how does entrepreneurial antifragility lead to the 
identification of opportunities for new business start-up post-bankruptcy?’; 3) ‘What are the 
organising practices that enable (or impede) the entrepreneurial antifragility required to restart 
a business venture after bankruptcy?’. By synthesising the findings from the three research 
questions, this chapter aims to uncover the range of insights identified as well as the research 
contributions, limitations, and recommendations for future works in relation to entrepreneurial 
failure current literature. The chapter commences with an exploration of the theoretical, 
empirical, and practical contributions of this research. Next, the study’s limitations and an 
agenda for future suggestions for research will be explicated.  
7.1 Contribution to Knowledge and Theory 
Given the significance of firm ownership for the economy, research on entrepreneurial re-entry 
post-failure is crucial (Korsgaard et al., 2020). In a world characterised with uncertainty, the 
importance of the matter is increasingly valuable, especially given the deeply traumatic nature 
of failures and bankruptcies (Ucbasaran et al., 2013; Manolova et al., 2020; Cowling et al., 
2020). Despite valuable research attempts which examine how business owners cope, learn, 
and restart post-failure and bankruptcy, it is evident that the extant works are inconsistent, 
fragmented and, crucially, require theoretical development. The thesis therefore aimed to 
provide an integrated approach to analyse the stories of once bankrupt entrepreneurs to enhance 
the current theoretical understanding on the subject. By applying antifragility as an overarching 
theoretical lens to examine the accounts of firm owners who managed to restart a venture post-
bankruptcy and after reaching a point of saturation, the research findings were divided into 
three overall aggregate dimensions that correspondingly answer each research question. Each 
aggregate dimension provides a unique contribution. A grounded theoretical process model 
that explains how a firm owner can bounce back from bankruptcy through the development of 




The use of antifragility primarily alongside aspects from the social cognitive theory (Bandura, 
1977) and the attribution theory (Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1992) have offered an alternative 
theoretical lens to view venture failure. Furthermore, the fresh theoretical gaze has led to 
suggestions for theory development in the domain of entrepreneurial failure, new venture 
creation, entrepreneurial learning, and beyond.  
7.1.1 The causes and recovery of entrepreneurial venture failure and bankruptcy 
The first aggregate dimension provides three conceptual implications. First, the findings 
deepen the current understanding of how one attributes blame towards their firm failure and 
bankruptcy. The results provide an explanation about the complex processes regarding how 
business owners develop an internal attributional style, the value of displaying this attributional 
style, and the consequences this has on their self-efficacy, emotional functioning, learning and 
formation of antifragility (Walsh and Cunningham 2017; Corner et al., 2017; Yamakawa et al., 
2015). Thus, the findings help to develop the concepts of attribution and antifragility by 
providing insights into the linkages between them in the context of restarting a venture post-
bankruptcy. In relation to existing literature, the findings partially agree with work that venture 
founders do acknowledge the influence of external factors which led to their failures such as, 
market forces (Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2019). Yet, these results importantly demonstrate that 
venture founders promptly undergo the process of unlearning their behaviours which caused 
their bankruptcy. Hence, these findings increase the current understanding on the antecedents 
of entrepreneurial venture failure by showing how previously bankrupted entrepreneurs 
recognise the importance of an internal attributional style following their company 
discontinuation. 
Second, the results compliment work that depicts the multifaceted effects of a business failure 
(Ucabsaran et al, 2013; Jenkins et al., 2014; Singh et al., 2015). Specifically, the participants 
reported the adverse financial implications of their failure and bankruptcy (Van Kesteren et al., 
2017; Heinze 2013). They also often made claims that due to their bankruptcy, they self-
stigmatised (Kirkwood, 2007; Shepherd and Haynie; 2011) as well as incurred social stigma 
(Cardon et al., 2011; Gratzer, 2001), and damaged relationships with stakeholders to family 
members severely (Cope, 2011; Erfat, 2006; Sutton and Calahan, 1987) online and face-to-face 
(Wakkee et al., 2014; Fisch and Block, 2020). The respondents also spoke of how the stigma 
occurred prior, during and after the bankruptcy charges (Signh et al., 2015; Jenkins et al., 2014). 




some even suffering from disorders and conditions which is consistent with prior studies (Singh 
et al; 2007; Shepherd, 2003). Yet, it is worthy to note that despite these negative consequences 
of failure, the participants did acknowledge positive reactions to their failure and the relief felt 
following their bankruptcy charges. This highlights the intricacies of the participants’ 
experiences (Sarasvathy et al., 2013; Singh et al., 2015; Jenkins et al., 2014). Notably, it has 
been identified that there is a link between the cultural attitudes of certain enterprise owners 
and the stigma experienced from their bankruptcy (Gratzer, 2001; Cardon, Stevens and Potter, 
2011; Erfat, 2006). No evidence was found that a business owners’ level of education (Mayr 
and Mitter 2014; Espinoza-Benavides and Diaz, 2019; Amaral et al., 2011) and gender, as well 
as sexuality (Shepherd and Patzelt 2015; Simmons et al., 2019), influenced their failure 
experience. 
One can summarise that the findings from the experiences of bankrupted business owners helps 
to form knowledge on the darker, commonly more secretive, aspect of the experiences 
associated with business failure (Ucbasaran et al., 2013; Shepherd and Patzelt, 2017). The 
findings precisely explain how entrepreneurs manage to move past a fragile state of functioning 
to embrace their negative physiological, financial, and social experiences through appraising 
them. In this regard, after a certain point, the business owners were able to begin to cope with 
their business venture. Hence, this illustrates the importance of a business owners’ perception 
of their failure which impacted their sequential reactions towards it. This research has increased 
the value of one’s use of appraisal since it has been found to form part of dealing with the 
complex bankruptcy process (Jenkins et al., 2014).  
Third, the results develop existing cognitive and emotional theoretical knowledge on how firm 
owners’ recover from failure. Specifically, the results extend prior literature which identified 
the importance of emotional coping mechanisms since these mechanisms help participants to 
build antifragility as an entrepreneurial competence, exhibit aspects of post-traumatic disorder 
and eventually restart a business (Byrne and Shepherd, 2015; He et al., 2018; Cusin, and 
Maymo, 2016). Moreover, the findings demonstrated how sense-making encourages the 
formation of an internal attributional style (Cardon et al., 2011). These findings are important 
given that this research area requires theoretical development (Shepherd and Patzelt, 2017).  
In sum, the findings from this aggregate dimension have not only advanced the state of the 




causes with an alternative theoretical lens through which the antecedents of firm failure can be 
explored. 
7.1.2 The learnings from venture failure and bankruptcy 
Given that the participants gradually converted their experiences throughout their recovery-
period to attain higher-order learnings and build their internal attributional style as well as 
eventually utilise their antifragility to restart, the conceptual understanding of the experiential 
learning theory in the context of entrepreneurial failure has been developed. Specifically, the 
findings compliment that experiential learning can help guide firm owners in their subsequent 
ventures (Ucbasaran et al., 2006; Ucbasaran et al., 2010; Hayward et al., 2010) and emphasise 
the importance of gradual learning from failure (Cope, 2011; Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2018). 
Additionally, an important finding was that the respondents often engaged in reflexive learning 
which prompted prospective sense-making and higher-order learnings; thus, building upon 
current conceptual understanding on reflexive learning (Minniti and Bygrave 2001; Pretorius 
and Le Roux 2011; Frota Vasconcellos Dias and Marten 2019). Such findings extend Byrne 
and Shepherd’s (2015) results, by emphasising the importance of sense-making as a failure 
learning mechanism and providing further details on the learning process post-bankruptcy. 
Both methods enabled the entrepreneurs to develop a deep understanding of how they could 
exploit their antifragility to launch another firm. Collectively, the findings on how firm owners 
learn advance work by Singh et al (2015), as the respondents discussed how such moments 
sparked long-term learnings on how they can build their business relationships, develop their 
business outlook and internal attributional style as well as form the ability to restart and 
continuously develop antifragility (Taleb, 2012; Heider, 1958). Moreover, the participant’s 
learnings prior to their recovery period were shorter-term and “lower-order”. Yet during and 
after their recovery period they formed more longer-term “higher-order” learnings; thus, 
supporting work on how firm owners cope with their business collapse and their development 
of knowledge (Shepherd, 2003; Cope, 2011). 
Besides this, the findings from this theme oppose prior results which have identified that 
venture founders do not always learn from their failure due to the grief encountered (Cope, 
2011, Shepherd, 2003). Instead, the findings corroborate previous results which have identified 
that firm failure encourages entrepreneurial re-entry (Politis, 2005; Ucbasaran, Westhead, et 
al., 2003). Specifically, the results have uncovered that entrepreneurs’ need for leadership was 




scholars. This can be perceived as an example of the business owner’s antifragility as an 
entrepreneurial competence and high self-efficacy. Hence, the findings from this theme overall 
demonstrate the long-term positives of failure (Jenkins et al., 2014) and reinforce that 
bankrupted business owners can utilise their experiential and reflexive learning in their attempt 
to bounce back (Huovinen and Tihuala, 2008; Boso et al., 2019).  
Importantly, the results also indicate that the antifragility formed by the business owners guided 
them to identify and develop an innovative opportunity for their sequential venture as well as 
reap other benefits which extend the corpus of works on the subject (Ucbasaran et al., 2006; 
Ucbasaran et al., 2009). The other benefits that the business owners reported are consistent 
with previous works. For example, the entrepreneurs spoke of how they regularly developed 
their business relationships (Polistis, 2008; Masuda, 2008; Atsan, 2016), enhanced their 
approach to running their organisation (Minello, 2014), and became more financially aware 
(Zhang, 2011; Paik, 2014; Nahata, 2019). The participants further spoke of how they were able 
to re-use the business knowledge to spark innovation within their current firm (Rerup, 2005; 
Kuuluvainen, 2010; Wakkee and Moser, 2016; Lin et al., 2019; Yu et al., 2014) and mentor 
others (Singh et al., 2015) whilst actively displaying an internal attributional style (Heider, 
1958). Moreover, the informants were found to pivot and made use of their antifragility to form 
internal firm related and external environmental strategic foresight. In this regard, these 
findings provide further clarity on how enterprise owners continue to learn after restarting a 
business and build on research on the matter (Boso et al., 2019; Lin et al., 2019; Nahata, 2019). 
The concept of antifragility has also helped to form linkages between existing learning concepts 
(Taleb, 2012). Besides this, cultural factors were also found to impact one’s venture restart, 
consistent with prior studies (Heinze 2013; Wakkee et al., 2014; Wisenfeld et al., 2008).  
Moreover, it was found that entrepreneurs are able to continually seek ways to grow their 
entrepreneurial competency with an internal attributional style. A specific finding that has not 
been conveyed previously was that the entrepreneurs discussed how they continually take 
strategic risks, whilst minimising the effect of certain risks by using the barbell strategy which 
involves maximising the benefits from smaller risks whilst avoiding specific higher risks with 
starker outcomes (Taleb, 2012). This precise result reinforced the value of the barbell strategy 
concept (Taleb, 2012). Furthermore, this finding indicates that the business owners’ learning 
is not always short-term, contrary to prior literature (Parker, 2013; Baumard and Starbuck, 
2005) and extends previous works on the exact long-term impact of learning (Choi and 




entrepreneurs deal with uncertainty better (Politis, 2008; Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright 
2009). Subsequently, the results support and advance works that highlight how previous 
business failure can help one manage subsequent firms (Zacharakis et al., 1999; Politis and 
Gabrielsson, 2009) and aid the performance of consecutives of businesses (Headd, 2003; Kato 
and Honjo, 2015; Huovinen and Tihula, 2008). Interestingly, age could be a factor that 
influences the business owners long-term learning behaviours such as, their ability to take risks, 
which builds on existing works that emphasise the significance of age in relation to restarting 
a venture post-failure (Dias and Teixera, 2017; Baù et al., 2017; Lin and Wang 2019).  
Lastly, another important finding from this aggregate dimension was that the business owners 
spoke of how they could make use of the antifragility to succeed in their current venture, despite 
recognising the limits to their abilities. This suggests that once failed venture owners are not 
likely to fail again and face financial issues, unlike prior findings which show that they may 
(see Van Kesteren et al., 2017; Metzger 2006; Gottschalk et al., 2017; Wakkee and Mosser, 
2016; Toft-Kehler et al., 2014). The entrepreneurs personified and stressed how they became 
stronger by leveraging their business failure experience. This is a unique finding as no other 
study has shown how failed firm founders use metaphoric rhetoric to describe themselves. 
Thus, this has built upon current entrepreneurial failure literature by shedding further light on 
the discourse that formerly bankrupt business owners use. 
Overall, this aggregate dimension has advanced the entrepreneurial failure literature by 
identifying the relationships between a firm owners’ recovery, their formation of antifragility 
and the gradual long-term learning that is used to recognise as well as develop innovative 
business opportunities.  
7.1.3 Influence of organising practices 
The results from the third aggregate dimension have also conceptually developed the view that 
emotions are organising practices (Scheer, 2012). The findings specifically highlight the 
various aspects of how emotional practices enabled the firm owners to restart post-bankruptcy 
by building the competency of antifragility in five ways. First, the business owners spoke about 
how they played hope, in which they discussed how their faith prompted them to realise their 
strengths. The spoke of how their spiritual values helped them to overcome the fear of failing 
again. Thus, this extends prior findings on the importance of spiritual faith in relation to dealing 
with business failure by providing insights into how one’s faith really guides their capability 




exuberance that entailed their high levels of optimism, resilience, and passion. Such exuberance 
precisely aided the venture founders’ coping (Ucbasaran et al., 2006; Jenkins et al., 2014; 
Sarasvathy et al., 2013; Cotterill, 2011), learning, and ability to continually enhance their firms 
by developing their antifragility as well as the ability to deal with their failure in general 
(Cannon and Edmondson, 2005; Politis and Gabrielsson, 2009; Hayward et al., 2010). The 
findings emphasise the value of resilience and passion for business owners who have gone 
through bankruptcy (see Corner et al., 2017; Yamakawa, Peng and Deeds, 2015; Hayward, 
Forster et al., 2010) as well as reinforce that a business owners’ passion is related to their self-
belief (Cardon and Kirk, 2015; Mayr and Mitter, 2014). Such findings are valuable given that 
passion has not been explored in much detail within the realm of entrepreneurial failure (Walsh, 
2017). Moreover, the entrepreneur’s high levels of optimism corroborate prior findings that a 
failed business owner is likely to display comparative optimism (Ucbasaran et al., 2010). This 
finding is important given the calls for further empirical evidence to explore the role of a failed 
firm owner’s positive emotions (Singh et al., 2017). Third, the participants displayed civil 
courage which entailed their heroic nature, soaring confidence and self-efficacy which grew 
throughout their recovery period and helped them to develop antifragility coupled with the risk 
of starting and running another venture. This finding has not been reported by other scholars. 
In doing so, the results build upon prior literature by demonstrating how antifragility helps to 
develop a business owners’ confidence which is used to restart an enterprise (Ucbasaran et al., 
2006; Hayward et al., 2010; Sarasvathy et al., 2013). Interestingly, the firm owners were not 
overconfident, as reported by previous work (Ucbasaran, et al., 2010). Yet, they displayed high 
levels of heroism to restart despite obstacles in their path. Fourth, the entrepreneurs’ internal 
attributional style helped them to develop positive emotions and antifragility as well as learn. 
This reinforces and extends the implications of a failed venture founders’ attributional style 
(Mantere et al., 2013; Yamakawa et al., 2015; Yamakawa and Cardon 2015). Lastly, the 
participants spoke of how they let go of prior emotional issues through the process of emotional 
regulation (Byrne and Shepherd 2015; He et al., 2018). This also enabled them to nurture their 
competency of antifragility and recognise the limits of the competency. Taken collectively, a 
theoretically refined view on how bankrupt entrepreneurs precisely use their civil courage, 
resilience, self-efficacy to develop antifragility has been obtained (Hayward et al., 2010; 
Lafuente et al., 2019; Corner et al., 2017). These richer theoretical understandings about the 
role of emotions and how they can be viewed as practices could allow scholars to systematically 
analyse how antifragility can be obtained and they have consequently provided several fruitful 




Besides this, the theoretical lens of antifragility has provided an in-depth explanation about the 
implications of a failed enterprise owners’; i) use of their support networks, ii) engagement 
with stakeholders and, iii) understanding of the short-term benefits of their bankruptcy charges. 
This has conceptually developed the work on the organising actions of business owners 
following a venture demise which is valuable as it has provided insights into how entrepreneurs 
can be supported to rebound to venture again. Specifically, in agreement with extant literature, 
by socialising with others, the enterprise owners were able to regulate their emotions towards 
their bankruptcy as well as make use of their social capital (Choi and Shepherd, 2004; Bosma 
et al., 2004; Cope, 2011). Moreover, the business founders use of mentoring allowed them to 
further develop knowledge on how they could pre-empt further business issues; thus, indicating 
that entrepreneurs are able to seek help, which has not always been found in prior studies 
(Politis and Gabrielsson, 2009; Cope, 2011). 
In addition, by discussing the role of the long-term bankruptcy policies, the study has advanced 
existing studies that are commonly published in economic and law related journals (Armour 
and Cumming 2008; Fan and White 2003; Primo and Green 2011) which emphasise how 
lenient bankruptcy policies can encourage entrepreneurial development (Lee et al., 2007; Lee 
et al., 2011; Eberhart et al., 2017; Peng et al., 2010). Beyond this, the respondents also made 
claims about problems with overcoming negative stakeholder reactions (Efrat, 2005; Walsh 
2017). Despite their coping mechanisms, it is apparent that an increase in stigmatisation 
associated with the business failure can decrease the chance of returning to entrepreneurship 
(Simmons et al., 2014; Kirkwood, 2007; Shepherd and Haynie, 2011). Moreover, consistent 
with prior work, it has been often reported that business owners still struggled to attain equity 
to run their consecutive enterprise(s) (see Cusin and Mayo, 2016; Nahata, 2019; Mathur, 2013; 
Metzger, 2008; Wakkee and Sleebos, 2014). Importantly, a reasoning for the financial issues 
was also linked to the lack of governmental assistance in the UK which has not been stated in 
previous works, thus extending researchers current understanding on the matter. Overall, the 
use of antifragility has provided a theoretically deepened understanding of how certain 
practices such as the long-term implications of the UK bankruptcy policies and a lack of 
governmental assistance may hamper a business owner’s ability to restart which has not been 






7.1.4 Theoretical grounded model  
Taken as a whole, the findings captured from the participants’ stories across all three aggregate 
dimensions provided detailed insights into the multifaceted failure and bankruptcy experiences 
which led to the theoretical grounded model (see Figure 8). The model is separated into three 
stages which represent how a firm owner can bounce back from a venture failure crisis ending 
in bankruptcy by forming antifragility as an organising capability. First, the entrepreneurs 
embrace their failure experiences, determining the true antecedent of their bankruptcy and 
coping with it. Subsequently, they can build an internal attributional style, self-efficacy, and 
antifragility (Heider, 1958; Bandura, 1977; Taleb, 2012). Second, the venture founders engage 
in gradual learning during and after their recovery which enables them to eventually utilise 
their competence of antifragility to restart. Third, the entrepreneurs exploit their antifragility in 
their current venture by continually learning, fostering strategic foresight, and consistently 
enhancing their business processes. Beyond these three related stages, the model highlights the 
organising enabling and impeding practices which can influence the entrepreneurial re-entry 
process. In this way, the model develops knowledge on the behaviours linked with restarting a 
business following bankruptcy, thereby extending the understanding from comparable 
frameworks on the matter (Cotterill, 2012). Consequently, the model may not only aid scholar’s 
current perception of a firm owners’ experience of restarting a venture following bankruptcy 
but can also help to provide future avenues of work.  
The theoretical process model also extends the applicability of antifragility, attributional 
theory, and the social cognitive theory (Taleb, 2012; Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1992; Bandura, 
1977). The model applies these theoretical constructs to the interrelated journey of 
entrepreneurial re-entry post-bankruptcy, thereby increasing the significance of such concepts. 
Specifically, the model forms a conceptual link between the emotional coping mechanisms and 
the two learning trajectories used by the business owners which are used to bounce back and 
progress in their current venture. Moreover, as highlighted in the model, the concepts have 
been able to explain the factors which hinder and facilitate the process, coupled with individual 
and firm level implications of restarting a venture. Thereby, the theoretical grounded model 
has produced novel insights which have helped to fill the lack of integration embedded within 
the current literature, explicitly between the antecedents, experiences, coping and learning from 
business failure and bankruptcy. In this way, the model helps to build a more nuanced 
understanding of why business owners bounce back by combining several strands of works on 




further constructive practical benefits for entrepreneurs and practitioners; in essence, aiding the 
economy (Korsgaard et al., 2020). Beyond the range of contributions, it is worthy to note, that 
overall, the grounded theoretical model has developed the initial theoretical framework by 
showing the exact process of developing antifragility as an organising capability. 
7.1.5 Methodological contributions 
Apart from enlightening the conceptual contributions of the study, it is important to recognise 
the empirical implications of this research. By applying an exploratory research design, rich 
data has been garnered from the semi-structured interviews as well as reviews of field notes, 
policy documentation and archival data. The use of this methodological plurality has provided 
a unique thick understanding of the topic whilst exposing heterogeneity across the sample, 
which is important given the diverse and intricate nature of entrepreneurial venture failure and 
entrepreneurial re-entry (Ucbasaran et al., 2013; Van Burg et al., 2020). Additionally, by using 
microstoria approach, a voice has been given to those who do not always partake in research 
studies (Muri, 1991). Besides this, the evolved grounded theory has helped to place close 
examination on the contexts and meanings attached to the participants’ stories as well as 
identify patterns and processes across the data (Struass and Corbin, 1998; Chamberlain-Salaun 
et al., 2013; Gioia et al., 2013). Taken together, the research design, participant recruitment 
approach, and data analysis method have not only produced interesting findings but have 
shown the value of such qualitative methodologies (Boje, 2011; Van Burg et al., 2020). 
7.2 Practical and Public Policy Contributions  
Beyond the empirical and theoretical contributions, this study makes five practical and policy 
related contributions which can ultimately help business owners during times of hardship. Such 
contributions are critical given the economic implications associated with the current global 
pandemic where business owners are likely to face a series of contemporary financial issues 
which may mean that their firms could be on the brinks of collapse (Manolova et al., 2020; 
Cowling et al., 2020).  
7.2.1 Use of model 
First, it is recommended that venture founders should make use of the grounded model (see 
Figure 8) as a guide in assisting them to formulate antifragility as an entrepreneurial 
competency. This, in turn, may aid them in their identification of entrepreneurial opportunities 




that all types of business owners can utilise the model from newer ones to those who have gone 
through failure. Newer business owners may find the model valuable in helping them offset a 
potential lack of business acumen that can often lead to a venture demise (Nummela et al. 2016; 
Al-Shami et al. 2019). They can explicitly glean ways which will enable them to engage in 
positive emotional practices and utilise their networks to seek social support. In doing so, they 
can foster antifragility to help them learn, build strategic foresight, and develop their business 
operations. In a similar vein, entrepreneurs who have failed with and without bankruptcy 
charges can use the model to help them restart a company. Specifically, the model could 
instruct them on the coping and learning steps involved throughout the journey of bouncing 
back as well as raise awareness about the enabling and impeding practices that can influence 
the process. This additional logic to the restart process is useful as it adds to the termination of 
one venture to the development of a subsequent one, as part of the organizational life cycle 
(Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2018). This is important since it can prompt once failed firm owners 
to re-use their prior knowledge and create more fruitful consecutive ventures (Schumpeter, 
1942; Korsgaard et al., 2020). 
7.2.2 Formal entrepreneurial failure recovery schemes 
Second, due to the severity of the experiences of bankruptcy for several of the participants and 
comments often shared about further support, the development of formal failure recovery 
schemes is advocated. This includes greater efforts to enhance current recovery programmes 
such as schemes advocated by the European Commission’s ‘Second Chance’ (see European 
Commission, 2011). Moreover, there is a need to create new schemes that specifically help 
failed business owners (including but not limited to bankruptcy) to overcome the multifaceted 
adverse consequences of their failure (Ucbasaran et al., 2013; Cardon et al., 2011; Metzger, 
2008). Specific guidance can include ways to help foster the range of coping mechanisms that 
are frequently utilised by entrepreneurs. For instance, guidance can be provided on how to 
develop effective sense-making, critical reflection, emotional regulation, and identity 
management techniques as well as other practical coping measures, alongside support on how 
to form links between the mechanisms. Precise and customised advice can also be offered to 
entrepreneurs on how they best cope with stigma across both online and offline mediums as 
highlighted in the literature (Fisch and Block, 2020). In addition, it could be valuable to also 
ensure that failed business owners are put in touch with each other as suggested by the 
participants which may help form a support network. Failed business owners can also be 




them to change their perception of the unbearable nature of business failure and subsequently 
encourage them to start-up another enterprise (Amankwah-Amoah., et al 2019; Cope, 2011; 
Cannon and Edmondson, 2001). The once failed business owners could also be provided with 
mentoring alongside coaching; such measures have been proven to be highly effective in the 
literature on the recovery from a business collapse (Singh et al., 2007; Schermuly et al., 2020).  
Overall, the recovery schemes could assist entrepreneurs in the management of their emotions 
at their own pace and in their own way, so they are able to effectively deal with their stress and 
stigma of their failure (Sarpong et al., 2013; Cardon et al., 2011). Consequently, this may help 
them to appraise their failure in a positive light and eventually learn in the long-term through 
engaging in both experiential and reflective learning. This is vital since it was found that the 
participants’ higher-order (long-term) learning played a key role in the development of their 
subsequent ventures. Moreover, the recovery schemes could help the once failed entrepreneurs 
develop self-efficacy, an internal attributional style and antifragility to aid them to take the risk 
of owning another firm, coupled with preventing further business failure. This is important as 
failed entrepreneurs are likely to restart a venture due to their developed know-how (Politis, 
2008).  
7.2.3 Entrepreneurial educational schemes and pedagogy implications  
Third, in light of these two practical implications, the findings can be used to create programs 
as well as improve existing mentoring and coaching focussed educational initiatives for novice 
and experienced entrepreneurs that aid their mental wellbeing whilst building antifragility as 
an entrepreneurial capability. Such schemes can entail an array of mindfulness and spiritual 
related activities in addition to regular networking events which have been found to be useful 
for venture founders. They can also entail ways to effectively build positive emotional 
practices, such as an internal attributional style and self-efficacy which are vital for running an 
enterprise (Jenkins et al., 2014; Mantere et al., 2013; Yamakawa and Cardon 2015).  
In a similar fashion, programs and resources that form antifragility as an entrepreneurial 
capability can also be integrated into current entrepreneurial educational schemes. In doing so, 
this may encourage firm ownership since they may help prepare budding and experienced 
business owners on how best to create sustainable ventures by equipping them with the 
valuable leadership skills and knowledge on how best to overcome issues. The programs and 
resources can also help spark new venture creation by providing students with insights into the 




to design optimal entrepreneurial courses which is useful given the lack of failure cases in the 
entrepreneurship education (Shepherd, 2004; Barringer and Ireland, 2016). This is also a 
valuable implication since schools across the globe are broadening their entrepreneurship 
programs (Martin et al., 2013). 
7.2.4 Changing the notion of failure for entrepreneurs, employees, and wider society 
Fourth, the findings help to depict a more positive image of business failure and bankruptcy 
that stems from the negative experience’s entrepreneurs endure. Financiers can use the findings 
as evidence to prove that previously bankrupted entrepreneurs can bounce back and therefore, 
they should not be automatically overlooked since they may eliminate potentially fruitful 
business opportunities. At a firm level, the study’s findings can help staff who fail on a project 
or an intrapreneurial endeavour to recognise that their non-success is not fatal as it can lead to 
a fresh beginning by effectively coping and learning. At a societal level, the findings push 
forward the idea that unsuccessful ventures, commonly described as the “dark-side” of business 
should not be stigmatised, especially in cultures where a business collapse is viewed negatively 
(Gratzer, 2001; Cardon et al., 2011). This is crucial given that failure can occur often and is a 
valuable portal of knowledge which is key in developing long-term success (Cope, 2011; 
Amankwah et al., 2018) and antifragility to benefit from hardships. To that end, it is suggested 
that the challenge now is to actively take a positive approach to address failures as they arise 
by showing an increased willingness to learn from them. 
7.2.5 Policy related implications 
Fifth, the results play a role in determining that the current UK bankruptcy policies are tolerable 
enough for those to pursue the opportunity to create another venture post-bankruptcy (Armour 
and Cunningham, 2008; Lee et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2011; Damaraju, Barney and Dess, 2020). 
Yet, there are four policy regulatory and resource distribution related changes which could help 
support bankrupted business owners and other entrepreneurs. First, the participants spoke about 
the potential requirement for the UK government to provide further information about failure 
and bankruptcy to venture founders when they register an enterprise. This could take the form 
of a regulatory body which issues firms with a licence to ensure that they succeed. Second, the 
respondents highlighted that the government should consider bankruptcy on a more case-by-
case basis by examining an individual’s financial history in more depth given that several of 
them felt that they could repay their debts. Third, the informants often discussed the need for 




associated with their bankruptcy. Therefore, policy funding may be required to fund the 
suggested recovery programs to support failed entrepreneurs and ultimately assist their 
entrepreneurial return (Nielson and Sarasvathy, 2016). Lastly, the results illustrate that 
previously bankrupt business owners need help in attaining equity more readily following the 
launch of their subsequent firm as this may enable them to practice their competence of 
antifragility. This could entail developing existing schemes which provide accessible financial 
aid with lower interest rates for once bankrupted and failed entrepreneurs. More so, this may 
help reduce the number of entrepreneurs with unregistered firms given that they know there is 
better odds of getting financial support. In sum, the suggested policy related changes can help 
policy makers in current times where they are required to fundamentally revisit existing 
policies and initiatives to aid businesses in distress (Manolova et al., 2020; Cowling et al., 
2020). 
7.3 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
This study is not without limitations. For instance, critics may question the theoretical approach 
taken as a lens for this study. Whilst it is accepted that the organisation of the sample of chosen 
publications which were analysed makes conceptual sense and led to the chosen theoretical 
gaze, other interpretations may exist. Notably, however, the analysis of the literature has 
enabled one to investigate a range of streams of research within the entrepreneurial failure and 
bankruptcy domain.  
7.3.1 Longitudinal design 
Another limitation is that a cross-sectional snapshot view of the participants’ experiences has 
been taken, the full extent of the entrepreneur’s failure and recovery journey may not have been 
garnered. This means that the results from the study and the model generated may not account 
for the dynamic narratives of the business owners’ stories.  
This limitation provides the grounds for future work to longitudinally explore the stories of the 
once bankrupt business owner’s recovery and the processes involved in restarting a business. 
This approach may pose difficulties including sample attrition amongst other issues, such as, 
the ability to identify suitable venture owners who are willing to partake in research during the 
event of their firm failure (Byrne and Shepherd, 2015). This may be a likely reason why it has 
not been used by many studies in the entrepreneurial failure domain (see Lattcher and Wdowiak 




can bypass the cognitive biases associated with retrospective research (Corner et al, 2017; 
Gartner and Birley; 2002; Menard, 2002). 
7.3.2 Cross-cultural studies 
A related limitation is that, given this research focuses on UK business owners, such 
entrepreneurs may have possessed considerable differences in experiences compared to others 
across the globe as their bankruptcy charges could have different implications in other countries 
(Cardon et al., 2011; Efrat, 2006). Consequently, it is questionable whether one should 
generalise findings to other contexts. Yet, the study’s main intention is not for its findings to 
be generalised, and if done so, should be done cautiously.  
This study’s issue with examining the accounts of UK based business owners can also be 
addressed with future cross-cultural work that could empirically test out the applicability of the 
findings from this study. For example, a future cross-cultural study that uses self-report and 
interview-based methods could be used to explore whether other formerly bankrupted venture 
founders bounce back due to a competence of antifragility. Scholars may face challenges in 
obtaining participants across the globe which meet these requirements, yet the use of mixed 
methods means that they could gather data more accessibly (e.g, Simmons et al., 2014). 
7.3.3 Integrated approach 
Beyond the areas of limitations that prompt future topics of investigation, as with most studies, 
the research raises a similar number of questions as it answers. Therefore, a range of other 
topics require exploration.  
Scholars may wish to build upon findings of this study and follow suit by continuing to draw 
on several strands of existing work but importantly use an alternative typology. For instance, 
it would be valuable to understand the long-term implications of a once failed venture founders’ 
attributional style in relation to the development of long-term learning as well as their 
development of self-efficacy and antifragility. This will enable scholars to build an 
understanding about the ongoing effects of a venture founders’ attributional style which may 
change as well as provide another level of analysis to the grounded theoretical model presented 
in this study. It would be helpful if researchers potentially investigate this topic by answering 
the following research question: “What is the ongoing influence of a failed business owners’ 
attributional style on their coping, learning and development of antifragility?”. A longitudinal 




these topics. The longitudinal design could involve several data collection points to gather rich 
data continuously (Gartner and Birley; 2002; Menard, 2002). Accordingly, this would help to 
build upon existing findings which currently only provide evidence of the more short-term and 
medium-term effects of bankruptcy and failure in relation to subsequent entrepreneurial 
development. Studying these areas will also bring one close to building a view on the multiple 
causes of entrepreneurial failure. Thus, helping scholars to coherently understand the 
intricacies within the heterogenous sample of business owners. 
7.3.4 Long-term experiences 
In continuing with taking an integrated approach to future work, another area within this 
domain could entail investigating the range of long-term experiences that bankrupted 
entrepreneurs undergo and the effects this has on the development of antifragility in further 
detail. It would be precisely beneficial to fully investigate the connections between the 
physical, financial, social, and emotional long-term effects of bankruptcy that entrepreneurs 
face in relation to the ability to appraise their failure and develop antifragility (Jenkins et al., 
2010; Jenkins et al., 2014; Taleb, 2012; Klimas et al., 2020). Scholars could also pay attention 
to the moral implications of a business collapse that results in bankruptcy which can possibly 
build a sharper understanding on the ethical issues that bankrupted entrepreneurs may 
encounter that can subsequently impact their coping and learning (Singh et al. 2015). This is 
important as research has only begun to explore the link between entrepreneurship, ethics, and 
bankruptcy (Eklund et al., 2020). Moreover, given the effects of entrepreneurial failure and 
bankruptcy on a business owners’ family, one other area researchers can explore is the role of 
an entrepreneurs’ venture collapse in relation to their children’s’ perception of 
entrepreneurship. Studies may potentially explore these topics using the following questions: 
‘What are the exact long-term implications of a business failure and bankruptcy as well as the 
precise connections between the implications?’ and ‘How is a failed firm owner’s ability to 
build antifragility and appraise their failure impacted by the long-term effects of their venture 
demise?’.  
The recommended research questions could be investigated by using a qualitative longitudinal 
research design coupled with making use of online data as done by others (see Fisch and Block, 
2020). A larger sample that includes the venture founder’s family and friends as well as their 
previous staff and financiers could potentially be included in future studies. This will help to 




consequences associated with the venture demise. Taking these approaches may pose 
challenges, such as the ability to recruit wider groups of participants and the ability to access 
online data (Cope, 2011). Notwithstanding these challenges, the suggested research design and 
sampling approach can help to develop the current theoretical understanding of antifragility by 
garnering a more detailed picture of the dynamic nature of a business owners’ relationships 
following a venture failure and bankruptcy (Ucbasaran et al., 2013; Jenkins and Mckelvie, 
2016). Thus, this can possibly yield genuine contributions to the literature that assist business 
owners in periods of hardship. 
7.3.5 Contextual Factors 
The research findings propose that business owners’ antifragility primarily enables them to 
bounce back, take further risks and ultimately grow stronger. Perhaps there are certain factors 
which influence whether these phenomena are more or less likely to occur. For instance, a 
failed firm owners’ age, ethnicity, industry, and years of experience have been reported to 
influence their formation of antifragility, albeit marginally. Within the field of management, 
further research could be carried out to establish the precise role of such contextual factors in 
relation to a venture founders’ development of antifragility, coping, learning, and ability to deal 
with stigma to provide a more detailed understanding of the exact influence of these factors. 
For instance, if an entrepreneur started a new enterprise in an entirely different industry to their 
previous firm, it would be interesting to determine the reasoning for this and the implications 
of doing so. Researchers can investigate these areas by exploring the following question: ‘To 
what extent does a firm owner’s identity related attributes and experience as well as industry, 
influence their capability of restarting?’. Cognitive, behavioural, and other inequality related 
concepts, for instance, the human capital and the upper echelons theory alongside antifragility 
could be used to investigate the research question. A large-scale cross-cultural study on the 
subject would also be valuable as it can help to explicate the effects of the contextual factors 
across cultures in relation to an entrepreneurs’ coping and learning. This may be logistically 
difficult to arrange, yet this methodological approach could help future scholars to obtain a 
more holistic understanding about the experiences of a venture demise and bankruptcy 
(Cotterill, 2012). Moreover, by investigating the impact of contextual factors in detail, more 






7.3.6 Coping methods 
Scholars may also potentially develop existing findings by exploring the interplay between 
various coping mechanisms as well as how such methods help to collectively develop an 
antifragile level of emotional functioning, self-efficacy, and an internal attributional style more 
extensively (Taleb, 2012). They could examine the following research questions: ‘What are the 
exact interrelationships between the various coping mechanisms that previously bankrupt 
entrepreneurs use?’ and ‘How does a failed firm owner’s range of coping mechanisms impact 
their overall antifragile functioning?’. A qualitative design such as a narrative oriented or case-
study approach which focusses on theory building by identifying patterns in data (Eisenhardt 
and Graebner, 2007; Burg et al. 2020) would be a suitable method to explore the topics given 
the considerable stands of research that forms part of the topic (Shepherd and Patzelt, 2017). 
Such studies could pose the risk of researcher subjectivity, yet they can help to generate the 
granular evidence required on the matter that can be empirically tested in subsequent research 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). A mixture of business owners who have failed once and 
several times could also be included in future studies as they can help to determine the influence 
of previous failure experiences in relation to coping behaviours.  
7.3.7 Learning trajectories 
To move this study’s findings forward, it would also be valuable to investigate how the learning 
trajectories used by venture founders can lead to the utilisation of antifragility in greater detail. 
For example, a logical extension from this study’s findings entails how the firm owner’s 
reflexive learning, specifically their prospective sensemaking will aid their ability to cope and 
learn. In addition, more research is required to look at how failed entrepreneurs develop 
strategic foresight, an enhanced ability to make decisions and an ability to pivot alongside the 
formation of antifragility. In doing so, more thorough knowledge about the long-standing 
individual, firm-level and wider-environmental level learnings from business failure can be 
generated. Scholars could explore these matters by potentially answering the following 
questions: ‘How exactly does prospective sensemaking guide entrepreneurs to cope, learn and 
restart from a business failure?’ and ‘How does a previously bankrupt firm owner develop 
strategic foresight, enhanced decision making and the capability to pivot alongside antifragility 
in the long-term?’. A longitudinal mixed-method empirical study would be a suitable 
methodology to explore the suggested research questions. Scholars could make use of 




researchers are called on to formulate and validate a scale that captures long-term learning and 
entrepreneurial antifragility which can be used in surveys. The use of a mixed methods 
approach with a validated scale may help to generate detailed data about the long-term 
cognitive learning trajectories that formerly bankrupted entrepreneurs use and thus, back the 
idea that genuine long-term learning is conceivable. A larger sample is also recommended, 
which entails:  i) entrepreneurs who have failed but not gone through bankruptcy; ii) failed 
(non-bankrupted) entrepreneurs who have not restarted a venture; and iii) bankrupted 
entrepreneurs who have restarted a venture. The sample size might be taxing to recruit, yet the 
mixed methods approach with the larger groups of sample can help to produce the required 
data on the subject to form viable conclusions (Molina-Azorín et al. 2012).  
7.3.8 Emotional resources as practices 
Another potential research avenue entails the examination of the dynamic emotional 
functioning of business owners in greater detail to further increase theoretical knowledge on 
the matter and resolve current inconsistences (Ucbasaran, Westhead, et al., 2010; Shepherd, 
2003). It would be interesting to explore how failed business owners’ optimism, resilience, 
civil courage, and confidence shape their long-term coping and learning as well as the 
formation of antifragility and self-efficacy (Corner et al., 2017; Shepherd and Patzelt, 2017). 
The use of civil courage, in particular, would be an intriguing area to study given the value of 
the emotional practice. Further, it would be interesting to examine the role of a once bankrupted 
business owner’s confidence and over-confidence in more detail. Scholars could investigate 
this research topic by examining: “How exactly does a business owner use their emotional 
resources to cope and learn in the long-term as well as restart a firm following a venture failure 
that ended in bankruptcy?”.  
The research topic can be explored using antifragility alongside other relevant cognitive, social, 
and learning related theories as well as concepts from the positive psychological domain as a 
lens. Integrating theories from differing disciplines may prove difficult as they may not directly 
complement each other, yet they can lead to fresh insights (Siedlok and Hibbert 2013). For 
instance, scholars could obtain a more thorough critical view about the antecedents of how 
entrepreneurs learn following bankruptcy coupled with their ability to perceive viable 
opportunities to restart a firm alongside the dynamic emotional pathways undertaken 
throughout the entrepreneurial re-entry process (Politis and Gabrielson, 2009; Ucbasaran et al., 




antifragility that could be required to bounce back from potential venture challenges. This 
increased knowledge on the matter can also improve insights into the individual differences 
amongst failed entrepreneurs in terms of the sequence of their emotional practices as well as 
the implications of such individual differences. More so, by studying these areas, scholars can 
potentially garner a detailed understanding of why certain venture owners repeatedly fail, 
whilst others to do not (Van Kesteren et al., 2017; Gottschalk et al., 2017). 
7.3.9 Organising practices 
A final arena of research for future scholars to investigate entails examining the organising 
practices used by business owners to restart in greater depth. This involves further exploring 
how once failed venture founders utilise their spirituality to restart an enterprise, given the 
importance of the practice, yet little work has been carried out on the matter (Singh et al., 2016). 
Future research could perhaps develop a more advanced understanding on whether more 
spiritual entrepreneurs are more prone to rebound to venture again. Besides this, it would be 
valuable for scholars to examine the long-term effectiveness of existing entrepreneurial failure 
wellbeing support programmes. Specifically, it would be beneficial to build a deeper 
understanding how such programmes can assist a once bankrupted business owner to get back 
on their feet and encourage them to feel less isolated. The following research questions could 
be examined: ‘How exactly does spirituality increase a failed firm owners’ antifragility and 
ability to restart?’ and ‘What are the long-term benefits of support programmes for failed 
business owners?’. Both sets of questions could be explored using a longitudinal design and 
qualitative methodologies to form rich data on the topic over a period (Gartner and Birley; 
2002; Menard, 2002). In this regard, conceptually, the findings from these proposed research 
questions can help to build a more detailed view of how spirituality may help entrepreneurs 
form hope. The findings can also offer knowledge on how spirituality may stimulate an 
enterprise owner to engage in higher-order learning by changing their underlying thought 
processes (Singh et al., 2016). Practically, the findings from these potential research questions 
can aid policymakers in the formation of specific spiritual related training for once failed 
business owners to enhance their antifragility and increase the odds of second chance 
entrepreneurship. 
7.4 Conclusion 
Bouncing back from venture failure that resulted in bankruptcy is an intricate and prevalent 




will have the (mis)fortune of facing that this research has shed new light on. The study set out 
to answer “how”, “when” and “why” certain firm owners restart post-bankruptcy through 
drawing on the overarching alternative theoretical lens of antifragility to answer calls to 
develop theory on the matter. By analysing the dynamic stories of twenty previously 
bankrupted business owners, this research has provided a nuanced view on the coping 
mechanisms and long-term learning strategies that such entrepreneurs undertake to develop 
their attributional style, emotional functioning as well as identify the opportunity to restart, and 
form long-lasting ventures. The study has specifically provided five key contributions. First, 
this research has complemented and developed recent existing knowledge on the significance 
of failed entrepreneurs’ varied experiences and emotional related coping strategies, which were 
found to be essential behaviours to develop an internal attributional style, self-efficacy, and 
antifragility as an ‘entrepreneurial competence’. The competence was found to encourage long-
term reflexive and experiential learning behaviours which led to prospective sense-making and 
higher-order profound moments of wisdom that were utilised to restart a business. Second, the 
study has uncovered that following the business owner’s venture restart, the sample of 
bankrupted business owners often developed foresight and the ability to pivot alongside the 
capability to engage in strategic risk-taking behaviours which helped to attain further 
antifragility. Third, this research has contributed to the understanding about the organising 
practices which facilitate and endanger the development of antifragility. Fourth, a grounded 
theoretical process model that synthesises the findings has accordingly been produced as a 
roadmap which illuminates how antifragility as an organising capability can be utilised by 
entrepreneurs to bounce back from bankruptcy. Fifth, the research has emphasised the 
significance of qualitative theory development (Suddaby et al., 2015). Indeed, this research has 
made several meaningful steps in conceptually progressing the state of the literature, yet it is 
hoped that the refined and enriched theoretical understanding obtained from this study will 
inspire scholars to continue to explore the suggested empirical and conceptual suggestions to 
support entrepreneurs. The research recommendations focus on a failed firm owners’ 
experiences and attributional style alongside coping, and long-term learning behaviours in 
relation to the development of antifragility. Besides the conceptual implications, the study also 
hopes to encourage policymakers to implement the proposed suggestions to ultimately help 
business owners enhance their wellbeing and venture performance. To end, given that 
entrepreneurs create and run sustainable organisations which are crucial in today’s fluctuating 
financial climate, this study hopes to not only help business owners’ wellbeing and career 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
Study title: 
 
Bouncing back from bankruptcy: Narratives of entrepreneurial antifragility   
Invitation Paragraph: 
Thank you for your time – you are being invited to participate in a research study. Prior to making a 
decision, it is crucial that you are fully made aware of the purpose of the study and what it entails. The 
below information sheds further light on this and you are welcome to talk about it with others if you 
would like. What’s more, please do not hesitate to ask me if you have any questions about the study 
to make an informed decision. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
The study aims to examine the experiences of UK based entrepreneurs’, specifically focuses on the 
courage and perseverance of those entrepreneurs’ who have managed to re-start their business after 
going through bankruptcy. The phenomenon of bankruptcy was chosen as it is something that impacts 
a large number of people. This is of great significance to entrepreneurs who may go through insolvency 
with a huge number of businesses failing and then subsequently starting-up again. The research in 
particular touches upon concepts of entrepreneurial dispositional traits, in conjunction to an 
entrepreneur business re-entry. The study will be fully complete by December and a full report with 
the findings will be compiled by mid-2020 and subsequently published. 
Why have been invited to participate? 
 
You have been chosen to participate as you have met criteria for inclusion to take part in the study: 
1) Be a UK based entrepreneur who has been declared as bankrupt within the last 10-25 years  
1a)  The bankruptcy should be accessible and verifiable via the UK Insolvency Register 
2)  The entrepreneur has now re-started a business or businesses  
2a)   The current business or businesses must be registered on the UK Company House 
2b) Their current re-established business or businesses are in working operation for a minimum 
of 6 months  
Do I have to take part? 
 




decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent 
form. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
After gaining consent from yourself, you will be invited to take part in a face to face semi-structured 
interview at a set date, time and place that is convenient for yourself and the researcher. The interview 
will last around 60-90 minutes. You will firstly be briefed.  This involves being told that your voice will 
be recorded, made aware you will be given a pseudonym in the write up of the report and asked not 
repeat the information spoken about during the interview. You will also be told about your right to 
withdraw at any stage of the interview if you are feeling distressed or uncomfortable and do not wish 
to carry on participating. The actual interview is separated into sections related to how you bounced 
back from bankruptcy to restart a business. These include, your general experiences and views on 
entrepreneurship, the bankruptcy experience, the entrepreneurial mindset, entrepreneurial learning 
and coping followed by coping with external factors. Once the interview has ended you will be given 
a debriefing sheet to keep. You will also be allowed to speak about any of their concerns that they 
may have with the researcher. Contact details of the researcher will also be found on the debrief 
sheet. 
 
The audio from the interview will be recorded on a voice recorder, saved stored on a secure, password 
protected, Brunel server and transcribed thereafter. Specific quotes may be used from the 
transcription to demonstrate certain points for my dissertation. Anonymity will be guaranteed and a 
pseudonym will be assigned to each participant. Also, all responses from the interview regarding your 
experience will be kept confidential.  Once transcribed all audio recordings will be destroyed. 
 
What do I have to do? 
 
You are required to give consent if you wish to and then participate in the interview. In the interview 
please feel free to answer as you wish. There are no lifestyle restrictions in particular that will stop 
you from taking part and as stated you have met the inclusion criteria to participate. 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
 
It is highly likely that there is no risk from your participation. However, if you do find any of the 
questions uncomfortable to answer, then you will always have the right to not discuss anything you 
do not wish to. Importantly, as a participant you can always answer how you would like to and always 
have the right to withdraw at any point during the study.  
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
As mentioned a study aims to look into how entrepreneurs have bounced back from bankruptcy and 
restarted a business. By taking part, you will be given the right to access the final copy of the report 
of the study. This may potentially help you to enhance your current entrepreneurial mind-set, which 
in effect, may help you to run your business more effectively and thus could yield more profits. Please 




What if something goes wrong? 
 
If you are harmed by taking part in this research project, there are no special compensation 
arrangements. If you are harmed due to someone’s negligence, then you may have grounds for a legal 
action but you may have to pay for it. Should you have any questions please feel free to get in touch 
with me using my contact details (please see contact information under the contact for further 
information and complaints heading). 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly 
confidential. Any information about you which leaves the University/hospital/surgery/local authority 
premises, etc., will have your name and address removed so that you cannot be identified from it.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
Only the researcher, myself, will have access to the actual raw data. Upon the interview being 
transcribed and analysed, selected quotations will be used in the results/findings section of the final 
report and journal article (once published). Anonymised transcripts will also included in the 
appendices of the report. All the results and the discussion is likely to be completed by mid-2020. Once 
fully complete, please do not hesitate to get in contact with myself for a copy of the full report. To 
reiterate your identity will not be exposed in the report and so full confidentiality is guaranteed. 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
The research is funded and being conducted by myself, Amit Rawal in conjunction with Brunel 
University. 
What are the indemnity arrangements? 
 
Participation in the study is highly unlikely to affect your health-related insurance. 
Who has reviewed the study? 
 
The College of Business, Arts and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee has reviewed the study 




Brunel University is committed to compliance with the Universities UK Research Integrity Concordat. 
You are entitled to expect the highest level of integrity from our researchers during the course of their 
research. 





Researcher: Amit Rawal, Management Studies PhD Student, Brunel Business School, Brunel University 
 
Contact Email: amit.rawal@my.brunel.ac.uk 
Supervisor: David Sarpong, Reader in Strategic Management, Brunel Business School, Brunel 
University 
Contact Email: david.sarpong@brunel.ac.uk 
 
Contact for complaints: 
Contact Chair of Research Ethics Committee: David Gallear, Professor of Operations Management, 
Brunel Business School, Brunel University 
Contact Email: david.gallear@brunel.ac.uk 
 
Please also note you will be given a copy of this information sheet and consent form for yourself to 
keep. Thank you once again for taking the time to read this through - please do not hesitate to contact 
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c) Participant Risk Consideration  
 
University Research Ethics Committee  
 
RESEARCH ETHICS RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 
 
This form should be used to support the assessment of risks associated with your research project and their mitigation.  This must be completed and submitted 
where relevant within the BREO form. 
 
Prior to completion, if there is any aspect of the risks or risk management process associated with your proposed research that you feel unsure about then it 
is your responsibility (as the researcher) to seek further guidance. 
 





Identified Risks Likelihood Potential Impact/Outcome Risk Management/Mitigating Factors 
Identify the risks/hazards present  High/Medium/Low Who might be harmed and how? Evaluate the risks and decide on the precautions, e.g., 
Health & Safety 






Low Participants may be psychologically 
harmed through discussing how they 
overcame the bankruptcy experience in 
their pursuit to start a business again in 
their interview  
The following precautions will be taken: 
1) All interview questions on the topic 
have been carefully selected  
2) Participants have the right to 
withdraw at any point of the 
interview 
3) If the participant shows any sign of 
discomfort the interview will be 
immediately terminated 
4) Participants will be fully briefed on 






d) Participant Invitation Letter 
 
 
Dear prospective participant, 
My name is Amit Rawal, a PhD Researcher at Brunel University London. My doctoral dissertation 
examines the experiences of UK based entrepreneurs’  and focuses on the courage and perseverance 
of those entrepreneurs’ who have managed to re-start their business after going through bankruptcy.  
I am therefore inviting you to a one-off interview between July 2019 – April 2020. The interview will 
touch upon your bankruptcy experience, what you sequentially did as part of your entrepreneurial re-
entry (how you bounced back to restart another business) and other questions focussed on this topic.  
Please note the interview data will be treated with the strictest confidence and all research 
participant information will be fully anonymised.  
If you would like to be invited to attend a workshop or to receive a summary of findings, please 
complete the information below so that I may contact you. This information will not be retained 
with your interview answers. 
____ I would like to receive a summary of the findings. 




You will also obtain a consent form, study information sheet and debrief form ahead of participating. 
If you are interested in taking part and/or know anyone suitable, please kindly contact me directly 
via email: amit.rawal@brunel.ac.uk or directly by calling 07958483040. 
I look forward to hearing from you in due course. 












PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
Project Title: Bouncing back from bankruptcy: Narratives of entrepreneurial antifragility 
 
Please note that The College of Business, Arts and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee has 
reviewed the study and granted myself as the researcher permission to conduct it. 
 
Please complete the whole of this sheet 
                                        Please tick the appropriate box 
                                                                                                                                                      YES  NO  
Have you read the Research Participant Information Sheet?  
Have you had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss this study?  
Have you received satisfactory answers to all your questions? 
Who have you spoken to?  
Do you understand that you will not be referred to by name in any report 
concerning the study? 
Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the study: 
• at any time? 
• without having to give a reason for withdrawing? 
• (where relevant) without affecting your 
future care? 
I agree to my interview being recorded. 
I agree to the use of non-attributable direct quotes when 
 the study is written up or published. 
Do you agree to take part in this study? 





Name in capitals: 
 
Witness statement 
I am satisfied that the above-named has given informed consent. 
Witnessed by: 
Date: 
Name in capitals: 
 
Researcher name: Amit Rawal Signature: 









PARTICIPANT DEBRIEF FORM 
Research Project Title: 
Bouncing back from bankruptcy: Narratives of entrepreneurial antifragility   
Purpose/Background to study: 
The study aimed to examine the experiences of UK based entrepreneurs’, specifically focuses on the 
courage and perseverance of those entrepreneurs’ who have managed to re-start their business after 
going through bankruptcy. This is of great importance due to importance for entrepreneurs who may 
go through insolvency with a huge number of businesses failing and then subsequently starting-up 
again. 
 
Recently the work in the field of re-nascent entrepreneurs post business failure looks at internal 
factors such as entrepreneurs’ learning and personality traits. Alternatively, there is a focus on 
external factors such as an entrepreneur overcoming the social stigma that comes from a business 
that has gone bust and the relationship of bankruptcy polices with re-nascent entrepreneurship. There 
appears to be a scarcity of research in the domain of re-nascent entrepreneurs who have been 
declared as bankrupt and since launched another entrepreneurial start-up in terms of attention to 
their entrepreneurial grit, defined as a perseverance of effort and having the confidence as well as 
courage to do so (Mooradian, Matzler, Uzelac and Bauer, 2016). The personality attribute of grit and 
perseverance have been shown as key entrepreneurial characteristics (Coelho and McGlure, 2005; 
Syed and Mueller, 2014; DiGegorio and Cordova, 2014; Mueller, Wolfe and Syed, 2017; Nielsen and 
Sarasvathy, 2011). Theoretically, these traits can be linked to the concept of antifragility (Taleb, 2012). 
Antifragility goes beyond resilience and grit, and shows how an individual, an organisation or an array 
of systems get stronger irrespective of facing stressors, failures and volatility (Taleb, 2012). The 
research gap in this area has not taken the antifragile approach to explore the area and this study 
intends to do so. 
Confidentiality: 
Personal information about participants will be kept confidential in the following ways: 
• Participants asked not to repeat what was said within the interview publicly. 
• The participant’s interview that has been recorded will be stored on a computer that is 
password protected. These recordings will be destroyed on a later date upon completion of 
the interview transcriptions. 
• Pseudonyms will be also given to participants and no actual names or other identifying 





If you are interested in knowing more information about the study or have any queries about it – 
please do not hesitate to ask either myself or my authorised supervisor. Below are our contact details: 
Amit Rawal (amit.rawal@brunel.ac.uk) 
Dr David Sarpong (david.sarpong@brunel.ac.uk) 
Thank you for participating in my study. 
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1. Give or email over participant consent form – with one copy for themselves to keep and one 
for myself. 
2. Brief participant on study (include that it will be recorded, he/she will be given a 
pseudonym, they have the right to withdraw and not to repeat what they say to others 
following the interview). 
3. Start interview and recording. 
4. Stop recording, give or email over debrief form. 
5. Notify participant they have the right to withdraw but to ensure he/she will let me know 
before leaving the study. 





h) Participant Interview Questions 
 
 
PARTICIPANT SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL SHEET 
Biographical data: 
1) Please can you state your age and gender? 
2) Please can you state your educational background? 
3) Please can you let me know when you started your first business? 
General experiences and view on entrepreneurship: 
4) Is it worth running one’s own business? 
5) What do you enjoy about owning your own business? 
6) What made you start a business? 
7) What is the easiest and hardest aspect of owning your own company? 
8) What is the current size of your business? 
9) What industry would you say your company is in? 
10) What resources did you use to start-up the business? 
11) Do you employ any staff? 
Bankruptcy Experience: 
12) When was you declared as bankrupt? 
13) What did your former company do, what was the size of it and where was it based? 
14) How old was the former company? 
15) What was the cause of the bankruptcy? 
• Was this due to internal causes more unique to the business such as finances, 
business structure, staff or external factors such as the business climate at the time, 
or perhaps a mix of both? Please state the exact factors. 
• Could you have changed anything and if so, what would this have been? 
16) Did you see the bankruptcy coming or did anyone else see it coming? 
• Did your relationships with the people around you change at all, and if so in what 
ways? 
17) When was it realised that the business should be closed and what actions did you 
sequentially take? 
18) What was the experience like for you? 
• How did you feel in terms of both positive and negative feelings? 
19) What was the experience like after you dealt with the business that had to be closed and 
then to go on to start-up again? 
• How did you feel in terms of both positive and negative feelings at these points? 
20) What was the impact of the financial costs you encountered from your bankruptcy? 
Entrepreneurial Coping: 
21) How did you make sense of the bankruptcy? 
• What helped you make sense of it? 
• Do others help you with sense-making of the business failure and if so how? 





• Did you have a recovery period? 
• Did others impression of you alter how you made sense of the business failure and if 
so, in what ways? 
• Did you ever have a fear of failure again and if you did, how did your sensemaking 
help you to overcome this and manage any uncertainty? 
• Did any negative feelings towards the bankruptcy motivate you to start another 
venture? 
22) How did you regulate your emotions from the bankruptcy process? 
• What helped you to regulate your emotions and manage uncertainty? 
• How do you reflect on the former business now and the failure of it to starting up 
again? 
23) What coping mechanisms and heuristics did you use to overcome the business failure? 
• Did they involve both emotional and problem based coping strategies and if so 
explain further?  
• Did you ever downplay or ignore the business collapse or alternatively fully embrace 
it? 
• How did these help you and enable you to manage any uncertainty you faced? 
• How did they reduce your stress and grief from your former business? 
• How did they help you cope with social stigma you may have faced? 
• Have you ever appraised the failure by transforming it into a positive experience and 
if so how? 
• Have you ever tactfully planned how you would end up terminating the business and 
if so did this help with how you coped with the closure of the venture? 
• What was the best coping mechanism if you had to choose one? 
• Did you change the coping mechanisms you used throughout the process from 
bankruptcy to start up a company again and if so please explain? 
• When do you feel that these coping mechanisms helped you start a business again 
and how did they make you feel? 
• Did you find your personality and emotions impacted your coping mechanisms 
used?  
• Did others impact your coping?  
Coping with external factors: 
24) How has the UK law impacted you with your bankruptcy? 
• Is there anything that can be changed in the law to help you or would have helped 
you with your bankruptcy, and if so please do explain? 
• How entrepreneurial friendly would you say the bankruptcy law is in the UK when it 
comes to starting up a business post-failure? 
• Did you have any debtor protection? 
• Did you have any involvement with insolvency practitioners, and if so how did they 
work with you? 
• Did you have any fall outs with any creditors or investors, if so how did you 
overcome these? 
25) Did any other external factors affect you and if so in what way? Please state how they 
helped you and if not how they impeded you? 




27) What were people’s views of you during the bankruptcy and what factors influenced 
people’s views? 
• Did you face any stigma and if so what kind of stigma did you feel? 
• What was the effect of the stigma to you and to others view of you?  
• Did any stigma from specific sources impact you more than others? 
• Did you experience grief and what was the behavioural implications of this? 
• How have you reduced the impact of stigma and cope with it? 
• What was the best coping mechanism to overcome stigma? 
• Did you have any impression management strategies? 
• Did you ever, detach, downplay or fully embrace the stigma? 
• Has the stigma ever been a motivator for you and if so how and why? 
• Are there any other positives from this experience that you may not have 
mentioned already? 
28) Did you ever feel that you felt that you lost your identity through the bankruptcy process? 
• How did you cope with this? 
29) How did you manage any debtors and customers at the time you faced any financial 
distress? 
30) How have you previously and perhaps currently managed creditors and investors involved in 
your business or businesses? 
• If you required any investment did your former business failure impact this and if so, 
in what ways? 
31) Were there any other external factors that impacted you and if so, what was these? 
• Did they ever impede you at all and if so in what ways, please explain in detail? 
• Were there any other factors in society that helped you get back on track? 
32) How stressful would you say the process of getting over the entrepreneurial failure 
compares with other events of your life? 
• Did you use similar coping mechanisms? 
Entrepreneurial Learning: 
33) How did you identify the opportunity for your new venture post the failure of your last one? 
• What factors motivated you? 
• How did they motivate you? 
• Is your new venture more innovative than the last? 
• Did anything deter you and if so, what did? Please explain this in detail? 
• Is your opportunity identification linked to how you see risk?  
34) When did you identify the opportunity for the new venture? 
35) What made you make this decision? 
36) Would you say how you attribute blame impacts how you learned from your previous 
business failure and if so, how so? 
37) How would you say your learnt from your previous business, if you have learnt at all? 
• Specifically, what would you have said you would have learnt during the following 
time frames; from being declared as bankrupt? 
• Making sense of the bankruptcy and managing the failure? 
• The aftermath of the failure to when you started a new business and now currently 
in your new business? 
• Did you ever have epiphany like moments of learning and if so please do explain 




• Has your learning influenced the performance of the new company or companies? 
• What factors have caused you to learn from your former business failure in the way 
you have done? 
• Did any factors hamper your learning from your previous business? 
• Did grief from your failed business impact launching your subsequent business and if 
so, how so? 
• How is your current business performing now? 
• Is your new business or businesses in the same industry or a different one to the 
previous failed company and what does the new company do? 
38) How did you use the knowledge (business capital) of your former business that went 
bankrupt to start again? 
• Has there been any positives from your former business ending and if so, please 
explain? 
• What lessons learnt have you learnt from this process? 
39) How would you say your experience and contacts (social capital) in general from your former 
business impacted you? 
• How important would you say your experience is from your former business? 
• Has your failure experience at all impacted your new business negatively? 
40) How would you say your psychological capital (use of cognitive attributes, emotions and 
strategies) helped you? 
41) Which capital, social, business and cognitive helped you the most? 
42) Are there any learning strategies that have helped you? 
• If there have been any learning strategies that have helped you more than others, 
what is the reasoning behind this? 
• Have you benefited in any other ways from your pervious venture failing? 
• Were these benefits temporary at all or long-lasting? 
• Would you say that you have become stronger from the process and if so in what 
ways, such as psychological and emotionally? 
• If you did become stronger at what point was this in the process, and what factors 
influenced this? 
• What is it about the bankruptcy experience that you gained the most from? 
• What else have learnt from the experience, if there is anything else? 
Entrepreneurial Mindset and Emotions: 
43) Can you describe your personality in relation to your role as an entrepreneur? 
44) What role have your emotions played during the process of restarting? 
45) With respect to your locus of control (how you perceive control of a situation) would you say 
your internal motives drive your actions or external forces control your behaviour when 
restarting a business post-failure or both? 
• What is the reasoning for your choice? 
• Has this changed from when you owned your last venture to now and if so in what 
ways exactly? 
• What factors have influenced this? 
46) How would you attribute the blame of the failure? 
• What is the reasoning for your choice? 





• What factors have influenced this? 
47) How optimistic were you that you could start a new business? 
• How has your optimism helped you to start up a new business? 
• Do you think having a positive mental attitude has influenced your motivation? 
48) How much hope did you have that you could start-up again? 
49) How much belief did you have in yourself that you could start another venture? 
• How did your confidence change from the process of bankruptcy to starting up 
again, please give examples? 
• Has it grown again, and would you say you are more confident now? 
• Would you say that bouncing back could lead to over-confidence and if so, how so 
and what would be the effects of this? 
• Ultimately, how confident would you say you are now? 
• Is your confidence linked to your risk preference?  
• Has your confidence in others changed as well, if so in what ways? 
50) What was your key motivators to create a new business? 
51) How passionate are you that you would bounce back from bankruptcy? 
• How did your passion help you? 
• Has it ever not helped you and if so, in what ways? 
• Did it ever pro-long the failure of your former business and if so, did you feel that it 
benefitted you in any ways such as balancing psychological and financial costs of the 
previous venture? 
• Are you more passionate now with your new business or businesses? 
52) How much courage would you say was involved from the point of being declared as 
bankrupt to restarting a venture? 
• Has this at all changed during this process and if so, how so and in what ways? 
• What has been the most courageous moment for you in this process? 
53) Do you feel that you have built resilience to continue from you’re the failure of your last 
venture to go on to start again and if so, please explain how? 
• What influenced this? 
• Have you ultimately built more resilience through going failure? 
• Out of the following, what type or types of resilience do you think you have built 
more of; emotional, cognitive, social and/or financial resilience? 
• How important is resilience and having the perseverance to continue to you? 
• Is this related to your personality and if so in what ways? 
• Are there any other traits in your personality that impacts this? 
• If your personality has changed during the process of going through bankruptcy to 
restarting a business, in what ways has it and would you describe it as a positive 
change? 
54) If you could describe how you view yourself an entrepreneur visually how would you 
describe this? 
Other Variables: 
55) Do you have any other comments from your bankruptcy experience in relation to how you 
bounced back to start a new business again? 
56) Have you advised any others on how you bounced back from failure? 
57) What advice would you give to other entrepreneur? 
 
